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Summary 
Evaluating Lobbying in the United Kingdom: Moving from a 
Corruption Framework to ‘Institutional Diversion’ 
Barry Solaiman 
The lobbying of Parliament and the Government in the United Kingdom by 
wealthy or influential groups and individuals raises concerns about corruption and 
political equality. Professional lobbying is available mainly to those with 
significant resources and is often the most effective means of influencing 
decision-makers. Unchecked, it corrodes public trust in core public institutions. 
This thesis argues that the problems attending the lobbying of Parliament and 
Government in the UK need to be identified and understood more clearly so that 
targeted regulatory solutions can be determined. Currently, lawmakers, 
organisations and academics have struggled to propose clear pathways for 
identifying the main issues and understanding them. This is due to a failure to 
agree on the nature and scope of the central problems associated with lobbying, 
the relationship between them, and how they are relevant to the model of 
democratic government in the UK. 
To overcome this, an analytical framework called ‘institutional diversion’ is 
developed, tested and evaluated. The framework is developed from institutional 
corruption literature in the United States and is divided into three parts. Part 1 
provides elements which help to identify specific lobbying concerns and provide 
a rich account of the underlying issues. Part 2 articulates a test to determine 
whether the identified problem in Part 1 causes a diversion from the purpose of 
the relevant public institution. It is argued that the critical purpose of decision-
makers in Parliament and the Government is to ‘act in the public interest’ and 
that a diversion from that purpose can be tested using the two criteria of ‘integrity’ 
and ‘objectivity’.  
Further, it is not sufficient for a framework to simply identify and help to 
understand the concerns with lobbying. The logical next step is to identify 
solutions, and that process must also be rationally guided. Therefore, guidelines 
are developed from an analysis of an interview with the Registrar of Consultant 
Lobbyists in the UK conducted specifically for this thesis. The guidelines are 
intended to help future reform analyses by highlighting the practical and political 
restrictions within which solutions must be developed otherwise they will be 
unlikely to succeed. 
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Preface 
Following the global financial crisis in 2008, I was determined to understand more 
about the use of complex ‘credit derivatives’ that fuelled the financial bubble. It 
was during my undergraduate dissertation on that topic that I learnt about 
lobbying. There was a determined effort behind the scenes in the United States 
to deregulate Wall Street; an objective that led to the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 
being repealed and the subsequent rise of credit derivates. In 2007, Barack Obama 
ran for President. He captured my mood well in the following passage from a 
speech: 
But too many times, after the election is over, and the confetti is swept 
away, all those promises fade from memory, and the lobbyists and the 
special interests move in, and people turn away, disappointed as before, 
left to struggle on their own […] The cynics, and the lobbyists, and the 
special interests who’ve turned our government into a game only they can 
afford to play. They write the checks and you get stuck with the bills, they 
get the access while you get to write a letter, they think they own this 
government.1 
I naively believed that Obama would change this reality (he subsequently did not). 
I was disappointed but found that I was not alone. It may be surprising to some 
that the largest online news show in the world is not a mainstream media outlet 
but ‘The Young Turks’ (TYT) who have spoken loudly about political corruption 
since 2006. Such shows in the ‘new media’ capture the disillusionment of young 
people with politics nowadays. Their host, Cenk Uygur, passionately stated that: 
Our government does not represent us; they represent only the rich and 
the corporations who pay their bills. Come on guys, there is only one issue 
in America. You have to clean up campaigns. If they keep getting paid by 
the rich and that’s how they keep getting re-elected and in the Senate, 
94% of the time the guy with more money wins re-election, well then we 
don’t have a representative democracy anymore. They represent the 
people who pay them.2 
Naturally, I turned my attention to lobbying in the UK and was surprised to find 
comparatively little written about it. London has the third biggest lobbying 
industry in the world after Washington and Brussels. The influence of lobbyists 
in the UK is embedded in the political system and there are genuine concerns 
about political corruption. Those concerns are not on the same scale as the US 
                                                          
1 ‘Barack Obama’s Campaign Speech’ (The Guardian, 10 Feb 2007) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/feb/10/barackobama> accessed 20 June 2017. 
2 Cenk Uyger, ‘Millionaire Surtax – Democrats Cave’ (The Young Turks, 15 December 2011) 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iBggK0TXnH8&feature=mfu_in_order&list=UL> 
accessed 20 June 2017. 
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but lobbying is pervasive in the UK and deserves more attention because it affects 
everyone in society. We should all have the right to lobby—to influence decision-
makers. However, some should not be afforded more opportunities than others 
to lobby because of corruption or political inequalities. Unfortunately, these 
issues are not well understood. 
My concerns grew in the years following my dissertation as I paid more 
attention to the issue. I was offered a fantastic opportunity to undertake a PhD 
at the University of Cambridge. I wholeheartedly recommend that any person 
only undertake a PhD if they truly care about an issue. Their passion for that issue 
will sustain them during the long periods of doubt, confusion and the sense of 
inadequacy that often arises when researching. My love and care for my subject 
has trumped all the obstacles that have arisen. Ultimately, I have felt a sense of 
gratitude and responsibility. Gratitude, at being able to do something that I love 
for more than three years at Cambridge of all places. Responsibility, for producing 
good research on an exceptionally important issue that has received little attention 
academically. 
Additionally, the timing of this thesis has been extraordinarily fortunate. 
Within two weeks of starting my PhD in 2014, the UK’s first lobbying legislation 
was enacted. I had significant materials at my disposal from parliamentary 
committees and have had the opportunity to assess the success of that legislation 
in the following years. The law has been rightly heavily criticised for bringing little 
transparency to lobbying. I have interviewed the Registrar of Consultant 
Lobbyists in 2016 whose post was created by the legislation, and have assisted 
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe in the House of Lords between 2016 to 2017 with 
the Lobbying Transparency Bill that he sponsored to replace the 2014 legislation. 
I learnt much from the process of advising on the wording of the Bill and drafting 
amendments to it. During the same period, there have been two general elections, 
two Labour Party leadership elections and a referendum. All these experiences 
and events have enriched my research in a multitude of unexpected ways.  
However, the focus of this thesis is more fundamental than an emphasis 
on those experiences or events. Its purpose is to develop a framework from which 
the remarkably varied issues underlying lobbying can be identified in a structured 
and coherent way, to test when those issues cause office-holders to be diverted 
from their duty of acting in the public interest, and to help guide solutions moving 
forward. The PhD process has taught me that taking a step back, giving order and 
coherence to an issue is sometimes more important than jumping straight in, in 
an attempt to ‘fix’ an issue in isolation. This is especially the case with lobbying 
that is so fundamentally complex. My aim is to offer a rational and structured 
framework which can be used in academia and beyond to help unravel this 
complexity. 
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Key Definitions 
 
Lobbying The act of individuals or groups attempting to 
influence decisions taken at a political level. 
 
Institutional 
Corruption 
Systemic and strategic influence which is legal, or 
even currently ethical, that undermines the 
institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its 
purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its 
purpose, including, to the extent relevant to its 
purpose, weakening either the public’s trust in 
that institution or the institution’s inherent 
trustworthiness. 
 
Institutional 
Diversion 
Decision-makers working within the institutions 
of Parliament or the Government in the UK are 
subject to lobbying—or there is some concern 
about lobbying—which is illegal, legal, ethical or 
unethical, which diverts the decision-makers 
from their purpose of acting in the public interest 
or weakens their ability to act in the public 
interest, including weakening either the public’s 
trust in Parliament or the Government or their 
inherent trustworthiness because of that 
lobbying. 
 
Integrity Holders of public office should not place 
themselves under any financial or other 
obligation to lobbyists that might influence them 
in the performance of their official duties. 
 
Objectivity Office-holders should assess ideas on their merits 
or inherent worthiness in the sense that they 
should not give greater weight to representations 
arising from lobbying that is underpinned by 
corruption or political inequality. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
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1 
Introduction 
____________________________________________________ 
Lobbying is the act of individuals or groups attempting to influence decisions 
taken at a political level.1 Whether it is direct lobbying where a person airs their 
grievances to their local Member of Parliament (MP),2 or indirect lobbying 
whereby thousands protest in the streets, or professionalised lobbies hosting and 
sponsoring events,3 the aims are similar; to influence the political system and bring 
about change. Lobbying is essential in any democracy. Citizens should be able to 
participate in politics to express their views. Politicians should not make decisions 
in a vacuum. Instead, they should engage with individuals and groups to 
determine the development of policy and law. However, lobbying by wealthy or 
powerful groups and individuals raises concerns about corruption and political 
equality. Such professional lobbying is available mainly to those with significant 
resources and is often the most effective means of influencing decision-makers.4 
Unchecked, it corrodes public trust in core public institutions.5  
Concerns have long been articulated in the United States (US) in the fields 
of law, political science, economics and sociology. In the US, legislation to 
regulate lobbying has existed for over a century.6 Underpinning the drive for 
                                                          
1 See, Raj Chari, John Hogan and Gary Murphy, Regulating Lobbying: a global comparison 
(Manchester University Press 2010) 4.  
2 Other forms of ‘direct lobbying’ involve sending letters or making phone calls. See, Alf Dubs, 
Lobbying: an insider's guide to the parliamentary process (Pluto 1989) 23–27. 
3 For examples of ‘indirect’ or ‘grassroots’ lobbying, see, Daniel E Bergan, ‘Does Grassroots 
Lobbying Work? A Field Experiment Measuring the Effects of an e-Mail Lobbying Campaign 
on Legislative Behavior’ (2009) 37(2) American Politics Research 327, 328. 
4 Data has consistently shown that groups such as ‘business’ in the UK ‘gain far higher levels of 
access than others’ to the Government. See Katharine Dommett, Andrew Hindmoor and 
Matthew Wood, ‘Who Meets Whom: Access and Lobbying During the Coalition Years’ (2017) 
19(2) The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 389, 404. 
5 The undermining of trust is explored in Chapter 2. 
6 At the Federal level, the oldest statute was the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act 1946; the 
laws at the state level in the US are the oldest in the world. See, Chari, Hogan and Murphy (n 1) 
20; An example of early regulation was the Constitution of Alabama 1901 which ‘forbad 
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2 
regulation has been the simple argument that wealthy people should not have 
more influence over the political process than people on lower incomes.7 The 
greatest criticisms are often directed at corporations and organisations who use 
their wealth to influence the political system in their favour.8 Such concerns are 
explored from a variety of angles in different fields which reflects the multifaceted 
nature of the phenomenon. In the United Kingdom (UK), there has been 
comparatively little research, but there is a growing body of literature thanks to 
excellent work conducted by a small group of academics. The most developed 
literature arises in two areas. First, in research on the funding of political parties 
(campaign finance) by Keith Ewing and others who have explored that topic since 
the 1980s.9 Campaign finance literature crosses over significantly with lobbying 
literature because donations are often given to influence politicians. Indeed, the 
overlap between the fields if often considered explicitly.10  
The second area is on pressure groups in Britain.11 Lobbyists constitute 
genuine pressure groups,12 and the literature explores the legitimate role of groups 
in the political system from three standpoints. First, groups are essential to 
democracy because they encourage participation and balance concentrations of 
power.13 This account emphasises how there is ‘a body of individuals bound 
together and guided forward by a unified and authoritative will’.14 The second 
                                                          
legislators from accepting free railroad passes’, see, Clive S Thomas, ‘Interest Group Regulation 
Across the United States: Rationale, Development and Consequences’ (1998) 51(4) 
Parliamentary Affairs 500, 505. 
7 Cass R Sunstein, ‘Political Equality and Unintended Consequences’ (1994) 94 Colum L Rev 
1390, 1392; see also, Julian Bernauer, Nathalie Giger and Jan Rosset, ‘Mind the Gap: Do 
Proportional Electoral Systems Foster a More Equal Representation of Women and Men, Poor 
and Rich?’ (2015) 36(1) International Political Science Review 78, 78. 
8 Dorie Apollonio, Bruce E Cain and Lee Drutman, ‘Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond the 
Corruption Paradigm’ (2008) 36 Hastings Const LQ 13, 33. 
9 Keith D Ewing, The Funding of Political Parties in Britain (CUP 1987); Keith D Ewing, The Cost of 
Democracy: Party Funding in Modern British Politics (Hart Publishing 2007); Keith D Ewing, Jacob 
Rowbottom and Joo-Cheong Tham (eds), The Funding of Political Parties: Where Now? (Routledge 
2012). 
10 See generally, Richard Briffault, ‘Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together’ 
(2008) 19 Stan L & Pol'y Rev 105; Heather Gerken, ‘Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New 
Campaign Finance’ (2011) 27 Ga St U L Rev 1155; Gajan Retnasaba, ‘Do Campaign 
Contributions and Lobbying Corrupt? Evidence From Public Finance’ (2006) 2(1) JL Econ & 
Pol'y 145. 
11 A detailed comparison of pressure group theory is undertaken by Grant, see, Wyn Grant, 
Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain (2nd edn, Harvester Wheatsheaf 1995) Ch 2. 
12 Maurice Duverger, Party Politics and Pressure Groups: A Comparative Introduction (Robert Wagoner 
tr, Nelson 1972) 110. 
13 Grant (n 11) 27–28. 
14 Samuel H Beer, Modern British Politics (2nd edn, Faber and Faber Limited 1969) 40. 
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perspective describes policy networks and policy communities which are 
organisations connected to one-another by resource dependencies. Policy 
networks describe a form of governance consisting of patterns of rule arising 
from interactions between multiple organisations.15 The organisations have highly 
restricted memberships and provide services for decision-makers.16 Their 
influence can help to contribute to better quality decision-making.17 The third 
account describes corporatism which is the bargaining between employers, trade 
unions and the state on economic policy. By securing the agreement of their 
members, unions and employers can help to influence government policy.18  
Aside from campaign finance and pressure group literature, there is also 
new literature developing that offers broader conceptions for analysing lobbying 
concerns. The most notable effort is that of Rowbottom who provides an 
overarching approach in his book that is underpinned by developing accounts of 
political corruption.19 Apart from these studies, there are also sporadic studies 
which analyse specific lobbying issues.20 The greater focus given by academics to 
lobbying is coinciding with the significant political attention that it is also 
attracting.  
In 2014, lobbying became directly regulated by legislation for the first time 
following the enactment of the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party 
Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 (TLA). This led to the 
creation of a Statutory Register of Consultant Lobbyists which was unsatisfactory 
to many. Consequently, a new Lobbying (Transparency) Bill was sponsored and 
passed the House of Lords in 2016.21 Additionally, parliamentary committees have 
written several reports on lobbying since the mid-2000s, and the main political 
                                                          
15 David Judge, Democratic Incongruities: Representative Democracy in Britain (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 
111. 
16 Grant (n 11) 35. 
17 ibid 23. 
18 ibid 38. 
19 Jacob Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics (CUP 2010); 
different accounts of political corruption are explored in Chapter 2. 
20 For example, for the influence of lobbyists on migration policy, see W Somerville and SW 
Goodman, ‘The Role of Networks in the Development of UK Migration Policy’ (2010) 58(5) 
Political Studies 951; for the influence of the alcohol lobby on health policy, see B Hawkins, C 
Holden and J McCambridge, ‘Alcohol Industry Influence on UK Alcohol Policy: A New 
Research Agenda for Public Health’ (2012) 22(3) Critical Public Health 297. 
21 Although, it did not become law having not been given time in the House of Commons by 
the Government. 
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parties have included lobbying reform in their manifestos in 2010, 2015 and 2017. 
Further, the regulation of standards in the UK has developed significantly since 
the early 1990s mainly in response to lobbying scandals. Indeed, office-holders 
have been filmed by undercover reporters offering to give speeches in Parliament 
or to undertake work on behalf of private entities in return for money; sometimes 
for £5,000 per day. Some have offered to amend bills for £120,000 and claim to 
be like a ‘cab for hire’.22  
Most of the concerns, however, are more insidious and less easily 
detectable. For example, political parties preclude access to ministers on the 
grounds of wealth. At a time when the average annual salary in the UK is roughly 
£27,000, the Conservative Party openly advertise access to the Prime Minister for 
a donation of £50,000 per year. In private, they reveal to undercover reporters 
that ‘premier league’ access costs £250,000.23 Secret fundraisers occur annually 
where tables are sponsored for significant sums of money by private corporations. 
Foreign governments, media moguls and professional lobbyists pay for seats at 
such events. Further, the ability of citizens to influence government decisions is 
severely undermined by sham consultations. For example, the public were 
encouraged to express their views to consultations on nuclear energy policy under 
the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown but policy decisions had 
already been made.24 
The reach of lobbyists pervades to the very heart of the political system 
itself. Major accountancy firms second staff for ‘free’ but openly admit that they 
do so in the interests of their private paying clients. They gain insider knowledge 
on policy and may even influence the development of it. A dependency on their 
assistance develops. Cross-party groups called all party parliamentary groups 
(APPGs) sitting in Parliament have been accused of being a front for commercial 
organisations. They are assisted by lobbyists and members have been flown to 
Beijing and beyond by foreign Chinese state-funded firms.25  
                                                          
22 This example is detailed in Chapter 6. 
23 ibid. 
24 ibid.  
25 ibid.  
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The decision-making environment is also cleverly controlled. Lobbyists 
have been accused of mobilising like an army to convey their messages through 
seemingly independent sources. For example, the tobacco industry has been 
accused of using local campaign groups, former police officers and council 
officers to lobby for them. They apparently flood public consultations and create 
fake consumer websites. They supposedly create fraudulent petitions containing 
signatures of people approached to sign them when drunk, falsify what the 
petition is about, or simply scribble fake names and signatures page after page. 
They threaten legal action and use fear to encourage office-holders to delay or 
scrap proposals.26 There are also concerns about the influence of secretive 
companies on elections and referendums,27 and the rise of ‘fake news’ spread by 
lobbyists seeking to influence the environment that ultimately influences decision-
makers.28 The average person simply lacks the resources to generate such 
opportunities for influence and control and, therefore, cannot compete with 
wealthier lobbyists.  
Some think-tanks have closed memberships and do not reveal their source 
of funding yet they are intertwined with the main political parties. Not only do 
they significantly influence the short-term development and implementation of 
policy, but they also shape the environment in which government decisions are 
made. Many members of think-tanks have been appointed to government 
positions. Peers and ministers also sit on the boards of lobbying organisations. 
Decisions are made without consulting with other interested groups. There are 
even questions about the relationship between regulators and lobbyists. 
The implications of these and many other issues (which are detailed in 
Chapter 6) are poorly understood which is particularly concerning at this time. 
The UK’s decision to leave the European Union following the 2016 referendum 
raises significant opportunities for lobbyists seeking to take advantage of the 
                                                          
26 ibid.  
27 Carole Cadwalladr, ‘The Great British Brexit Robbery: How Our Democracy Was Hijacked’ 
(The Guardian, 7 May 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/07/the-
great-british-brexit-robbery-hijacked-democracy> accessed 10 May 2017. 
28 ‘Investigate Facebook and Google Over 'Murky' Fake News, Publishers Demand’ (The 
Telegraph, 9 March 2017) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/09/investigate-
facebook-google-murky-fake-news-publishers-demand/> accessed 10 May 2017. 
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‘Brexit bonanza’.29 Indeed, the legal and regulatory landscape will change 
substantially which has ‘sparked one of the most intensive lobbying efforts in 
recent memory’.30 There are genuine concerns that the policy landscape will be 
increasingly shaped by powerful and vested interests; omitting most citizens from 
the political process.31  
Whilst the literature on lobbying is developing, these concerns about 
lobbying, and potential solutions to those problems, remain underexplored which 
poses problems for lawmakers.32 One of the greatest obstacles for legislators 
seeking to regulate lobbying is identifying the specific problem or worry that 
regulations should rectify beyond donation and expenditure limits. Politicians are 
presented with a myriad of concerns which are sometimes completely distinct or 
overlap in some parts but not others. For the legislator, determining the main 
problem amongst this ‘blur’ is challenging. Judges also struggle to understand 
concerns about lobbying and how it works in practice. The same disconnect arises 
in academic literature which does not offer a clear framework for evaluating 
lobbying matters in the UK context. Terms such as ‘corruption’, ‘equality’ and 
‘impropriety’ are used, but a ‘great deal of uncertainty’ regarding what they mean 
remains.33 It is this problem that this thesis seeks to explore and offer a path 
towards solving. 
1. Aims of Research and Hypotheses 
This thesis argues that the problems with the lobbying of Parliament and 
Government in the UK should be identified and understood more clearly so that 
targeted regulatory solutions can be determined. Currently, lawmakers, 
organisations and academics have struggled to propose clear pathways to 
achieving that objective due to a failure to agree on certain fundamental issues: 
the nature and scope of the central problems associated with lobbying, the 
                                                          
29 ‘Pitch Imperfect’ (The Times, 24 August 2016) <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/pitch-
imperfect-lj7r9tcts> accessed 10 May 2017. 
30 Andrew MacAskill and William James, ‘Bankers Dominate Lobbying of Britain's Brexit 
Ministry’ (Reuters, 18 April 2017) <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-banks-lobbying-
idUKKBN17K1F2> accessed 10 May 2017. 
31 Oliver Wright, ‘Hague ‘Lobbying by Back Door’ in Brexit Deals with Government’ (The Times, 
24 August 2016) <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/hague-lobbying-by-back-door-in-
brexit-deals-with-government-rl58m0nqn> accessed 10 May 2017. 
32 This is examined in Chapter 2; see also Ewing, Rowbottom and Tham (n 9) 7. 
33 Ewing, The Cost of Democracy (n 9) 88. 
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relationship between them, and how they are relevant to the model of democratic 
government in the UK. As a result, discussions about reform and proposed 
solutions are poorly informed, not fully considered and sometimes misguided.  
To overcome this, an analytical framework called ‘institutional diversion’ 
will be developed, tested and evaluated. ‘Institutional diversion’ is developed by 
building on the theory of ‘institutional corruption’ in the US by Dennis 
Thompson and its adapted form ‘dependence corruption’ by Lawrence Lessig. 
Those theories of political corruption are situated in the fields of campaign 
finance and legislative ethics in the US. They provide a useful starting point 
because lobbying is a central theme in those works. However, those theories are 
too narrow in scope to provide a sufficient basis for identifying all lobbying 
problems in the UK. The focus on ‘institutional corruption’ ignores two other 
significant concerns. Namely, ‘individual corruption’ (which the authors are keen 
to stress is distinct from institutional corruption) and ‘political equality’ (which 
the authors have denied the prominence of within institutional corruption 
theory). Omitting an analysis of these matters would limit the depth of the enquiry 
because lobbying is complex and raises concerns about individual corruption, 
institutional corruption and political equality.34 At the same time, those issues 
would be better understood if structured within an overarching framework—a 
framework that can be developed from institutional corruption. 
Therefore, ‘institutional diversion’ embraces individual corruption and 
political equality as being fundamental issues. The omission of ‘corruption’ in the 
title and the inclusion of the term ‘diversion’ indicates that difference. The result 
is that institutional diversion should help to identify individual corruption, 
institutional corruption and political equality concerns without promoting one 
concern as being more important than the other. Within this framework, a more 
balanced analysis of the key issues can be undertaken. 
In the following chapters, the institutional diversion framework is 
developed and evaluated to determine whether it helps to identify the concerns 
with lobbying and to test whether decision-makers have been diverted from their 
                                                          
34 This is recognised by Rowbottom who analyses both individual corruption and political 
equality concerns. See generally, Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted (n 19). 
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duty of acting in the public interest. Once developed, the framework is applied to 
specific examples of lobbying in the UK across a breadth of issues. However, it 
is not sufficient for a framework to simply identify and help to understand the 
concerns with lobbying. The logical next step is to identify solutions, and that 
process must also be guided. Therefore, guidelines are developed from an analysis 
of an interview with the Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists in the UK conducted 
specifically for this thesis.35 The guidelines should help to guide the development 
of solutions that account for the practical and political realities operating in the 
UK political system. Taking account of those factors should improve the 
likelihood of proposed solutions succeeding (or at least not being dismissed 
outright by politicians). Thus, it is intended that ‘institutional diversion’ not only 
acts as a starting point for identifying the concerns and testing why they are 
problematic but also as a guide to the development of solutions. 
Four hypotheses are made. First, ‘institutional diversion’ will help to 
identify the concerns with lobbying with greater precision than other literature 
through a clear structure and will offer a rich account of the underlying matters. 
Second, the framework will offer straightforward tests to determine when a 
diversion has occurred. Third, the framework will act as a starting point for 
normative enquiries into reform by highlighting issues of concern that require 
changing. Fourth, the framework will help to guide the development of solutions 
that are workable within the UK political and administrative context. 
The aim is for the framework to be helpful to anyone seeking to identify 
and understand lobbying concerns and to those who are looking to develop 
solutions to those worries such as academics, policymakers, legislators and judges. 
It is also intended that the framework will act as a starting point for future research 
into lobbying in the UK by offering a clear structure to explore the issues. 
2. Scope of Research 
There are three matters concerning the scope of this research. First, determining 
the types of lobbying covered. Second, identifying which lobbyists are addressed 
                                                          
35 See Appendix. 
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since there are many potential lobbyists. Third, explaining which institutions and 
individuals are covered who are subjected to lobbying. 
First, this thesis takes a broad view of what lobbying is. Essentially, any 
conduct (both direct and indirect) that is undertaken with the aim of influencing 
politicians is lobbying. Academics tend to label various conduct separately from 
lobbying which is odd. For example, Rowbottom notes how corrupt payments 
are one form of unequal wealth impacting on the decision-making process and 
that ‘aside from corrupt payments, more common ways to influence [politicians] 
include lobbying’.36 This is an unsatisfying distinction because activities such as 
corrupt payments are usually undertaken to influence politicians which falls within 
the definition of lobbying. The corrupt payment is the lobbying conduct that one 
is concerned with; they are not separate. Overall, the framework is intended to be 
comprehensive so that most conduct can be identified under the ‘lobbying’ label.  
Second, on who can lobby, most persons and groups who lobby are 
covered by the framework save for a few exceptions. Lobbying by the Monarch 
or the Royal Family is not covered because that involves separate constitutional 
considerations which are beyond the scope of this thesis.37 MPs, peers and 
ministers who lobby one another whilst in office are not considered but those 
who lobby once they have left office, who have second jobs or who take up (or 
are offered) appointments whilst in office are. Politicians lobbying one another 
whilst in office is not covered because regulations would impose unrealistic and 
absurd restrictions on their ability to work. If every MP had to record every 
interaction with a colleague (such as an MP or a minister of the Government), 
this would impose time-consuming and bureaucratic burdens on their work.  
Further, a clear distinction is maintained in this thesis between political 
parties and lobbyists. Political parties are not lobbyists in this thesis. They seek to 
win seats in elections and form government whereas lobbyists do not. They have 
far wider concerns than lobbyists and develop policies on a broad range of 
                                                          
36 Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted (n 19) 78. 
37 The lobbying of the Government by Prince Charles came to light in the case of Evans. See, R 
(on the application of Evans) and another (Respondents) v Attorney General (Appellant) [2015] UKSC 21; 
Evans v Information Commissioner (Correspondence with Prince Charles in 2004 and 2005) [2012] UKUT 
313 (AAC) (Upper Tribunal - Administrative Appeals Chamber); Ministry of Defence v Information 
Commissioner and Rob Evans [2007] UKFTT EA/2006/0027 (IT) (Information Tribunal). 
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issues.38 This matter becomes complicated when the internal structure of a party 
consists of a coalition of various interests. For example, questions have long been 
raised by the specific case of the Labour Party which has affiliated members 
through trade unions. The party is dependent on funding from unions who could 
technically be defined as lobbyists because they influence party policy.39 This issue 
is addressed in Chapter 4, however, at this stage, it is important to state that the 
relationship is unlikely to engage the framework developed in this thesis for two 
reasons. First, the unions form part of the structure of the Labour Party and are 
not, therefore, defined as lobbyists in that context.40 Indeed, the party would not 
have existed without union support.41 Second, exchanges within the party will not 
breach corruption rules since the party and unions are essentially the same entity 
which cannot conduct an exchange with itself, and the relationship does not 
preclude the political equality opportunities of citizens generally—both of which 
are important elements of the framework.42 The same applies for any political 
party with similar structural arrangements. Nevertheless, this thesis does cover 
exchanges between external lobbyists and political parties. For example, a lobbyist 
donating to an MP’s party to influence them.  
Therefore, aside from these identified people and groups, everyone who 
lobbies is considered as a lobbyist in this thesis. This approach is broader than 
most research in this field in the UK which tends to analyse the regulation of 
lobbying from the aspect of the lobbied only (the politicians). Understanding the 
conduct of lobbyists is essential to the analysis. 
Third, for the lobbied, the framework is narrowed to cover MPs, peers and 
ministers in the UK Government. However, the following Government entities 
are not analysed: non-ministerial departments, executive agencies, executive non-
departmental public bodies, advisory non-departmental public bodies, public 
corporations and others that work with and are accountable to the UK 
                                                          
38 Grant (n 11) 8–9. 
39 Beer (n 14) 23. 
40 See, Labour Party, ‘Labour Party Constitution’ (The Labour Party, 2017) 
<https://www.labour.ie/party/constitution/> accessed 20 June 2017, Article 10; the Labour 
Party was founded by the unions. See, Leon D Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies 
(Freferick A Praeger 1967) 148. 
41 Epstein (n 40) 147. 
42 Although, if unions give impermissible donations to the party, the framework will be engaged. 
See, Chapter 4. 
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Government.43 The Civil Service is not covered because the analysis would 
become unwieldy. The devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland are not analysed nor are mayors, local councillors or other public officials 
who are not members of Parliament or the Government.44 Keeping the 
framework focussed on a narrow group of officials is necessary for overcoming 
some of the obstacles for defining political corruption explored in Chapter 2.45 
In summary, for this research, lobbying means direct and indirect lobbying. 
The lobbyists covered include everyone except the Monarch and the Royal 
Family, political parties or politicians lobbying one another whilst in office. Those 
lobbied, are MPs, peers and ministers. The analysis covers these identified groups 
only. However, it is likely that the framework can be developed to cover other 
categories in future research. 
3. Terminology  
Unless otherwise stated, Parliament collectively refers to the House of Commons 
and the House of Lords in the UK. The Government refers to Her Majesty’s 
Government of the UK. The terms public officials, office-holders, decision-
makers, officials and politicians are used interchangeably to refer to MPs, peers, 
ministers or their staff.  
                                                          
43 There are currently 119 ministers in the UK Government. See, UK Government, ‘How 
Government Works’ (UK Government, 2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/how-
government-works> accessed 23 April 2017. 
44 Transparency International UK published a report which compared lobbying regulations in 
England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. It highlighted large disparities between 
regulations. See Elizabeth David-Barrett and Nick Maxwell, Lifting the Lid on Lobbying: The Hidden 
Exercise of Power and Influence in the UK (Transparency International UK, 2015). 
45 It is acknowledged that the opportunity exists to approach parts of the subject-matter of this 
thesis, within the discourse of British administrative law doctrine and theory. That opportunity 
is most evident insofar as the decision-making functions of ministers may be affected by 
lobbying, because the influence of lobbyists may sway ministers into considering irrelevant 
considerations, exercising a statutory power for an improper purpose, in bad faith or in 
circumstances of unreasonableness. It is less evident where lobbying affects peers and MPs in 
their legislative capacities, where the norms of judicial review do not normally apply. Despite 
those opportunities, it should be emphasised that the ‘institutional diversion’ framework is not 
proposed as a new conceptual map of administrative (or public) law, nor is it designed for the 
purpose of judicial operationalization. The central challenges of lobbying are addressed from the 
vantage point of socio-legal policy, rather than through the prism of black-letter law. 
Nevertheless, the framework may complement doctrinal understandings about lobbying in the 
administrative law context (which is considered in Chapter 6). 
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4. Structure 
Including this chapter, this thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapters 2–5 
develop the diversion framework. Chapter 6 revisits the lobbying concerns 
highlighted above, applies the framework to them, and evaluates the effectiveness 
of the framework. Chapter 7 develops guidelines which can be used to shape 
future reform analyses. Chapter 8 assesses whether the hypotheses made at the 
outset are achieved. 
In Chapter 2, there are two aims. First, it is determined why the framework 
is needed. Second, the framework is introduced and outlined. On the former, the 
concerns about lobbying expressed by the main political parties in their 
manifestos are analysed as are those raised by parliamentary and other 
committees. It is argued that the concerns are not articulated coherently and 
diverge in places. Further, the misgivings voiced by ministers, MPs and peers 
during the bill stages of the TLA 2014 are detailed. The analysis demonstrates that 
there were significant differences regarding what the perceived problems with 
lobbying were and what problems the TLA 2014 was meant to address. On the 
latter, following an analysis of the UK literature on political corruption, 
‘institutional corruption’ theory from the US is adapted to develop a framework 
called ‘institutional diversion’. The diversion framework is divided into three 
parts. Part 1 is called ‘Identify’, Part 2 is called ‘Test’ and Part 3 is called ‘Solve’. 
The adaptations are explained, the framework is justified, and the development 
of the framework in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 is outlined.  
In Chapter 3, a comprehensive analysis is undertaken of what the purpose 
of MPs, peers and ministers is and how they may become diverted from that 
purpose for Part 2 of the framework. Part 2 is developed first because it assists 
the reader to have in mind the defined purpose of the relevant office-holder when 
considering the specific concerns that might cause a diversion from their purpose 
analysed in Chapters 4 and 5. It is argued, following an analysis of laws, codes of 
conduct and the literature that it is an express purpose of MPs and peers is to ‘act 
in the public interest’. An analysis of the literature does not reveal a similarly 
expressed purpose for ministers. Thus, it is argued, normatively, that ministers 
should act in the public interest. Two criteria are introduced called ‘integrity’ and 
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‘objectivity’ which can be used to test when decision-makers have been diverted 
from their purpose of acting in the public interest. Integrity pertains to the 
independence of individuals being compromised by personal gain. Objectivity 
pertains to the need for decision-makers to make decisions on their merits. The 
introduction of the criteria lays the foundation for developing questions from the 
literature in subsequent chapters to test when those criteria have been undermined 
thereby causing a diversion. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, both Parts 1 and 2 of the framework are developed. 
For Part 1, the elements of individual corruption, institutional corruption and 
political equality (which may cause a diversion from the purpose established in 
Chapter 3) are detailed. In Chapter 4, for Part 1 of the framework, the elements 
of individual corruption used for identifying a concern with lobbying are 
established through an analysis of laws, rules and resolutions. Next, the elements 
of institutional corruption are established. To achieve this, the theories of Lessig 
and Thompson are evaluated, synthesised and adapted to work within the 
diversion framework. For Part 2, questions are developed to test when the 
criterion of ‘integrity’ has been undermined thereby causing a diversion. 
In Chapter 5, the elements of ‘political equality’ are detailed for Part 1 of 
the framework. It is argued that Lori Ringhand’s framework on political equality 
offers a useful starting point for identifying political equality concerns. Ringhand 
confines her framework to the field of party funding in the UK, and that 
framework is, therefore, expanded to apply to the lobbying context through an 
analysis supplemented by additional literature. It is argued that two elements 
underlie all concerns with political equality and lobbying—the ‘equality of arms’ 
and the ‘equality of the opportunity to influence’. Those elements are detailed and 
developed, as are six derivative sub-elements. Additionally, the crossover between 
institutional/dependence corruption and political equality is explained, and the 
implications of that crossover are explored. For Part 2 of the framework, several 
questions are developed which can be used to test specifically whether a concern 
about lobbying causes ‘objectivity’ to be undermined thereby causing a diversion. 
In Chapter 6, the diversion framework is summarised and applied to 
concerns about lobbying in the UK. The effectiveness of Parts 1 and 2 of the 
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framework are evaluated in three stages. First, there is an analysis of case studies 
categorised into concerns about lobbying explored in earlier chapters on 
individual corruption, institutional corruption and political equality. The 
framework is applied to those case studies and evaluated. Second, there is an 
analysis of a case involving lobbying which highlights how the court’s poor 
understanding of lobbying issues may undermine its ability to reach fully informed 
conclusions. Third, there is an analysis of the influence of lobbying on the 
development of recent legislation. The diversion framework is evaluated for its 
effectiveness in identifying lobbying concerns, testing whether they cause a 
diversion and for highlighting issues that potentially require regulatory reform. 
Chapter 7 develops Part 3 of the framework. It examines how the TLA 
2014 regulates lobbying in the UK, whether the Act deals with the concerns that 
justified its creation and the matters highlighted by the diversion framework. It is 
argued that the TLA 2014 does little to deal with lobbying concerns and that 
regulatory solutions should be developed carefully in the future. In that regard, 
there is an analysis of an interview, conducted specifically for this thesis, with the 
UK’s lobbying Registrar, Alison White. From that interview, ten guidelines are 
synthesised which will help to shape future reform analyses. It is hoped that the 
guidelines will contribute to regulatory analyses that are considered more 
coherently and efficiently; avoiding redundant solutions that will simply not work 
in the UK context because of political restrictions. 
Finally, in Chapter 8, the thesis is concluded with an evaluation of whether 
the institutional diversion framework achieves the hypotheses set out above. 
Namely, whether the framework helps in the identification of lobbying issues, 
offers useful tests to determine when and why those issues are concerning, and 
offers guidelines for developing workable regulatory solutions moving forward. 
Chapter 2 – The Need for the Diversion Framework 
15 
 
2 
Exploring the Need for the ‘Institutional 
Diversion’ Framework 
____________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
The concerns about lobbying are multifaceted and complex. A constituent may 
be influenced by media stories about corruption and lobbying; linking 
wrongdoing to some form of criminality. An MP may be concerned not about 
criminality, but with the infiltration of lobbyists into the decision-making process. 
A charity may feel aggrieved at their lack of influence or opportunities to influence 
compared with wealthy professional lobbyists who have power and access to 
officials. A wealthy individual may see it as their right to spend money lobbying 
whereas a poor citizen may begrudge a system that enables the wealthy to skew 
policy more easily.1 The issues are complex and require careful thought when 
identifying the underlying concerns and exploring solutions to those problems. 
However, in practice, such concerns are not afforded the careful thought 
they demand. There is often a focus on one factor which fails to account for other 
important factors. Political parties do not agree on what the problems are, and 
there is much divergence in political will for solving matters. Parliamentary and 
other committees do a better job of articulating the issues but do not do so in a 
coherent or structured way. Further, their reports are based on witness evidence 
which—although helpful—do not offer holistic insights. Academic literature 
offers a better foundation for analysing the issues but could be developed to draw 
                                                          
1 The purpose of this thesis is not to analyse freedom of expression rights and lobbying which 
are covered elsewhere. See, for example, Jacob Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence 
and Democratic Politics (Cambridge University Press 2010) Ch 2; Stephanie Palmer, ‘Legal 
Challenges to Political Finance and Election Laws’ in Keith D Ewing, Jacob Rowbottom and 
Joo-Cheong Tham (eds), The Funding of Political Parties: Where Now? (Routledge 2012). 
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the different threads together more clearly and with greater focus. In this thesis, 
it is argued that a useful approach is to build on the US literature on institutional 
corruption to develop an analytical framework called ‘institutional diversion’. It is 
hypothesised that this framework will offer a better approach than currently exists 
for identifying the concerns with lobbying, to test why they are problematic and 
to guide solutions to them. There are four aims in this chapter. 
First, the concerns about lobbying expressed by the main political parties 
in their manifestos are considered. It is argued that their worries are not 
articulated coherently and diverge in places. Second, the problems with lobbying 
expressed by three committees are analysed. Their reports better explain the 
issues but also do not articulate them clearly or coherently. Nevertheless, their 
reports influenced consultations during the bill stages of the TLA 2014. The third 
aim is to consider the misgivings expressed by ministers, MPs and peers by 
analysing Government statements, and speeches given, during the bill stages of 
the TLA 2014. The analysis demonstrates significant incongruousness regarding 
what the concerns were and what problems the TLA 2014 was meant to address.  
Fourth, the academic literature on lobbying is considered in two stages. 
First, the work of Rowbottom and others in the UK is examined, and it is 
explained how this thesis can complement their work whilst developing the 
evaluation of lobbying in a more structured direction using a framework. Thus, 
second, it is argued that the theory of ‘institutional corruption’ from the US can 
provide a starting point for developing that framework. The US literature is 
detailed, and it is hypothesised that adapting ‘institutional corruption’ theory to 
develop a framework called ‘institutional diversion’ would offer a better approach 
for analysing and evaluating lobbying matters. This chapter defines and outlines 
the framework; the remaining chapters develop and test it.  
1. The Incongruous Lobbying Concerns Expressed by Political 
Parties 
The concerns regarding lobbying voiced by the main political parties are 
important for two reasons. First, from a practical perspective, any lobbying 
regulation will inevitably affect political parties significantly. Their members form 
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Government and sit in both Houses of Parliament. They and their staff attract 
the attention of lobbyists, and their perspective is, therefore, of obvious 
importance. Second, it will be elected members of the major political parties who 
will inevitably be tasked with formulating legislation on lobbying regulation, 
debating it and voting on it. Their perspective of the issues will significantly affect 
what form regulations take. The starting point is to analyse the matters that the 
major political parties identified in their manifestos for the 2010 and 2015 general 
elections when lobbying was a hot topic. Manifestos are analysed because they 
are a simple tool for gauging the policies of political parties on lobbying, and 
because of the importance that political parties attach to them. Between 1987 to 
2005, 88% of manifesto pledges were kept by political parties who formed 
Government.2  
1.1 The Liberal Democrats 
The Government in power at the time of the TLA 2014 was the Coalition 
Government consisting of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats.3 
The seeds of the policy of both parties on lobbying regulation can be gleaned 
from their respective manifestos. Under the heading of ‘cleaner politics’, the 2010 
Liberal Democrats manifesto stated that they would: 
Curb the improper inﬂuence of lobbyists by introducing a statutory 
register of lobbyists, changing the Ministerial Code so that ministers and 
ofﬁcials are forbidden from meeting MPs on issues where the MP is paid 
to lobby, requiring companies to declare how much they spend on 
lobbying in their annual reports, and introducing a statutory register of 
                                                          
2 Judith Bara, ‘A Question of Trust: Implementing Party Manifestos’ (2005) 58(3) Parliamentary 
Affairs 585, 594; The statistics for the 2010 Coalition Government are more complicated since 
policies were based on a Coalition Agreement which was a compromise of both parties’ 
manifestos. See, UK Government, The Coalition - Our Programme for Government (HM 
Government, 20 May 2010); Additionally, ‘policy pledges’ were made in the Coalition 
Agreement which usurped traditional manifesto pledges to provide stable government. In some 
cases, pledges were made which ‘seemingly emerged from nowhere’. See Thomas Quinn, 
Mandates, Manifestos and Coalitions: UK Party Politics after 2010 (The Constitution Society, 2014) 32–
36; Rudimentary analyses by the media point towards a mixed success rate for the Coalition in 
achieving their pledges. See, Mark Leftly and Mollie Goodfellow, ‘Election 2015: How many of 
the Government's coalition agreement promises have been kept?’ (The Independent, 29 March 
2015) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/election-2015-how-
many-of-the-governments-coalition-agreement-promises-have-been-kept-10141419.html> 
accessed 18 Aug 2016. 
3 The Coalition Government governed from 2010 to 2015. 
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interests for parliamentary candidates based on the current Register of 
Members’ Interests.4 
Thus, the Liberal Democrats identified four issues. First, lobbyists may have 
‘improper influence’ over the political process. Second, there are concerns about 
MPs, who are paid to lobby, from meeting with ministers and officials. Third, 
there is unease with the transparency of company spending on lobbying. Fourth, 
there were misgivings with the register which existed at the time that 
parliamentary candidates registered their interests on. 
1.2 The Conservative Party 
For the Conservative Party, their leader David Cameron gave a speech in 2010 in 
which he stated that lobbying was the ‘next big scandal waiting to happen’.5 His 
party’s manifesto provided more context under the heading of ‘Make politics 
more accountable’: 
We will clean up politics: the expenses, the lobbying and problems with 
party funding.6 
[…] 
It is vital that we act quickly and decisively to restore the reputation of 
politics. Too much unacceptable behaviour has gone unchecked for too 
long, from excessive expenses to sleazy lobbying practices. the people of 
Britain have looked on in horror as revelations have stripped away the 
dignity of Parliament, leaving millions of voters detached from the 
political process, devoid of trust in the political classes, and disillusioned 
with our system of government.7 
[…] 
The public are concerned about the influence of money on politics, 
whether it is from trade unions, individuals, or the lobbying industry.8 
                                                          
4 Liberal Democrats, The Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010 (Liberal Democrats, 2010) 89. 
5 Andrew Porter, ‘David Cameron Warns Lobbying is Next Political Scandal’ (The Telegraph, 
2010) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/election-2010/7189466/David-Cameron-warns-
lobbying-is-next-political-scandal.html> accessed 25 September 2015. 
6 The Conservative Party, Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: The Conservative Manifesto 2010 
(The Conservative Party, 2010) 65. 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid 66. 
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[…] 
We will start by cleaning up the expenses system to ensure MPs live by 
the same standards as the people who give them their jobs, and by curbing 
the way in which former ministers have secured lobbying jobs by 
exploiting their contacts.9 
[…] 
A Conservative government will introduce new measures to ensure that 
the contacts and knowledge ministers gain while being paid by the public 
to serve the public are not unfairly used for private gain. We will: 
• ensure that ex-Ministers are banned from lobbying government 
for two years after leaving office; 
• ensure that ex-Ministers have to seek advice on the business posts 
they take up for ten years after leaving office; […] 
• Introduce new rules to stop central government bodies using 
public money to hire lobbyists to lobby other government 
bodies.10 
Therefore, several issues were identified in the manifesto. First, there is a problem 
with money in politics. The expenses claimed by politicians, party funding and 
lobbying are all part of that problem, and the public is suspicious about the 
influence of money on those processes. Second, there is a behavioural problem 
in politics caused by ‘sleazy lobbying’ which has undermined the reputation of 
the political system and has led to citizen disillusionment in the political process. 
The statement by David Cameron that lobbying ‘is the next big scandal’ suggests 
that there are also corruption fears. Third, there are misgivings about former 
ministers exploiting their contacts to secure lobbying jobs. Ministers may be using 
the information they gained whilst in public office for private gain. Fourth, there 
is a problem with the transparency of lobbying practices. Fifth, the heading of 
‘make politics more accountable’ under which the issues are stated suggests that 
the issues collectively highlight a lack of accountability within politics. 
 
                                                          
9 ibid 65. 
10 ibid 66. 
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1.3 The Labour Party 
The Labour Party also included lobbying in its manifesto.11 Under the heading of 
‘cleaning up politics’, the first page of the manifesto stated that: 
We will create a Statutory Register of Lobbyists to ensure complete 
transparency in their activities. We will ban MPs from working for generic 
lobbying companies and require those who want to take up paid outside 
appointments to seek approval from an independent body to avoid jobs 
that conflict with their responsibilities to the public.12 
1.4 The Coalition Programme for Government 
Following the 2010 election, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats 
formed the Coalition Government. The Coalition created a ‘Programme for 
Government’ which brought together the policies of both parties. On lobbying, 
the Programme stated simply that ‘we will regulate lobbying through introducing 
a statutory register of lobbyists and ensuring greater transparency’.13 The 
Programme only highlighted transparency as a concern with consultant lobbying 
which significantly differed from the more thorough pledges outlined in the 
respective manifestos of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats. 
1.5 Summary 
The main political parties identified several concerns with lobbying in the UK. 
Table 1 below summarises them for comparative purposes. The issues that 
overlap between the parties are highlighted in green. The separate concerns of 
the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative Party are highlighted in orange and 
blue respectively (aligning with the party colours).
                                                          
11 The Labour Party were the main opposition party. 
12 The Labour Party, The Labour Party Manifesto 2010: A Future Fair For All (The Labour Party, 
2010) section 9:2. 
13 UK Government, The Coalition - Our Programme for Government (n 2) 21. 
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Table 1: The problems with lobbying in the UK identified by the main political parties in 2010. 
 The Liberal Democrats The Conservative Party The Labour Party 
1 Transparency of company spending on 
lobbying. 
Transparency of lobbying practices. Transparency of lobbying activities. 
2 Problem with MPs who were paid to lobby 
from meeting with ministers and officials. 
Former ministers exploiting their contacts 
to secure lobbying jobs. The problem is 
that ministers may be using the information 
they gained whilst in public office for private 
gain. 
MPs who want to take up paid outside 
appointments and MPs who work for 
generic lobbying companies. 
3 Problem with parliamentary candidates 
registering their interests on the register 
(that existed at that time). 
  
4 Lobbyists have ‘improper influence’ over 
the political process. 
  
5  There is a behavioural problem in politics 
caused by ‘sleazy lobbying’ which has 
undermined the reputation of the political 
system and has led to citizen disillusionment 
in the political process. 
 
6  There is a problem with accountability.  
7  The public are concerned about the link 
between money and lobbying. 
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Five issues are identified above with only two overlapping between all parties. 
These are a lack of transparency of lobbying practices and MPs securing lobbying 
jobs. Behavioural issues were identified by the Liberal Democrats and the 
Conservatives who cited improper influence and sleaze as being a concern. One 
matter raised by the Liberal Democrats related to MPs registering their interests 
and two matters raised by the Conservative Party related to the overarching public 
mistrust with money in politics and a lack of accountability. Further, an important 
observation can be derived from Table 1; the subtle differences in terminology 
which identify different problems. 
The Conservatives and Labour noted that there was a lack of transparency 
of lobbying activities. The Liberal Democrats, however, specified the lack of 
transparency around company spending as a worry which are different issues. The 
former is a broad concern about a lack of transparency whereas the latter is a 
narrower transparency issue on company lobbying spending. Both manifestos use 
the word ‘transparency’, but the focus is different. On MPs working as lobbyists, 
the parties identified three different factors. For the Conservatives, MPs 
exploiting their public office for private gain is potentially a matter about 
corruption. The Liberal Democrats were suspicious of MPs, who were paid to 
lobby, meeting with officials and ministers to influence them. For Labour, there 
was unease at MPs taking up paid outside appointments and working for lobbying 
companies. At first glance, it may appear that terms such as ‘MPs’ and ‘being paid 
to lobby’ are the same concern, but the parties describe different facets of the 
problem which highlights a lack of precision. 
On the conduct of lobbyists, there are more questions than answers. The 
Liberal Democrats highlighted ‘improper influence’ as a worry. The term is given 
no context and could fall anywhere on a scale between illegal bribery and conduct 
which is permissible in law but deemed improper for other reasons. Similarly, the 
Conservatives use the term ‘sleazy lobbying’: a term which raises the same 
questions about meaning. The use of imprecise terminology without context 
highlights how the problems are not defined with coherence. Finally, it is not 
explained why, in the context of lobbying, the register of members’ interests 
should be placed on a statutory footing. It is also not explained what it is about 
money and lobbying that causes the public to become disillusioned with the 
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political process nor why there is an accountability problem. None of the matters 
are articulated clearly. 
Of course, it is not expected that a party manifesto will provide much detail 
as these will be determined during the development of legislation. However, the 
political parties identify different problems with lobbying which are not 
articulated properly. Even where terms overlap they are used in different contexts. 
For example, there are three distinct issues highlighted with MPs being ‘paid to 
lobby’. All could be relevant or not, but the fact that they are different illustrates 
a lack of focus about what the precise problem is. Further, the terms used are 
undefined which can be seen with ‘improper influence’ and ‘sleazy lobbying’. This 
has consequences for regulation because there must be an agreed problem for 
regulation to solve. The next section explores the misgivings with lobbying as 
identified by three committees in reports from 2008 to 2015.  
2. The Contrast Between Committees on Lobbying Concerns  
The Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL), the Public Administration 
Select Committee (PASC) and the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee 
(PCRC) have published several reports since 2008 which have either examined 
lobbying specifically or considered lobbying issues within other contexts. Their 
reports are helpful because they consist of oral and written evidence given from 
academics and lobbyists who provide good insight. Whilst all committees are 
important (because their reports influence decision-makers to varying degrees), 
the CSPL is of most importance. The UK landscape on ethics regulation began 
to change significantly in the 1990s following the creation of the CSPL.14 The 
CSPL has ‘played a major and unique role in raising the salience of ethical issues 
across the public sector and putting in place new institutions to regulate individual 
sectors’.15 Its prominence makes an analysis of its reports imperative. 
There are two observations which will become apparent from the analysis 
below. First, the committee reports unsurprisingly provide much greater detail 
and context to the concerns with lobbying than the manifestos. However, the 
                                                          
14 David Hine and Gillian Peele, The Regulation of Standards in British Public Life: Doing the Right 
Thing? (Manchester University Press 2016) 52. 
15 ibid 66. 
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problems with lobbying are not always articulated clearly. Issues are often mixed 
which require careful analysis to decipher the precise misgivings. Further, the 
‘mixing’ of different matters reflects a problem with structuring and identifying 
the relationship between different issues. The analysis below was only possible by 
piecing together various parts of the reports to understand the matters more 
clearly. 
Second, whilst there is much crossover between the problems highlighted 
in the reports, there is a lack of consistency about what the concerns with lobbying 
are. This is reflected in the titles of the reports. The CSPL report is titled 
‘Strengthening Transparency Around Lobbying’ which suggests the main 
problem is a lack of transparency with lobbying.16 The PASC report is titled 
‘Lobbying: Access and Influence in Whitehall’, suggesting that the main issue is 
privileged access and influence.17 The PCRC report highlights ‘the perception of 
undue influence’ as the main worry.18 The lack of consistency leads to questions 
about which matters are of greatest concern or whether all the highlighted issues 
are of equal worry. 
2.1 The Committee on Standards in Public Life 
Although the report of the CSPL focusses on ‘Strengthening Transparency 
Around Lobbying’, it highlights several other problems with lobbying:19  
At the heart of the concern is the confluence of money, influence and 
power and vested interests: it is often not known who is influencing 
decisions or what may have been done to achieve the influence. This arises 
from suspicions:  
• that some lobbying may take place in secret—people do not know 
who is influencing a decision and those who take a different view 
                                                          
16 Committee on Standards in Public Life, Strengthening Transparency Around Lobbying (CSPL, 
2013). 
17 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, Lobbying: Access and Influence in 
Whitehall (HC 2008-09, 36-I). 
18 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Introducing a Statutory 
Register of Lobbyists: Second Report of Session 2012-13 (HC 2012-13, 153-I). 
19 These concerns were presented in evidence to the Committee by academics, the lobbying 
industry, charities, campaign bodies and think-tanks. See Committee on Standards in Public Life, 
Strengthening Transparency (n 16) 10. 
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do not have the opportunity to rebut arguments and present 
alternative views; 
• that some individuals or organisations have greater access to 
policy makers, because they or someone they know works with 
them, because they are significant donors to a political party or 
simply because they have more resources; 
• of the way lobbying can be carried out; either because it is being 
accompanied by entertainment or other inducements or because 
there is a lack of clarity about who is financing particular 
activities.20 
Therefore, the concern is that there is a lack of transparency—not knowing who 
is influencing whom and how they are influencing—and the consequences of a 
lack of transparency. The consequences involve important issues which are 
deciphered in turn. 
The first consequence is that poor transparency can lead to public 
suspicions about what is taking place behind closed doors; particularly the 
conduct of lobbyists. The passage above cites ‘entertainment or other 
inducements’ as conduct which may lead to suspicions. Later passages cite 
‘excessive hospitality’ as being another type of conduct.21 Essentially, the problem 
is that lobbyists have unduly influenced decisions-makers, that there has been 
corruption or other impropriety.22 This ‘undue influence’ matter is alluded to in 
the following passage which states that it is important: 
That the public has confidence that decisions are made fairly and on merit; 
without undue influence from vested interests; and in an open and 
transparent manner—the process by which a decision is made matters.23 
The first worry is that a lack of transparency leads to suspicions that undue 
influence or some other form of corruption has taken place. This, in turn, 
undermines objective decision-making. The concern is not that officials have 
                                                          
20 ibid 5. 
21 ibid 22. 
22 ibid.  
23 ibid 6.  
Chapter 2 – The Need for the Diversion Framework 
 
26 
been unduly influenced but that there are suspicions that they have been unduly 
influenced which undermines public trust. Therefore, it is a misgiving about 
public confidence in the political system.  
The second consequence of a lack of transparency noted above is that other 
interested parties (who take a different view to those lobbying) will not have the 
opportunity to rebut arguments and present alternative views.24 If a person is 
unaware of the arguments being put forward (because there is no public record 
of the meeting), they will not have the opportunity to respond to those arguments. 
This consequence is made up of two matters; equality of access and objective 
decision-making. On the former, the report states that: 
The concern is that there is not always a level playing field of fair and 
equitable access to decision making and to the development or 
implementation of public policies.25 
Access is determined by ‘money, influence and power and vested interests’.26 Few 
people possess money, influence and power which leads to worries that policy is 
being influenced by vested interests or by the will of a wealthy minority as 
opposed to the majority. This relates to the latter issue highlighted below: 
Equality of access is important in enabling decision makers to act in 
accordance with the Nolan principle of Objectivity and take decisions 
impartially, fairly and on merit using best evidence and without 
discrimination or bias.27 
[…] 
Lobbying which is secret without good reason inhibits even-handedness, 
results in distorted evidence and arguments.28 
                                                          
24 This point was reiterated in another report by the CSPL. See, Committee on Standards in 
Public Life, Standards Matter: A Review of Best Practice in Promoting Good Behaviour in Public Life (Cm 
8519, January 2013) 53. 
25 Committee on Standards in Public Life, Strengthening Transparency (n 16) 14; Committee on 
Standards in Public Life, Standards Matter (n 25) 52. 
26 Committee on Standards in Public Life, Strengthening Transparency (n 16) 14. 
27 ibid 20. 
28 ibid 22. 
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Therefore, the second consequence of a lack of transparency around lobbying is 
that some will not have the opportunity to respond to lobbying. This may result 
in decisions being made in a manner that is not impartial, fair and based on merits 
because office-holders are being influenced by a few vested and powerful interests 
that have access (and who could distort the policy narrative). The committee 
reason that more transparency around decision-making would mean ‘more 
rounded decisions, taking on board a range of views and revealing the stance and 
motives of [lobbyists]’.29 A third point raised in the report, not related to 
transparency, is on conflicts of interest: 
The revolving door raises the risk of potential conflicts of interest and 
particular cases often generate close media attention or other public 
scrutiny. Hiring people either permanently or temporarily with contacts 
or knowledge gained from their time in government or the public sector 
can be seen as an attempt to buy access and influence. The concern is that 
public office holders’ “behaviour before leaving employment is altered in a way that 
is not in the public interest in anticipation of future employment or, post-public office, 
commercial or other organisations are given unfair advantages over others as a result of 
the knowledge or contacts of people they employ post-office”.30 
[…] 
If such movements across sectors are not managed carefully, they can 
present “opportunities for public officials to use their position for 
personal gain, and may give rise to public anxiety about the probity of 
former, and serving, public officials” and have the potential to damage 
public trust and confidence in public office holders and the decisions they 
take generally.31  
These points may appear to be an extension of the two consequences regarding 
the undermining of public trust and equality of access highlighted above. Indeed, 
                                                          
29 ibid. 
30 ibid 30; The CSPL cited evidence of Sir Christopher Kelly to the Public Administration Select 
Committee. See House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, Business 
Appointment Rules (HC 404 [incorporating HC 1762-i-v, Session 2010-12] 2012-13) Oral 
Evidence, 2. 
31 Committee on Standards in Public Life, Strengthening Transparency (n 16) 30; The CSPL cited the 
summary of a report by the PASC; See Public Administration Select Committee, Business 
Appointment Rules (n 30) 3. 
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the passages note how hiring former decision-makers can be seen as an attempt 
to buy access (which only few can do). It also highlights that the behaviour of 
decision-makers could be altered thereby undermining objective decision-making, 
and damaging public confidence. Despite the obvious crossover, the passage also 
raises an entirely separate point to those matters which is not necessarily related 
to transparency—that decision-makers may use their position for personal gain. 
Personal gain is a worry about individual corruption so, in this regard, conflicts 
of interest are not merely an extension of the consequences alluded to in the 
report but also raise a new matter. 
Overall, the report positively highlights important considerations thanks to 
the CSPL collating a good body of evidence. It describes the nature of the 
problems with lobbying in more depth. However, the problems could be 
articulated and structured more clearly. Issues are often mixed together which 
required careful analysis to decipher the precise issue being enunciated. Further, 
the analysis could only be undertaken by piecing together various parts of the 
report to understand matters more clearly because they are not presented logically 
or coherently. 
2.2 The Public Administration Select Committee 
The PASC report covers similar ground to the CSPL; concluding that:  
There are two underlying issues of concern: that of privileged access […] 
but also, and equally importantly that of excessive influence […] someone 
with access does not necessarily have influence. The two ideas are 
inextricably linked, however, because anyone without access cannot hope 
to wield direct influence.32 
Taken together, the points highlight the same unease as the CSPL; that those with 
money, power and influence may have better access (an equality of access worry). 
However, there are also separate matters which were not made explicit in the 
passage above. First, how privileged access is gained: 
                                                          
32 Public Administration Select Committee, Lobbying: Access and Influence in Whitehall (n 17) 13. 
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Particularly controversial is the practice of hiring people with personal 
contacts at the heart of Government. This can be portrayed as an attempt 
to buy access and influence.33 
A second concern is that ‘excessive’ influence reflects some wrongdoing. In this 
regard, the report indicates that hospitality may be of worry: ‘lunches are the kinds 
of contacts which can be of as much potential concern as formal lobbying 
meetings’.34 Further, whilst the PASC highlights two matters in its report, it—like 
the CSPL—raises further misgivings regarding conflicts of interests: 
We have concerns that individuals may find themselves facing conflicts 
of interest between their career and the public good, if they are asked, for 
example, to assess the balance of regulation in a sector into which several 
of their predecessors have moved.35 
There is trepidation that objective decision-making may be undermined because 
of conflicts of interest compromising an official’s ability to ‘assess’ policy. This 
conflict may also lead to individual corruption with the official using their position 
for a personal gain: 
We are strongly concerned that […] former Ministers in particular appear 
to be able to use with impunity the contacts they built up as public 
servants to further a private interest.36  
As a result, there are three issues arising from conflicts of interest.37 First, hiring 
former ministers looks like buying access which only few people have the 
resources to do—an equality of opportunity issue. Second, when officials are 
hired, this may undermine their objectivity when making decisions. Third, office-
holders may use their position for personal gain. Finally, the PASC raise the issue 
of lower public trust in politics: 
                                                          
33 ibid 13. 
34 ibid 57. 
35 ibid 59. 
36 ibid 58. 
37 The same issues were highlighted in a later report by the PASC. See, Public Administration 
Select Committee, Business Appointment Rules (n 30) 24. 
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The result of doing nothing would be to increase public mistrust of 
Government, and to solidify the impression that Government listens to 
favoured groups—big business and party donors in particular—with far 
more attention than it gives to others.38 
Overall, the PASC raise similar misgivings as the CSPL. The PASC provide some 
description of the concerns but the issues are not clearly explained. Initially, the 
report highlights access and influence as being the main issue but later raises 
‘strong concerns’ surrounding conflicts of interest and the undermining of public 
trust. Further, like the CSPL report, one must piece together the various elements 
from different parts of the report to make sense of the matters. 
2.3 The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee  
The PCRC report was published during the consultation process of the TLA 
2014. The main worry raised in the report is that ‘there is a perception in some 
quarters that some people have undue access to, and influence over, the policy-
making process’.39 Similar to the CSPL’s concern of public ‘suspicions’, the PCRC 
argue that there is a ‘perception’ of a problem of undue access and influence over 
the policy-making process. There may also be ‘inappropriate relationships 
between Ministers and lobbyists’.40  
The PCRC report is the only report which does not provide much detail 
because it is focussed on reforming the TLA 2014 rather than re-assessing the 
problems with lobbying which the CSPL and PASC had already undertaken. 
Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn by the PCRC are vague and only account for 
part of the problem raised by the other committees; the ‘perception’ of a problem. 
At this stage, it is helpful to summarise the main concerns with lobbying 
highlighted by the three committees. Issues that overlap between all the 
committees are highlighted in green, matters that overlap between two 
committees are in yellow and matters covered by one committee are in red. 
                                                          
38 Public Administration Select Committee, Lobbying: Access and Influence in Whitehall (n 17) 42. 
39 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Introducing a Statutory Register of Lobbyists: Second 
Report of Session 2012-13, ‘Introducing a statutory’ (HC 153-1) 8. 
40 ibid 9. 
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Table 2: The problems with lobbying in the UK identified by three committees between 2008 to 2013. 
 CSPL PASC PCRC 
1 Public suspicions that the conduct of lobbyists has 
unduly influenced decision-makers. These 
suspicions can undermine public confidence in 
the political system. 
Lobbyists may have excessive influence over 
decision-makers.  
There is a perception that some people have 
undue access to (and influence over) the policy-
making process. 
2 Those with money, power and influence may have 
greater access to decision-makers. Few people 
possess money, power and influence which means 
that access to decision-makers is unequal. 
Some have privileged access to officials.  There is a perception that some people have 
undue access to (and influence over) the policy-
making process. 
3 Conflicts of interest:  
(a) Decision-makers who take up outside 
appointments may compromise their 
behaviour in a way that is not in the 
public interest in anticipation of that 
appointment.  
(b) Officials may use their position for 
personal gain by taking up external 
appointments. 
Conflicts of interest:  
(a) Officials may face conflicts of interest 
between their career and the public 
good. 
(b) Ministers may be able to use with 
impunity the contacts they built up as 
public servants to further a private 
interest. 
 
4 Since some lobbying is in secret, others will not 
have the opportunity to respond to the 
arguments put forward. 
  
5 Officials may make decisions in a manner that is 
not impartial, fair and based on merits because 
they are being influenced by a few vested and 
powerful interests that have access. 
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2.4 Summary of the Concerns Highlighted by the Committees 
Three observations can be made about the reports. First, they identify the 
misgivings with lobbying in reasonable detail which helps to elucidate the matters 
identified by the political party manifestos. For example, row 2 of Table 1 (earlier 
in the chapter) reveals worries about MPs who are paid to lobby or who take up 
positions for private gain. This is explained more fully in row 3 of Table 2 above 
which reveals that this worry consists of two issues. Second, despite that positive, 
the problems with lobbying are not always articulated clearly. The reports could 
have explained the problems more precisely and structured the issues more 
coherently. Third, the reports place a different emphasis on what the main issues 
are which highlights a lack of consistency. This leads to questions about which 
issues are of greatest concern. The next section considers, in greater depth, the 
matters expressed by ministers, MPs and peers by analysing Government 
documentation and speeches given during the bill stages of the TLA 2014.  
3. The Differing Government Concerns Leading up to the TLA 
2014 
The sections above highlighted several concerns with lobbying raised by the three 
main political parties in 2010 and three parliamentary committees from 2008 to 
2013. The consultation process for the TLA 2014 and the various stages of the 
TLA Bill took place in 2013 which means that the Government had all the issues 
available for consideration. During the consultation and Bill stages of the TLA 
2014, the Government stated what problems the law was meant to address. This 
section analyses two impact assessments and statements by the Government 
during the stages of the TLA Bill in the House of Commons and Lords to identify 
those problems. The analysis demonstrates significant incongruousness regarding 
what matters the lobbying register created by the Act was supposed to address.  
3.1 Impact Assessments 
The first articulation of the problems with lobbying arises from the Government’s 
impact assessments for the TLA 2014. One impact assessment identifies the 
following problem: 
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It is not always transparent whose interests are being represented when 
consultant lobbyists meet with ministers and senior officials. This 
information asymmetry may lead to suboptimal policy making.41  
This raises two issues. First, there is a lack of transparency about whose interests 
are being represented by consultant lobbyists which is a distinct and much 
narrower transparency issue to that noted by the CSPL or the manifestos. The 
CSPL were concerned with a lack of transparency surrounding who is lobbying. 
The impact assessment highlights a worry about whose interests are being 
represented when a consultant lobbyist lobbies (one type of professional lobbyist). 
As such, the lobbyist is identified (a consultant lobbyist) and there is unease about 
a lack of transparency surrounding whom a consultant lobbyist is representing. 
This matter is narrowed further to cover only meetings between consultant 
lobbyists, ministers and senior officials. The transparency gap noted by the CSPL 
and PCRC referred more generally to ‘policy makers’ and the ‘policy making 
process’. The transparency ‘problem’ highlighted by the Government is thus 
distinct and much narrower than that identified in other reports. Nevertheless, it 
is the problem that the Government sought to address. 
Second, the impact assessment states that there is concern that this 
‘information asymmetry’ may lead to suboptimal policy making. The use of the 
term ‘information asymmetry’ reflects a lack of precision in describing the 
problem and is poorly aligned with the literature on lobbying. Taken alone, the 
term simply means that one person has more information than another person, 
placing them at an advantage. The impact assessment is, therefore, highlighting 
that only consultant lobbyists know whose interests they are representing which 
the public do not know (although it is not explained exactly why these leads to 
suboptimal policy making). The use of the term is problematic because there is 
literature which analyses ‘information asymmetry’ in lobbying in a very different 
context to which the term is applied above. In political science and economics, 
information asymmetry describes how decision-makers are forced to rely on 
lobbyists for policy expertise, or how lobbyists benefit from information 
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asymmetries to encourage corporations to lobby.42 The description of 
‘information asymmetry’ in the impact assessment does not align with the 
descriptions in the literature which creates confusion. The second impact 
assessment states that:  
Where lobbying is opaque, this creates a market failure caused by imperfect 
information that can undermine public confidence in the decision making 
process and its results.43 
This statement illustrates both a poor articulation of the problem and a 
broadening for the justification for more reform. On the first point, it is 
challenging to decipher exactly how opaqueness in lobbying creates market 
failures without clear explanation. This concern may relate to Hasen’s theory on 
rent-seeking,44 but this is not clear from the description given. The latter point 
regarding a lack of transparency undermining public confidence in the political 
system is easier to decipher and has been explained more clearly in the CSPL 
report above.45 However, this is a broader concern than a lack of transparency 
about whom consultant lobbyists represent—which is the focus of the TLA 2014. 
3.2 Bill Stages of the TLA 2014 
The statements given by the Government during the bill stages of the TLA 2014 
reveal a greater lack of precision and further inconsistencies. During the second 
reading, Mr Lansley on behalf of the Government stated that: 
There are two key principles reflected in the Bill. The first is that 
transparency is central to accountability and that the public should be able 
to see how third parties seek to influence the political system. The second 
                                                          
42 Lee Drutman, The Business of America is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicized and Politics 
Became More Corporate (OUP 2015) 165 & 228; Jan Potters and Frans Van Winden, ‘Lobbying and 
asymmetric information’ (1992) 74 Public Choice 269, 271; David Martimort and Aggey 
Semenov, ‘Political Biases in Lobbying Under Asymmetric Information’ (2007) 5 Journal of the 
European Economic Association 614, 615. 
43 Cabinet Office, Proposals to Introduce a Statutory Register of Lobbyists (Impact Assessment, 27 
November 2011) 1. 
44 See, Richard L Hasen, ‘Lobbying, Rent-Seeking and the Constitution’ (2012) 64 Stan L Rev 
191. 
45 The ‘public confidence’ issue was also noted in a Government command paper which stated 
that ‘where lobbying is not transparent, it can undermine public confidence in the decision-
making process and its results’. See UK Government, Introducing a Statutory Register of Lobbyists 
(Cm 8233, 2012) 9. 
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is that third parties should act in an open and accountable way. The Bill 
will give the public more confidence about the way third parties interact 
with the political system.46 
There are two issues here. First, there is a lack of transparency around lobbying 
which is similar to the impact assessments. Linked to this, is the issue of third 
party lobbying which hints towards worries about improper influence. The use of 
the term ‘accountability’ highlights another matter which is emphasised in the 
next passage by Mr Lansley: 
I believe that the great majority of those in our Parliament and our 
political system behave well. But, human nature being what it is, the 
minority tempted to do otherwise need to know that they cannot engage 
in sustained, concealed efforts to peddle influence. Their activity will be 
brought into the open and they must expect to be held to account for 
their behaviour. Sunlight is the best disinfectant.47 
This passage is concerned with bringing transparency to hold decision-makers to 
account for their ‘concealed efforts to peddle influence’. It highlights a different 
issue to the Government’s impact assessment which was concerned with a lack 
of transparency surrounding whose interests’ consultant lobbyists represent. It 
also raises a different issue to the ‘two key principles’ apparently underlying the 
Act first stated by Mr Lansley. This brings into question what the key principles 
reflected in the Bill (and subsequently the Act) were because there is a focus on 
different points. Further, it appears that inequalities of power, wealth or access 
around lobbying were not a worry for the Government as they were not 
highlighted in the statements by the Government. However, this strongly 
contradicts the rationale underlying Part 2 of the TLA 2014 which introduced 
spending limits on third parties in elections. Mr Lansley stated that: 
The Bill strengthens the existing limits on the campaign spending of third 
parties. We have spending limits on parties at elections. That ensures a 
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degree of equality of arms, and we should not see it undermined by 
distorting activity of disproportionate expenditure by third parties.48 
The Government was thus concerned about the disproportionate expenditure of 
third parties undermining the equality of arms in elections. However, it was not 
concerned with the disproportionate expenditure of lobbyists undermining 
equality in the policy making process. This illustrates a contradiction in the logic 
of the Government and highlights a lack of articulation about the problems with 
lobbying. Further, it will be seen in Chapter 5 that election expenditure issues 
cross over significantly with lobbying issues, and so it appears that the 
Government were unwittingly describing a lobbying concern in the passage.  
More contradictions are found in statements by the Government at other 
Bill stages. During the second reading of the TLA Bill in the Lords, the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills (Viscount Younger of Leckie) stated that: 
There has been some concern, however, that some lobbying activity is 
opaque and there is a perception that certain powerful organisations and 
individuals could exert a disproportionate influence on government.49 
This observation is different to Mr Lansley’s about a lack of transparency 
regarding whom consultant lobbyists represent. Instead, it is a concern that there 
is a perception that powerful individuals and groups could exert disproportionate 
influence on the Government. During the same reading stage, Lord Wallace of 
Tankerness stated that: 
It is not, nor has it been, the Government’s intention to attempt to 
regulate comprehensively all those who communicate with government, 
and the register will not, therefore, be associated with a statutory code of 
conduct. Instead, the Government are committed to ensuring that the 
statutory register complements the existing self-regulatory regime by 
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which the industry promotes the ethical behaviour that is essential to the 
integrity and reputation of the lobbying industry.50 
This statement suggests that the ‘ethical behaviour’ of lobbyists is an issue and 
that the TLA 2014 was meant to ‘complement’ existing regimes which promote 
ethical behaviour. However, none of the previous statements or reports consider 
the issue of ethics at all.  
3.3 Summary 
The passages above highlight four issues. First, the problem that the Government 
sought to address with lobbying was initially very narrow; that it was not clear 
whom consultant lobbyists were representing. Second, that problem was mixed 
with other concerns surrounding lobbying which were neither articulated well nor 
explained clearly. Third, there were contradictions about what problem the law 
was meant to address. Different statements focussed on various matters that 
deviated from the original problem as stated. Fourth, the issue regarding the 
transparency of consultant lobbyists is distinct from all the misgivings raised in 
the party manifestos in 2010 and the parliamentary reports between 2008 to 2013. 
As such, the analysis demonstrates significant incongruousness regarding what 
the worries are and what problems the TLA 2014 was meant to address. This 
passage could have considered the matters highlighted in the statements given by 
other parties during the bill stages, but the conclusions would have been much 
the same. The next section develops a more coherent framework for analysing 
the concerns with lobbying. 
4. Creating a Framework for a Lobbying Evaluation: 
‘Institutional Diversion’ 
Analysing the problems caused by lobbying requires an analytical framework 
which gives order and structure to the concerns surrounding the complex 
phenomenon of lobbying. It is evident from the analysis above that lobbying takes 
on numerous guises, permeates different institutions, influences different people 
and can have diverging intentions. It is, therefore, not enough to think about the 
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concerns of lobbying as merely being about one issue or another. Further, it does 
not suffice to present the issues without coherence or structure because that 
approach undermines efforts to identify solutions. When purported solutions are 
identified, their purpose, place and effect in the grander scheme is unknown.  
Academic literature provides greater depth to the analysis through various 
definitions of corruption which are helpful. However, those analyses usually do 
not cover the crossover between concerns about individual corruption, 
institutional corruption and political equality explicitly. The main exception is 
Rowbottom who analyses that crossover in good depth. However, despite the 
efforts of Rowbottom and others, a clearer and more structured approach is 
needed than is currently offered. It is argued below that this thesis can 
complement the excellent work of other academics whilst developing the 
evaluation of lobbying in a more structured direction using a framework. Second, 
it is argued that the theory of ‘institutional corruption’ from the US can provide 
a useful starting point and foundation for developing that framework.  
4.1 Advancing the UK Literature on Political Corruption 
In his book, Democracy Distorted, Rowbottom considers the influence of wealth on 
politics in the UK, arguing that the greatest objection to wealth is its corrupting 
effect on politics or that it is contrary to the principle of political equality.51 When 
Rowbottom writes of ‘influence’, he is essentially concerned with lobbying 
because lobbying entails the influence of the political process. Throughout his 
book, he considers different issues pertaining to political equality in the UK 
democratic system. His analyses will complement those in this thesis (particularly 
those in Chapters 3 and 5). However, it is two contentions in his book that are 
important at this stage. 
In his chapter on lobbying, Rowbottom rightly highlights the difficulties of 
analysing political corruption because of definitional challenges.52 Lobbying is the 
central issue in such an analysis. Indeed, whilst Rowbottom restricts his analysis 
of lobbying explicitly to one chapter,53 the misgivings with lobbying arise 
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consistently throughout his book. His analysis shows that it is hard to determine 
the norms against which one can judge lobbying conduct which is problematic. 
In this regard, he highlights two ways of defining political corruption.  
First, is a ‘norms of office’ approach. Under that approach ‘a corrupt act 
occurs where a person holding office deviates ‘from norms binding upon its 
incumbents’ for personal or private gain’.54 One must identify the norms that bind 
the office-holder which may arise from set rules. However, those rules do not ‘tell 
us what standard the official is expected to live up to and takes as a given the 
existing rules that bind the officeholder’.55 Therefore, to determine whether an act 
is corrupt, one must refer to the rules or expectations governing the particular 
office. 
The second approach is called the ‘public interest’ approach. This ‘moves 
away’ from the first approach because one looks to establish whether the corrupt 
behaviour is damaging the public interest as opposed to the norms of office.56 
The ‘public interest’ is frequently used in literature. Indeed, Howarth notes that 
‘the ultimate ideal for any activity that involves design is to produce something of 
benefit, and the most general way to measure benefit is in terms of maximising 
public welfare’.57 Rowbottom explains that the public interest approach: 
Brings normative questions into the open and provides a way of thinking 
about whether an action should be thought of as corrupt. The major 
difficulty with this definition is in determining whether an arrangement is 
detrimental to the public interest. […] Consequently, a public interest 
definition does not provide answers as to whether lobbying activities, 
beyond the most obvious scenarios, should be regarded as corrupt.58 
For both definitions, he explains how there is a close connection between 
corruption and political equality and that the latter can play a role in defining the 
standards from which office-holders deviate:59 
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For example, if the norms regulating the official or the standard of the 
public interest are drawn from democratic theory, then the ‘basic norm of 
democracy’ is that ‘every individual potentially affected by a decision 
should have an equal opportunity to influence the decision’.60 
Rowbottom highlights that this standard will be applied in different ways to 
different offices. The expectations on MPs acting as representatives will be 
different to the expectations on ministers or civil servants. MPs are expected to 
be responsive, and civil servants should be impartial and, therefore, a corruption 
can be established by a deviation from those requirements.61 He explains that the 
understanding of corruption can be shaped by general arguments about political 
equality.62 Under this account, corruption and political equality are rooted in a 
common concern.63  
Similarly, Philp notes how the approach to understanding corruption as the 
‘subversion of the public interest […] by private interests is one with an impeccable 
historical pedigree’.64 He explains that both the ‘norms of office’ and ‘public 
interest’ conceptions must be fleshed out to establish their character and scope.65 
However, it is not immediately obvious which norms one can turn to but they 
will most likely turn on public opinion, legal norms and standards derived from 
modern Western democratic systems.66 Taking each approach in isolation is 
problematic because there are times, for example, when principles will come into 
play where legal rules are silent.67 Ultimately, Philp argues that to identify political 
corruption, one must ‘make commitments to conceptions of the nature of the 
political and the form of the public interest’. One line definitions of corruption 
are reductionist and misleading because they ‘obscure the extent to which the 
concept is rooted in ways of thinking about politics — that is, of there being some 
‘naturally sound condition’ from which corrupt acts deviate’.68  
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Beetham also argues that a lot of conduct in the political sphere cannot be 
captured by narrow definitions of corruption which is why a broader definition is 
needed.69 He suggests a broader conception of corruption defined as ‘the 
distortion and subversion of the public realm in the service of private interests’.70 
The activities of the Government ‘should serve a general or public interest rather 
than a set of private ones, and that there should be transparent public debate to 
determine where the general interest lies’.71 He finds that the literature lacks ‘a 
coherent narrative which links these different phenomena together, explains their 
common causes and systematic effects’.72 This latter contention is echoed by Hine 
and Peele who note that when one puts the criminal law to one side, we are left 
with ‘improper’ conduct for which the main sanction is the ballot box. Such 
conduct has proved to be ‘the most sensitive and difficult’.73 Together with Philp, 
they not how there is a: 
Need for a systematic account of why we think certain forms of behaviour 
are acceptable, and others not, and of how, when we form a view of this, 
we implement the values which our accounts entail in ways that give them 
a reasonable chance of bedding down with existing British institutions.74  
The arguments by these academics illustrate the problems with analysing lobbying 
very well. They are right that a coherent narrative is missing which can articulate 
misgivings such as those highlighted in this chapter. Philp and Beetham are 
correct that a one line definition does not suffice because the issues are inherently 
complex. Rowbottom comes very close to offering an answer to that approach 
when he highlights that one can apply the ‘norms of office’ or ‘public interest 
approach’ which can be informed by principles of political equality. Beetham’s 
attempt to offer a definition of a ‘distortion’ or ‘subversion’ from the public 
interest also comes tantalisingly close to offering an answer but is insufficient 
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because it is not underpinned by an in-depth analysis. Ultimately, it is submitted 
that the authors do not offer an answer to the problem they have identified.  
Beetham’s analysis is very short (spanning a five-page chapter) and 
consequently does not grapple with necessary analyses of what the ‘public 
interest’, ‘distortion’ and ‘subversion’ mean in the UK context. Philp offers great 
depth as to how one defines political corruption but does not offer a conception 
of it for analysing lobbying (that was not the aim of his work). Similarly, Hine and 
Peele highlight the lack of coherence but do not offer a mechanism or framework 
for identifying and analysing the main issues. Although, the work of Philp, Hine 
and Peele offer a very informative basis for developing such a mechanism.  
For Rowbottom, his analysis is excellent in that he pinpoints very relevant 
concepts of equality and corruption laws. He applies examples of lobbying to 
those concepts and laws to explain why the issue is concerning. However, whilst 
his application of those principles is consistent, he does not offer a unifying gauge 
through which every matter can be funnelled. He is dismissive of using the ‘public 
interest’ because, he argues, a public interest definition does not provide answers 
as to whether lobbying activities, beyond the most obvious scenarios, are corrupt. 
That is correct if one does not define the public interest, but it is submitted that 
a definition can be provided. This can be achieved by combining the ‘norms of 
office’ and ‘public interest’ approaches which need not be applied in isolation as 
is recognised by Philp. 
Indeed, it is submitted that there are common norms of office pertaining 
specifically to lobbying conduct that bind MPs, peers and ministers.75 A 
‘transparent public debate to determine where the general interest lies’76 is not 
needed as Beetham and Rowbottom suggest because an answer already exists. In 
any case, their approach is not satisfying because, as Philp highlights, it raises 
many questions about whose opinion to give most weight to in developing such 
a conception.77 By analysing the norms, one can determine what the public 
interest is in a given case. Further, the norms can be informed, as Rowbottom 
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suggests, by examining the close connection between corruption and political 
equality principles. From this, an analytical framework can be developed which 
gives order and coherence to the analysis of lobbying in a way that has not been 
achieved so far. In this thesis, that framework is called ‘institutional diversion’ and 
is developed from the theory of ‘institutional corruption’ in legislative ethics by 
Dennis Thompson and Lawrence Lessig’s ‘dependence corruption’ theory (which 
is an adaptation of institutional corruption).  
4.2 From ‘Institutional Corruption’ to ‘Institutional Diversion’ 
Most of the concerns identified with lobbying highlight conduct that is not illegal. 
The vast majority of public officials are not taking bribes, and most who lobby 
are not offering a bribe. The matters which are usually identified are more 
complex. The theory of institutional corruption was developed by Dennis 
Thompson78 who moves beyond blatant bribery to consider what he calls ‘the 
shadowy world of implicit understandings, ambiguous favors, and political 
advantage. Moving beyond individual corruption [to focus on] the institutional 
corruption [that has been neglected]’.79 Like Thompson, Lessig’s work focuses on 
the corruption of the US Congress from an institutional perspective.80 However, 
he offers a slightly different approach to Thompson by arguing that an institution 
becomes corrupted where it deviates from its intended dependence.81  
The nuances of that debate are detailed, and their framework is developed 
in Chapter 4. For this section, two tasks are necessary. First, to outline the 
definition of institutional corruption, and to adapt that definition for ‘institutional 
diversion’. Second, to outline the framework that manifests from Thompson and 
Lessig’s definition which is used to test for an institutional corruption, and to 
adapt that framework in light of the adapted definition of institutional diversion 
for the institutional diversion framework. 
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4.2.1 The Definition 
 
This definition82 offers an excellent starting point for a framework because it 
covers legal and ethical conduct pertaining to the issues of political equality 
highlighted by Rowbottom. Further, the definition correlates with Beetham’s 
broader conception of a ‘subversion’ when it states that an influence must ‘divert’ 
the institution from its ‘purpose’. That concern of a ‘subversion’ is not new in the 
UK political context. As long ago as 1695, the House of Commons resolved that 
improper influences over Parliament tend ‘to the subversion of the constitution’.83 
The idea of a ‘diversion’ is, therefore, not new and this thesis seeks to use it as an 
overarching gauge of the institutional diversion framework because it is 
conceptually straightforward. Further, it should be noted that the definition is 
written in the campaign finance context, but Lessig and Thompson clearly 
envisage the relevance of lobbying. Thompson states that: 
When the recipients are organized as lobbyists (or more generally when they 
are financially dependent on powerful economic interests in society), the 
corruption becomes embedded in the routines of government.84  
[and] 
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Institutional Corruption 
A systemic and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently 
ethical, that undermines the institution's effectiveness by diverting 
it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose, 
including, to the extent relevant to its purpose, weakening either the 
public's trust in that institution or the institution's inherent 
trustworthiness.  
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When [officials] travel with lobbyists, providing easy and routine access 
denied to ordinary citizens, they are likely to be participating in 
institutional corruption.85 
Lessig states that: 
If you have a system where the mechanism is so directly and powerfully 
controlled by the lobbyists and the only people who can effectively afford 
the lobbyists are a tiny fraction of that that need to influence government, 
then you have replicated the inequality that denies citizens equal standing 
inside our process.86 
Whilst a ‘diversion’ in the context of lobbying is, therefore, not problematic, the 
narrow definition of ‘corruption’ is. Both Thompson and Lessig are keen to 
emphasise that a ‘corruption’ has occurred: albeit not in the sense of criminality. 
Thompson explains that  
In the case of institutional corruption, the fact that an official acts under 
conditions that tend to create improper influence is sufficient to establish 
corruption, whatever the official’s motive (…) Action under these 
conditions is not merely evidence of corruption, it constitutes the 
corruption.87 
For Lessig, the US Congress is, by design, meant to be dependent upon the people 
alone. Any conflict which causes that dependency to change is the corruption 
itself.88 Therefore, for both Thompson and Lessig, corruption describes 
something that does not work according to its design. 
It is contended that their definition is helpful to this thesis but in an adapted 
form. The aim is to develop a holistic framework from a definition which takes 
account of individual corruption, institutional corruption and political equality 
worries. Indeed, Rowbottom analyses individual corruption,89 institutional 
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corruption,90 and political equality91 in his studies. However, in its current 
articulation, institutional corruption theory is not sufficient to analyse individual 
corruption or many aspects of political equality. Thompson differentiates 
individual and institutional corruption quite explicitly, and institutional corruption 
will not identify many instances of problematic lobbying.  
Further, the name of the theory, ‘institutional corruption’, is not the best 
label for an adapted framework. Whilst, for Thompson and Lessig, ‘corruption’ 
means something different to bribery, it is submitted that the term has developed 
an association with criminality which has become almost ingrained. If one were 
to suggest to an MP that Parliament is institutionally corrupt, it would likely 
provoke a defensive response due to the association of corruption with bribery. 
This is important because it is hoped that policymakers and lawmakers will use 
the framework. Therefore, the definition requires developing not only to cover 
broader lobbying concerns but also to describe the problems is a manner that 
might not provoke a defensive and dismissive response. 
Additionally, Thompson avoids describing corruption directly in terms of 
an institutional purpose for two reasons. First, the purposes of government ‘are 
multiple and contestable, and therefore cannot be fully specified and endorsed 
independently of a legitimate collective decision-making process’.92 Second, 
within the institutional corruption framework, it is necessary to identify 
procedures and rules that distinguish permissible and corrupt conduct—rules that 
are not ‘natural or obvious’.93 On the first point, whilst there are multiple and 
contestable purposes of government, there is no reason why an analysis cannot 
focus on one determinable and key purpose such as ‘acting in the public interest’ 
from which a diversion can be tested.94 On the second point, instead of identifying 
‘procedures’ for establishing a corruption, Chapter 3 introduces the elements of 
‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’ which, it is argued, are sufficient for testing for that 
diversion.95  
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As such, six adaptations are made to the definition of ‘institutional 
corruption’ for ‘institutional diversion’. These adaptations are needed to cover the 
necessary lobbying conduct and to provide a foundation for analysing lobbying 
which accounts for the matters raised by UK academics. 
First, a ‘systematic and strategic influence’ contained within the definition 
is replaced with ‘a concern about lobbying’ since lobbying is about influencing 
office-holders.96 An influence need not be ‘systematic’ nor ‘strategic’ since the 
conduct in question could be a one-off bribe. Second, the requirement that the 
influence is ‘legal, or even currently ethical’ which diverts the institution from its 
purpose, is adapted to lobbying that is ‘illegal, legal, ethical or unethical’. This will 
account for misgivings about individual corruption and political equality. 
Third, it is unnecessary to retain the requirement that the influence 
‘undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose’. This suggests 
that a diversion from a purpose will result in the effectiveness of the institution being 
undermined. The presumption is, therefore, that the institution’s operations or 
purpose (as it stands) are effective. The reality may be that the purpose is not 
effective and that the influence may achieve enhanced effectiveness for that 
institution. For this reason, ‘effectiveness’ is omitted. Further, the key concern 
here is not that effectiveness has been ‘undermined’ but that a diversion from a 
purpose has occurred. That is the more serious issue since the institution is not 
operating according to its purpose. Therefore, the measure required is a ‘diversion 
from a purpose or a weakening of the ability to achieve that purpose’. Whether 
that diversion is good or bad can be considered later in the analysis.  
Fourth, since the institutions in this thesis are known (Government and 
Parliament), the definition is given greater precision by identifying those 
institutions. However, the focus is specifically on ‘decision-makers’ working 
within those institutions rather than the institutions as a collective. It would be 
impossible to hold the institutions of Parliament or Government accountable for 
a diversion, but holding individual decision-makers to account is more achievable 
and realistic. 
                                                          
96 Raj Chari, John Hogan and Gary Murphy, Regulating Lobbying: a global comparison (Manchester 
University Press 2010) 4. 
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Fifth, it is necessary to identify the ‘purpose’ of the decision-makers. In 
Chapter 3, it is argued that their purpose is to ‘act in the public interest’. This 
purpose is, therefore, identified within the definition. Sixth, the final element of 
the definition is retained; that a diversion must result in ‘weakening either the 
public’s trust in that institution or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness’. 
Ultimately, one is concerned with enhancing public trust in the political process. 
Therefore, applying those six adaptations, an ‘institutional diversion’ is defined as 
follows: 
 
The definition accounts for the crucial differences that are necessary for the 
creation of the framework. It identifies the institutions, the decision-makers 
working within them, and the need for office-holders to be diverted from their 
purpose of acting in the public interest or are weakened in their ability to achieve 
their purpose because of lobbying. From this, one can consider lobbying broadly 
grouped into matters about individual corruption, institutional corruption or 
political equality which may cause a diversion, and can develop specific definitions 
of the public interest from an analysis of norms. 
4.2.2 The Framework 
From the definition, a framework can be created which allows one to test precisely 
why lobbying is problematic in a coherent manner. Indeed, the definition of 
institutional corruption given by Thompson and Lessig manifests a framework 
that is used to test for institutional corruption. That framework is explored in 
detail in Chapter 4. However, a basic outline is offered at this stage. 
Institutional Diversion 
Decision-makers working within the institutions of Parliament or 
the Government of the UK are subject to lobbying—or there is 
some concern about lobbying—which is illegal, legal, ethical or 
unethical, which diverts the decision-makers from their purpose of 
acting in the public interest or weakens their ability to act in the 
public interest, including weakening either the public’s trust in 
Parliament or the Government or their inherent trustworthiness 
because of that lobbying. 
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Figure 1: The Institutional Corruption Framework 
 
In this thesis, it is argued that criteria can also be used in the ‘institutional diversion’ 
framework to test why lobbying is concerning in a clear and coherent way. 
However, the criteria of institutional and dependence corruption require adapting. 
Lessig’s criteria are insufficient, and Thompson’s criteria are both too contingent 
and too complicated. Lessig’s approach is insufficient because a ‘dependency’ 
cannot describe many of the problems with lobbying; although it describes an 
important one. Thompson’s approach is too contingent because there are too 
many steps to establishing institutional corruption. It is also too complicated 
because he uses terminology that is overly complex and unnecessary. The 
institutional diversion framework should be intelligible to academics, politicians 
and policymakers and should, therefore, be easy to understand and follow. 
Therefore, for this thesis, the elements for institutional corruption remain but 
are separated from the criteria. The elements of institutional corruption are 
necessary because they help to identify the problem of institutional corruption. 
However, these are further supplemented with new elements of individual 
corruption and political equality.97 Together, the elements can be applied to any 
issue about lobbying to identify the underlying unease in a consistent and coherent 
way. However, different criteria are applied to test more broadly for a diversion in 
the institutional diversion framework. Again, different criteria are used because 
Thompson and Lessig’s criteria are both insufficient, unnecessary and overly 
complex. The institutional diversion framework requires straightforward criteria 
                                                          
97 Similar to those highlighted by Rowbottom. 
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Establish elements of 
institutional corruption 
and determine a 
corruption by applying 
criteria.  
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to test for the concerns of individual corruption, institutional corruption and 
political equality holistically.  
In this regard, three arguments are made which will be tested in later 
chapters. First, the criteria used in the diversion framework are sufficient because 
they help to test clearly when a diversion has occurred. Second, they are not overly 
complex and thus easy to understand for most readers. Third, they are not overly 
contingent because there are only two or three steps (depending on the scenario) 
in the process for identifying a diversion. The framework that manifests from the 
definition of institutional diversion and the adaptation of Thompson and Lessig’s 
approach is outlined below. 
Figure 2: The Institutional Diversion Framework 
 
Part 1 is called ‘Identify’. For this, one identifies whether the worry is about 
individual corruption, institutional corruption or political equality by reference to 
certain elements that are necessary for identifying those concerns. As noted 
above, the elements of institutional corruption arise from those enunciated by 
Thompson and Lessig (although, they will be adapted in Chapter 4). The elements 
Institutional 
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of individual corruption are explained in Chapter 4. The elements of political 
equality are explained in Chapter 5. This identification stage in Part 1 is necessary 
for a later examination of whether there has been a diversion in Part 2. 
Part 2 if called ‘Test’. For this part, uniform criteria are used to gauge 
whether the matter identified in Part 1 causes a diversion from the purpose of 
acting in the public interest and why. To achieve this, the criteria of ‘integrity’ and 
‘objectivity’ are used to test whether there has been a diversion through a series 
of questions. The criteria derive from the ‘norms of office’ that apply to decision-
makers being lobbied, and the questions arise from the literature on political 
equality and corruption. In this manner, Rowbottom’s recommendation is 
followed that political equality can play a role in defining the standards from 
which office-holders deviate.98 Where ‘integrity’ or ‘objectivity’ are undermined, 
decision-makers in Parliament or the Government may have been diverted from 
their purpose of acting in the public interest or their ability to do so has been 
weakened.  
In addition to Parts 1 and 2 developed from the definition above, Chapter 
7 develops a third part of the framework. Part 3 is called ‘Solve’ and offers 
guidelines, based on an interview with the UK’s lobbying Registrar for shaping 
regulatory solutions to the problems identified in Parts 1 and 2. The purpose of 
Part 3 is to avoid ‘jumping the gun’ when analysing regulatory solutions. One 
could conceive of many solutions to the problems, but it is more helpful first to 
understand what type of reform is achievable in the UK’s political environment 
otherwise solutions are unlikely to be enacted. Thus, the institutional diversion 
framework can be developed further. 
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Figure 3: The Institutional Diversion Framework Developed 
 
The institutional diversion framework is distinct from institutional corruption 
theory on definitional grounds which also manifests a framework that is 
structured differently. The definition is different because ‘institutional corruption’ 
is insufficient for identifying many other lobbying concerns. In this regard, this 
thesis accepts the measure of a ‘diversion’ but rejects that a ‘corruption of the 
institution’ explanation is appropriate for articulating the misgivings with lobbying 
in the UK. Instead, institutional diversion recognises three broad categories which 
can explain when lobbying may lead to a diversion of the institution’s purpose.  
Further, the diversion framework is distinct from institutional corruption 
because it offers ways to test for a diversion by reference to the criteria of 
‘objectivity’ and ‘integrity’ in Part 2. Whether those criteria have been undermined 
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is determined by reference to specific questions arising from the literature on 
corruption and political equality. Finally, the development of regulatory guidelines 
in Part 3 also highlights the distinctive nature of the diversion framework. 
4.3 Institutional Diversion: A Better Approach  
There are four reasons why the institutional diversion framework should offer a 
better approach than currently exists for identifying the concerns with lobbying, 
testing why they are problematic, and guiding solutions to those problems. 
First, the framework can bring clarity to an area that is often confused. This 
chapter highlighted how the misgivings with lobbying are not articulated clearly 
or coherently. The concerns are sometimes connected and sometimes not and 
they are seldom articulated in a manner that can assist in illuminating why they 
are problematic within the UK’s model of democratic government. The 
framework will offer clear elements for identifying the concerns and testing why 
they are problematic. 
Second, the framework encourages broader institutional considerations. 
Institutional concerns are rarely articulated as being institutional, or when they 
are, the specifics of why something is an institutional corruption is not detailed 
beyond the short analysis offered by Beetham.99 Retaining the elements of 
institutional corruption within the wider institutional diversion framework will 
provide a more detailed evaluation of the issues in the UK. 
Third, the gauge of a ‘diversion’ is conceptually straightforward and clear. 
If decision-makers are not acting as they should be, that is a problem which 
should be rectified. One can then explore the details of why those officials are not 
acting as expected and seek solutions. This approach is more complete and is 
easier to understand than disparate and unfocused arguments about notions of 
corruption or equality only.  
                                                          
99 Miller also offers a short analysis of institutional corruption but does not develop it in the UK 
context. See, David Miller, ‘Neoliberalism, Politics and Institutional Corruption: Against the 
‘Institutional Malaise’ Hypothesis’ in David Whyte (ed), How Corrupt is Britain? (Pluto Press 
2015); Further, Gray considers the theory in the British Journal of Criminology but only in the 
US context. See, Garry C Gray, ‘Insider Accounts of Institutional Corruption’ (2013) 53 British 
Journal of Criminology 533. 
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Fourth, the framework encourages a more sophisticated holistic 
examination of the underlying issues. An MP who is bribed raises individual 
corruption concerns but also raises questions about the consequences of such 
conduct for the institution as a whole, the internal rules in place and the public’s 
trust in the institution. This is more helpful than analyses which exist in a narrow 
void ignoring bigger and more fundamental questions. 
These hypotheses will be tested in Chapter 6 when applying the institutional 
diversion framework to specific examples of lobbying in the UK. 
4.4 Structure of the Analysis in this Thesis 
Whilst the diversion framework is organised into three consecutive parts, the 
analysis in the following chapters in structured differently. Instead of beginning 
with Part 1, Chapter 3 explores the ‘purpose’ of Parliament and the Government 
for Part 2 of the framework. It is necessary to determine the purpose before 
determining when a diversion from that purpose arises. Within the same chapter, 
the criteria of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’ are defined, and their use in the 
institutional diversion framework is justified. This structure assists the reader in 
understanding the context for the concerns analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 regarding 
individual corruption, intuitional corruption and political equality. The analyses in 
Chapters 4 and 5 will concurrently develop Part 1 (the elements of individual 
corruption, institutional corruption and institutional corruption), and Part 2 (the 
questions to test when integrity and objectivity have been undermined) of the 
framework. This approach enables the reader to have in mind whether, why, and 
how the concerns might cause a diversion from the purpose of acting in the public 
interest (having established what that means in Chapter 3). The framework is 
tested in Chapter 6, and guidelines are developed in Chapter 7 for Part 3. 
Conclusion 
The concerns with lobbying are poorly structured and poorly articulated. The 
analysis above reveals that different worries with lobbying are identified by the 
political parties in their manifestos. The committee reports provided much greater 
detail, but they often mixed issues instead of clearly explaining and structuring the 
issues. The reports were also incongruous in their emphasis of the problems with 
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some issues being given greater weight than others. For the CSPL, transparency 
was the main issue. For the PASC, privileged access was the main problem. For 
the PCRC it was the perception of undue influence. The committees also 
considered matters that did not fall within those headings. Therefore, it is unclear 
what the main concerns are or whether all the issues are of equal concern. The 
Government impact assessments and the reading stages of the TLA Bill also 
reveal contradictory reasons for regulation and the purpose of the law. 
The academic literature in the UK has come close to offering a means of 
analysing and evaluating the problems with lobbying but needs developing 
further. It points in the right direction, and this thesis seeks to move in that 
direction. As such, this chapter examined the definition of ‘institutional 
corruption’. It was argued that an adapted form of institutional corruption called 
‘institutional diversion’ can offer useful a framework for identifying the concerns 
with lobbying and testing why they are problematic, as well as providing guidelines 
that help to shape potential solutions. The next chapter explores the ‘purpose’ of 
Parliament and the Government in the UK and defines the criteria of ‘integrity’ 
and ‘objectivity’ for Part 2 of the institutional diversion framework. 
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3 
Examining the Purpose of Office-holders: Acting 
in the Public Interest 
____________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
In this chapter, Part 2 of the institutional diversion framework called ‘Test’ is 
developed. It is argued that the ‘purpose’ of office-holders working within 
Parliament and the Government is to ‘act in the public interest’ and that a 
diversion from that purpose caused by lobbying can be ascertained using the 
criteria of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’. Where those criteria are undermined, a 
diversion from acting in the public interest (or a weakening of the ability to act in 
the public interest) may have occurred. Below, the meaning of ‘acting in the public 
interest’ is deciphered, and the criteria are defined through a detailed exploration 
of the role of decision-makers, codes and statute. Specific questions are developed 
in Chapters 4 and 5 to determine when the criteria are undermined thereby 
causing a diversion from acting in the public interest. 
Beginning with an analysis of the ‘purpose’ is essential because one cannot 
analyse in what circumstances office-holders become diverted from their purpose 
without first identifying what that purpose is. Indeed, Lessig notes that ‘if an 
institution does not have a purpose, then it cannot be corrupted in this sense. If 
it does, then corruption is manifested relative to that purpose’.1 However, 
identifying what the ‘public interest’ means is challenging because it raises 
normative questions about the representative role of decision-makers in the UK. 
In that regard, there are no legal requirements compelling office-holders to act in 
                                                          
1 Lawrence Lessig, ‘Foreword: “Institutional Corruption” Defined’ (2013) 41(3) The Journal of 
Law, Medicine & Ethics 553, 554. 
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the interests of those whom they represent.2 There exists only one common law 
offence called ‘misconduct in public office’ which could apply where the conduct 
of the office-holder has been ‘calculated to injure the public interest’.3 However, 
that offence is strictly confined and usually only applies as an aggravating factor 
when some other explicit breach of a statutory criminal offence has been found 
(such as a breach of the Bribery Act 2010).4 
In the lobbying literature, the ‘public interest’ is used to express concerns 
about the influence of private or commercial interests to the detriment of public 
interests.5 Despite that articulation, the concept is seldom detailed explicitly. For 
Lessig, he determines the ‘purpose’ of the US Congress by analysing Originalist 
accounts of the US Constitution. Based on those analyses, he argues that the 
purpose of Congress is to be ‘dependent upon the people alone’.6 The ‘people’ 
meaning ‘the great body of the people’ and not just ‘some people’.7 Thus, Lessig 
takes a high-level principled approach by arguing that the US Constitution 
requires Congress to be financially dependent upon the majority of the population 
and not on a small minority.  
That definition is not helpful for the diversion framework because an 
equivalent articulation of a ‘dependency’ is not borne out by a legal, constitutional 
analysis in the UK. Further, the analysis is complicated by the fact that three 
institutions are analysed which are very different (the Commons, Lords and the 
Government). The challenge is, therefore, to determine whether MPs, peers and 
ministers are required to act in the public interest in the same manner (to keep 
the framework consistent). It is certainly not possible to provide a broad 
                                                          
2 Mark Elliott and Robert Thomas, Public Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 157. 
3 R v Dytham [1979] QB 722, 728 (Shaw LJ). 
4 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Misconduct in Public Office’ (CPS, 2015) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/l_to_o/misconduct_in_public_office/> accessed 14 February 
2015. 
5 As was detailed in Chapter 2; See also, OECD, Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 2: 
Promoting Integrity through Self-regulation (OECD Publishing, 2012) 3; Craig Holman and William 
Luneburg, ‘Lobbying and Transparency: A Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Reform’ (2012) 
1(1) Interest Groups & Advocacy 75, 78; William Dinan and David Miller, ‘Sledgehammers, 
Nuts and Rotten Apples: Reassessing the Case for Lobbying Self-Regulation in the United 
Kingdom’ (2012) 1(1) Interest Groups & Advocacy 105, 106; Miriam Galston, ‘Lobbying and 
the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal Revenue Code's Treatment of Legislative Activities’ 
(1993) 71 Tex L Rev 1269, 1271. 
6 Lawrence Lessig, ‘What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean’ (2014) 102 
Cal L Rev 1, 16. 
7 ibid 8 & 10. 
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definition of what the public interest means in every situation, but it is possible 
to identify what is not in the public interest by applying the criteria of ‘integrity’ 
and ‘objectivity’ derived from an analysis of the norms of public office. As such, 
this chapter first examines the role of MPs, peers and ministers in isolation to 
determine the relevance of ‘acting in the public interest’ to their respective jobs. 
MPs and peers are examined first because there is a congruence in the standards 
that apply to them which can be contrasted with the differing standards that apply 
to ministers. That examination informs the second aim of developing definitions 
of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’ which are used to test when MPs, peers and 
ministers are not acting in the public interest. It is argued that ‘integrity’ means 
officials ‘should not place themselves under any financial or other obligation to 
lobbyists that might influence them in the performance of their official duties’. 
‘Objectivity’ means that officials ‘should assess ideas on their merits or inherent 
worthiness in the sense that they should not give greater weight to representations 
arising from lobbying that is underpinned by corruption or political inequality’.  
In this manner, the same definitions (or common ‘standards’) are used to 
determine when the public interest is undermined.8 Further, the ‘public interest’ 
and ‘norms of office’ approaches identified in Chapter 2 are combined. Therefore, 
Thompson’s approach is followed of identifying conduct which may ‘frustrate the 
primary purpose of the institution’ by reference to core principles of ethics similar 
to the criteria of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’.9 At the same time, using the ‘public 
interest’ as the ultimate gauge retains Lessig’s high-level approach of using an 
overarching purpose. Below, the norms of the House of Commons, the House 
of Lords and the Government are analysed in turn. 
1. MPs and the Public Interest 
The purpose of MPs is examined in two parts. First, there is an examination of 
what the representative and decision-making role of MPs entails through reports 
of parliamentary committees, deliberative/participatory initiatives and the 
                                                          
8 Both Rowbottom and Philp note how a ‘standard’ is needed to gauge a ‘deviation’. See Jacob 
Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics (CUP 2010) 82; Mark 
Philp, ‘Defining Political Corruption’ (1995) 45 Political Studies 436, 445. 
9 Dennis F Thompson, ‘Two Concepts of Corruption’ [2013] Edmond J Safra Working Papers, 
No 16 1, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13 & 17. 
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statements of MPs. Second, it is argued that the principles of ‘integrity’ and 
‘objectivity’ found in the House of Commons Code of Conduct can be used to 
test when the public interest has been undermined by lobbying. The meaning of 
‘integrity’ is clear and uncontroversial and, therefore, can be inserted into the 
diversion framework with little alteration. However, ‘objectivity’ is vaguely 
defined which raises questions about its meaning. Thus, the examination 
undertaken on the role of MPs in the first part is used to flesh out what that 
principle means more clearly. Normative arguments are made about what 
‘objectivity’ should mean.  
1.1 Examining the Role of MPs 
There is little doubt that MPs should act in the public interest. The House of 
Commons Code of Conduct states that MPs ‘should take decisions solely in terms 
of the public interest’.10 However, it is questionable what this means, particularly 
where MPs are lobbied by different people. The job of an MP ‘comprises a 
number of different but interconnected roles; sometimes mutually reinforcing 
and sometimes conflicting’.11 That is, in part, because the ‘demands of politics are 
unpredictably diverse and protean’.12 As a result, academics have struggled to 
generalise, articulate and codify their role.13 Even established theories fail to 
capture ‘the normative complexity of what MPs ‘should do’’,14 never mind what 
they are required to do. As Wright bluntly states: ‘what do they mean. That they 
should take account of their representations? That they should do what their 
constituents want? That they should answer to them for their activities? Or does 
it just mean that they have to face periodic elections?’15 Similarly, Hirst queries 
the meaning of giving ‘expression to the will of the people’: 
                                                          
10 This Code is analysed in detail below under section 1.2; House of Commons, The Code of 
Conduct together with The Guide to the Rules Relating to the Conduct of Members (HC 2015, 1076) 4. 
11 House of Commons Select Committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons, 
Revitalising the Chamber: The Role of the Back Bench Member (2006-07, HC 337) 3. 
12 Richard D French, ‘The Professors on Public Life’ (2012) 83(3) The Political Quarterly 532, 
538. 
13 ibid. 
14 David Judge, ‘Recall of MPs in the UK: ‘If I Were You I Wouldn't Start from Here’’ (2013) 66 
Parliamentary Affairs 732, 744. 
15 Tony Wright, ‘Recalling MPs: Accountable to Whom?’ (2015) 86(2) The Political Quarterly 
289, 291. 
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What can that mean? In a sense the answer has an obvious meaning: 
democracy is a decision procedure and the people use this political 
mechanism to choose those public actions they want done by 
government. But there is a mass of problems in this obvious meaning. 
For a start, democracy is presented as a single idiom: one is a democrat, 
one is in favour of democracy. But once one starts to ask what democracy 
is for, one uncovers the thorny problem of what democracy is. There is 
no “democracy” in the singular, rather there are a variety of doctrines of 
democracy and a variety of political mechanisms and decision procedures 
which are claimed to be democratic.16 
Thus, there are questions about the meaning of democracy itself which is 
problematic because there are no manuals or rules regarding how MPs should be 
‘democratic’.17 There is the additional conundrum of what ‘representation’ means 
in this context. Whilst the term ‘parliamentary democracy’ is often associated with 
‘representation’, Judge explains that the concept of representation existed before 
democratic times: the ‘structure of representative government predates the 
growth of representative democracy in Britain and has never fully accommodated 
itself in practice to the idea of popular sovereignty inherent within democratic 
theory’.18 He argues that this has led to paradoxes such as the inclusion of citizens 
in the political process during elections yet their exclusion from the decision-
making process once power has been attained.19 Therefore, there is much debate 
about the meaning of the ‘public interest’ because there is uncertainty about the 
meanings of ‘democracy’ and ‘representation’ which underlie it. Ultimately, it is 
submitted that the following passage by Judge accurately reflects the complex role 
of MPs: 
MPs are primarily representatives of their party, increasingly attentive to 
their territorial constituencies, marginally more descriptive of the 
population at large than two decades ago, yet retain a propensity to assert 
                                                          
16 Paul Hirst, ‘Representative Democracy and its Limits’ (1988) 59(2) The Political Quarterly 
190, 191. 
17 French (n 12) 534–35. 
18 David Judge, ‘Whatever Happened to Parliamentary Democracy in the United Kingdom?’ 
(2004) 57(3) Parliamentary Affairs 682, 683. 
19 ibid. 
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the value of their own independent judgement [...] Burkean notions of 
‘trusteeship’, co-exist alongside more contemporary collectivist theories.20  
This description is unravelled in the analysis below to understand the proper 
decision-making role of MPs when faced with lobbying. It will be seen that the 
complex factors involved lead to different views about what the public interest is. 
Specifically, one’s view of politics will colour what the ‘merits’ means when 
making decisions objectively. To that end, the sections below examine reports of 
parliamentary committees, how citizens participate in the political process and 
what MPs think about their role. Together, the analyses assist in shaping a 
conception of ‘objective’ decision-making that can be used to test when MPs are 
not acting in the public interest for the diversion framework. 
1.1.1 What Parliamentary Committees Say 
The role of MPs has been considered by various House of Commons committees 
both explicitly and implicitly following the 2009 parliamentary expenses scandal.21 
Howarth notes that the controversy surrounding the scandal contributed to a 
public view that MPs ‘were merely local “campaigners” who occasionally turned 
up in London to speak on constituency issues or [that they were] creatures of 
their party who mindlessly voted as their whips instructed them’.22 An additional 
concern was (and continues to be) the significant control that the Government 
exercises over the parliamentary agenda.23 Therefore, the Reform Committee 
considered these issues in 2008 and 2009 with the aim to ‘make the Commons 
matter more, increase its vitality and rebalance its relationship with the executive, 
and to give the public a greater voice in parliamentary proceedings’.24 It was 
argued that MPs should have more control over the agenda of the House. 
Therefore, in 2010 the Backbench Business Committee (BC) was created.25 It was 
                                                          
20 David Judge, Democratic Incongruities: Representative Democracy in Britain (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 
105. 
21 See, ‘Q&A: MP Expenses Row Explained’ (BBC News, 18 June 2009) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7840678.stm> accessed 22 May 2017. 
22 David Howarth, ‘The House of Commons Backbench Business Committee’ [2011] Public law 
490, 492. 
23 ibid 490. 
24 House of Commons Reform Committee, Rebuilding the House: First Report of Session 2008–09 
(2008-09, HC 1117) 5. 
25 ibid 7. 
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given powers on ‘the scheduling of business in the House; the election of select 
committee chairs; the election of the Deputy Speakers’,26 and enabled backbench 
Members to bring forward debates of their choice.27  
The report by the Reform Committee highlights an important point about 
the role of MPs in upholding the public interest. In it, the Committee noted how 
the public already exercises ‘very substantial influence’ over what is discussed and 
that it is rare for proceedings not to originate from public concerns.28 
Nevertheless, they suggested this could be improved with calls for the ‘primary 
focus of the House’s overall agenda for engagement with the public to be shifted 
towards actively assisting a greater degree of public participation’29 to ensure that 
the public is ‘listened to’.30 The main focus was on giving the public greater 
influence over the agenda of the Commons and thereby to ‘nourish’ representative 
democracy.31 However, the agenda itself would continue to be controlled by the 
Government, the BC, the Liaison Committee and the Petitions Committee.  
This can be seen in the Standing Orders of the House of Commons on 
Public Business in 2016. These state that ‘save as provided in this order, 
government business shall have precedence at every sitting’.32 Sittings are then 
allocated in a cascading number of days for the opposition parties,33 the BC,34 and 
Private Members’ bills.35 The Liaison Committee is also responsible for 
determining the time available for sittings in Westminster Hall,36 and the Petitions 
Committee determine whether a sitting should take place in Westminster Hall.37 
Thus, politicians continue to exercise ultimate control over the agenda with most 
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of the power residing with the Government which exercises ‘exclusive 
domination of much of the House’s agenda’.38  
Consequently, it has been argued that the public interest is served by 
holding the Government to account. A ‘battle’ ensues between the Government 
and the Opposition which offers a forum for public concerns being expressed.39 
Some argue that such a verbal battle achieves little because ‘the governing party, 
inevitably, triumphs in the lobbies and pushes its legislation through’.40 Therefore, 
whilst MPs attempt to ‘reflect public concerns’ better to make the business of 
Parliament ‘matter more to the public’,41 the extent to which citizens can influence 
the verbal battle becomes a pertinent issue. This can be garnered by examining 
deliberative/participatory initiatives. 
1.1.2 What Deliberative/Participatory Initiatives Tell Us 
Deliberative and participatory forms of engagement are concerned with giving 
citizens the opportunity to express their views.42 There is an increasing tendency 
at the national and subnational levels in British politics for MPs to endorse 
participatory and deliberative initiatives for citizen participation in politics.43  
The purpose of deliberation is to derive policy ‘through the assembly and 
education of representative samples of the citizenry’.44 Recommendations are 
more justified when they arise from deliberations because they are more 
representative, more rational and are supposedly in the common good.45 
Participatory elements allow citizens to put their views forward to officials, to be 
consulted, be given access to information and have the right to vote on decisions; 
the purpose being to ensure that policy is better-prepared and considered.46 
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Despite these aims, such initiatives are limited in their ability to decipher what the 
public interest is on a given issue for several reasons. 
First, it is impractical to defer to public opinion on every decision, so there 
should be careful consideration about when to engage with the public.47 They 
could be consulted where there is a popular demonstration, a national campaign 
or consistent polling of an issue over time but the best approach is not evident.48 
Second, some MPs have narrow views of their role which are ‘consonant with 
traditional modes of consultation and representation—that is, as individual access 
to elected representatives’ rather than deciphering the public interest through 
deliberative/participatory initiatives.49 Linked to this is the effect that 
parliamentary positions have on the attitudes of decision-makers.50 The ruling 
majority favour the ideals of representative democracy and majoritarian rule 
whereas the Opposition favour the ideals of participatory democracy.51 These 
differences arise in part because of self-interest; politicians will support ideas that 
increase their chances of retaining and reaching positions of power.52 
Third, there are concerns that there is an emerging gap between the rhetoric 
of using more deliberative/participatory initiatives and their use in practice.53 Part 
of this is due to the time constraints placed on MPs who undertake several 
parliamentary duties. Davis highlights the ‘over-riding impression, gained from 
observing and interviewing politicians, is one of constant pressure, to balance 
constituency and parliamentary duties, and to keep up with a fast-moving 
sequence of tasks, debates, meetings and decision-making on multiple issues’.54 
To fulfil these numerous duties, politicians filter out ‘meaningful engagement 
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with external social conditions and public concerns’.55 Fourth, it is hard practically 
to ‘connect [public engagement] up to the ‘main game’, politically’,56 to ensure 
that it is meaningful.57 
Therefore, there are limitations on the extent to which 
deliberative/participatory methods can help to decipher the public interest is on 
a given issue. Nevertheless, considerable importance is increasingly attached to 
them. Indeed, in 2001, the Public Administration Select Committee stated that 
‘the period since the middle 1990s has seen an explosion of interest in involving 
the public more frequently, more extensively and in much more diverse ways in 
the conduct of decision-making within the public services’.58 This is increasingly 
the case today as evidenced by the greater use of referendums, petitions, 
consultation exercises, committee inquiries and outreach initiatives which are 
briefly considered below.59 Together, they help to show how the public interest 
on given issues is deciphered. 
First, referendums demonstrate a greater emphasis on broad citizen 
engagement. They are a powerful device of direct democracy; able to supplement 
representative government,60 override the decisions of Parliament61 and are now 
established constitutional conventions for important issues such as devolution 
and European Union (EU) membership.62 Their use has increased recently as 
evidenced by the United Kingdom Alternative Vote Referendum in 2011 (41% 
turnout),63 the Welsh Devolution Referendum in 2011 (35% turnout),64 the 
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Scottish Independence Referendum in 2014 (85% turnout),65 and the UK’s in-out 
European Union Referendum in 2016 (72% turnout).66 Their greater use 
highlights that office-holders are increasingly deferring to citizens on decisions of 
national and constitutional significance. 
Second, e-petitions have gained prominence following the launch of the e-
petitions website in 2015.67 Citizens can create petitions which are debated by 
MPs and receive a Government response where 100,000 signatures are received.68 
For example, a petition to ‘Give the Meningitis B vaccine to ALL children, not 
just newborn babies’ gained over 800,000 signatures.69 Those who sign the 
petition are directed to the contact details of their local MP to discuss the matter. 
Whilst MPs do not have to create new laws or to resolve the issue raised by a 
petition70 (they usually do not),71 petitions can lead to action. The Meningitis B 
vaccine petition resulted in a debate on the issue by MPs, a working group being 
set up by the Government, and a national awareness campaign to increase public 
knowledge about dangerous infections.72 Third, political parties are increasingly 
using broad consultation exercises to form policy73 instead of forming policy 
solely through traditional means of membership based upon social or class 
integration.74 Examples include Labour Party’s ‘Big Conversation’ in 2003, ‘Let’s 
Talk’ in 2006, ‘Fresh Ideas’ in 2011 and ‘Your Britain’ in 2013.75 Whether such 
initiatives are genuine (and this is a contentious issue) they ‘indicate that the nature 
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of party organisation and the way in which policy opinions are aggregated has 
fundamentally changed’.76 
Fourth, committees undertake outreach initiatives and offer a channel for 
the public to submit evidence to MPs on issues, and inquiries provide 
opportunities for some to present oral testimony. The Reform Committee note 
that matters inquired into are frequently those which have been expressed to 
committees by the public.77 Further, committees often make informal visits 
around the UK which give opportunities for the public to participate.78 For 
example, MPs have visited towns and cities to meet with small businesses, NHS 
and prison workers.79 Further, educational events around the UK are frequently 
advertised,80 and special events such as Parliament Week are promoted with the 
goal of engaging and empowering citizens to get involved and ‘make their voices 
heard about the issues that matter to them’.81  
Another report by the Liaison Committee in 2015 stated that committees 
must see public engagement ‘as a core way of undertaking scrutiny and oversight’ 
and that the public should be involved in topic selection.82 The use of 
intermediary organisations like Mumsnet and Money Saving Expert was also 
encouraged, as well as the dissemination of reports on platforms like Facebook.83 
Twitter and YouTube have been used to encourage the public to submit questions 
on issues, to gather evidence, spread information, select witnesses and launch 
reports.84 Twitter was used in 2012 to collect thousands of questions on education 
and policy which were put to the former Secretary of State, Michael Gove in an 
evidence session.85  
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Therefore, deliberative/participatory initiatives have enhanced citizen 
engagement and influence over the political agenda. The public interest on a given 
issue is deciphered, in part, through those initiatives. Nevertheless, in most cases, 
it is impossible to defer to public opinion. Even where public opinion is available, 
MPs can disregard it. In this sense, MPs are giving citizens some influence over 
the political agenda but not all of it, and certainly not control of it. To unravel 
this further, it is helpful to consider the views of MPs regarding their role. 
1.1.3 What MPs Think 
MPs have different views about their role in upholding the public interest. To 
understand this divergence, it is necessary to step back and consider the views of 
former MP, Edmund Burke, who gave a famous address in 1774.86  
Burke believed that MPs should use their judgement independently of 
others when making decisions.87 Only the interests of a small number of powerful 
constituents were important, and in any case, were readily apparent to the 
representative. In other words, the MP ‘did not have to be told what the interest 
was, nor did he need to receive instructions as to how best to advance that 
interest’.88 As such, Burke believed that an MP’s duty was to maintain the interests 
of his constituents even if it was against their own opinions.89 Burke’s views 
crossed over with those of John Stuart Mill who supported the notion that an MP 
should exercise independent judgment by using their ‘mental superiority’ to 
correct the views of constituents that are wrong.90  
The role of MPs was to listen to their constituents and be electorally 
responsible to them. This did not mean that citizens could express policy 
preferences but that elections were a mechanism by which constituents could 
‘assess the efficacy of representation and decide how far a constituency’s 
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economic interest has been protected’.91 Further, MPs should not be bound by 
the instructions of constituents or act as their delegate in Parliament;92 the job of 
the representative was to give the ill-informed public information and not receive 
it.93 Burke favoured the idea of an aristocratic trusteeship and certainly did not 
support the idea that individuals had equal political footing.94 The aristocracy 
would determine the national interest and could not be mandated or bound by 
the wishes of constituents.95 
Burke’s ideas existed when most citizens were uneducated and where media 
dissemination of information was not prevalent.96 Nevertheless, a concept of the 
public interest existed for MPs (as far back as 1774) of a trustee model of 
representation whereby the public interest would be served by MPs deciding what 
that meant. Whilst these views were a product of their time, some MPs have never 
fully moved on from that mode of thinking. As noted above, MPs are seeking to 
give citizens greater influence over the political agenda, and citizens are more 
educated today. However, Parliament remains sovereign, and MPs are free to 
make their own judgments and to vote independently.97  
These points were expressed in a 2007 Select Committee report where it 
was stated that ‘Members of the House do not pass laws or hold the government 
to account in a vacuum; they do so in ways that they judge best meet the interests 
of their constituents, particular groups, and the nation as a whole’.98 Some office-
holders explicitly subscribe to this. In evidence presented to the Reform 
Committee in 2008, several MPs responded negatively to proposals for the public 
to initiate debates in the Commons. Bill Cash believed ‘that Members of 
Parliament are elected as representatives of the electors. I do not subscribe to the 
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idea of enabling the public to initiate debates and proceedings in the House’.99 
Colin Challen expressed his concerns more strongly: 
And what’s this about how the public can “initiate proceedings in the 
House”? How about a weekly referendum or The Sun (which apparently 
wants to dictate defence policy) telling us what we need to do? Have we 
completely lost sight of the fact that MPs are elected not only as 
representatives but also mediators?100 
David Ames stated that it was a ‘ridiculous proposal and totally unworkable. The 
House of Commons and its Members should be well aware of how the public feel 
on any number of issues and should act accordingly’.101 Further, some academics 
express deep scepticism about whether MPs seek to reflect the views of citizens. 
Diamond et al. argue that British democracy is in crisis because of a ‘top-down, 
leadership view of British democracy […] a limited, liberal notion of 
representation in which parliamentarians act according to [what they believe is in] 
the national interest, rather than expressing the views of voters’.102 Indeed, 
Burke’s ideals are often used ‘to justify the actions of representatives when those 
actions conflict with constituency ‘opinion’, party policy or the wishes of interest 
groups’.103  
This was seen in the Labour Party leadership election in 2016 that followed 
the EU Referendum. Jeremy Corbyn became the leader of the Labour Party in 
2015 having won 60% of the vote of party members.104 Following the EU 
referendum—and despite polls showing that Corbyn retained the support of the 
majority of members—105 Labour MPs passed a no-confidence motion in Corbyn 
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by a majority of 172 to 40 MPs.106 MPs followed their personal views on Corbyn’s 
leadership when passing a no-confidence motion despite Corbyn retaining the 
support of most Labour Party members. The trustee model, therefore, appeared 
to be the prevailing dogma with party MPs; although, the popular choice prevailed 
in the subsequent 2016 leadership election when Corbyn won with an increased 
62% of the vote. 
Statements following the EU referendum in 2016 also highlight Burkean 
ideals. There were calls by some MPs not to invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon 
Treaty (which triggered the EU exit process) at all or until Parliament voted to 
agree to it being triggered. Ben Bradshaw queried: ‘is it not the case that 
referendums are advisory and that this Parliament is sovereign?’.107 David Lammy 
opined that ‘in our democracy, parliament is sovereign and must vote ahead of 
any decision to Brexit’.108 Owen Smith demanded that Article 50 should not be 
invoked without another referendum or general election; arguing that he would 
‘fight tooth and nail’ to keep the UK in the EU.109 Kenneth Clarke stated that he 
had always used his judgement to decide what is in the national interest— ‘then I 
go back and I’m accountable for it and if they don’t like it, they can throw me 
out. That’s called parliamentary democracy. That’s how we’ve been governed for 
years’.110 He has similarly argued that ‘MPs should vote according to their 
judgement in the national interest and the interest of their constituents’ and they 
should not take a referendum result as an instruction on how to vote.111 He stated 
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that ‘we must have respect for each other’s opinions, rather than telling each other 
that we have been ordered by an opinion poll to start abandoning them’.112  
Thus, some MPs in 2017 continued to favour traditional Burkean notions 
whereby MPs would ultimately decide whether or not leaving the EU was in the 
public interest. Whilst this view aligns with the Supreme Court,113 it highlights 
how even 52% of citizens voting to leave in a referendum with a 72% turnout 
remain subordinates in the ultimate outcome of issues that they have explicitly 
voted on. In other words, for some MPs, citizen inputs into the political process 
should be entirely disregarded even when expressed through a democratic 
referendum.  
Whether the views voiced by a minority of MPs are a fair reflection of 
representation in practice generally, is an open question. MPs are giving citizens 
greater opportunities to influence the political agenda, but they are not giving 
them much control over the agenda. Nevertheless, where citizens exercise a 
considerable degree of influence on the outcome of a pre-set agenda (such as a 
referendum), the outcome of which was not desired by most MPs (such as leaving 
the EU), the wishes of citizens are adhered to. Whilst there was opposition to 
triggering Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty to leave the EU, it was subsequently 
invoked with MPs voting 461 in favour and 89 against.114 The vocal resistance, 
noted above, to the popular will usurping Parliament’s powers, thus appears to 
be in the minority where the weight of influence carries considerable force. The 
prevailing sentiment is probably best captured by Conservative MP Heidi Allen 
who, after the referendum, stated that whilst she was ‘personally very 
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disappointed’ with the result, MPs ‘cannot ignore the wishes of the rest of the 
country’.115  
Further, whilst some MPs have expressed reluctance at giving citizens 
control over the parliamentary agenda, others have been supportive. In evidence 
given to the Reform Committee, Hugh Bayley MP (who was concerned that well-
financed lobbying groups might subvert the general public interest) suggested that 
citizens could nominate topics for debate through their MPs who could debate 
the issues in the Commons.116 Dai Davies similarly proposed that the public could 
suggest topics through petitions or a dedicated office.117 Michael Meacher 
submitted that the Petitions Committee should rotate meetings around major 
cities in the country to improve the public’s sense of engagement.118 He also 
argued in favour of public petitions initiating debates in the Commons.119 Jo 
Swinson suggested that the public should submit proposed topics and vote on 
the subject of a debate chosen by the Leader of the House.120 She stated that 
‘Parliament must move with the times, recognising and embracing the 
opportunities this gives for opening up public access to politics and meaningful 
two-way involvement’.121  
These statements align with evidence presented to the Modernisation 
Committee which indicates that MPs do not draw distinctions between 
parliamentary work and representing constituents.122 For example, Oliver 
highlights that when consenting to legislation, Members believe that they do so 
on behalf of constituents.123 Indeed, some MPs argue that holding the 
Government to account is done so for constituents,124 and some argue that MPs 
prioritise the interests of constituents when sourcing information.125 Support for 
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these views can also be found from academics who argue that the UK is moving 
tentatively ‘into a new area of constitutional reform [by introducing] new elements 
of direct democracy into the British political system’.126  
As such, MPs have mixed views about what their role entails. Whilst some 
continue to believe in Burkean ideals, there is a gradual shift towards the greater 
use of deliberative/participatory initiatives which are mostly supported. Citizens 
do not have the express power to decide outcomes or to control the agenda itself. 
Instead, MPs make decisions about what they believe is in the public interest and 
what should be debated. Nevertheless, in making decisions, most MPs will not 
simply disregard the views of citizens but will give considerable weight to them 
in deciding what is in the public interest. Therefore, Burkean ideals exist to the 
extent that MPs continue to decide. However, citizen influence over those decisions 
has increased. Thus, questions arise about when the judgement of MPs is 
reasonable when making decisions that are in the public interest. In this regard, it 
is argued below that the criteria of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’ can be used to test 
when MPs are not acting in the public interest. 
1.2 Defining ‘Integrity’ and ‘Objectivity’ 
1.2.1 The Code of Conduct 
Public integrity systems consist of values expressed through principles.127 Values 
are important for determining the basic ethos of a country’s public life through 
their aspirational and social impact rather than through legal force. It is formal 
procedures which define and enforce the precise rules through codes or laws.128 
For the House of Commons, values are expressed through the Nolan Principles 
created by the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) in the 1990s.129 
These values are expressed in the House of Commons Code of Conduct130 which 
sets the parameters for defining those values and the mechanisms for their 
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enforcement. The Nolan Principles were created with the intention of being 
adaptable to the institution that incorporates them. This has significant 
implications for their meaning when adapted for the role of MPs. There are seven 
principles outlined in the Code: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, 
openness, honesty and leadership. From these principles, it is argued that adapted 
definitions of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’ can be used to determine when MPs are 
not acting in the public interest. 
The first principle—selflessness—as originally drafted by the CSPL states 
that ‘holders of public office should act solely in terms of the public interest’.131 
This is reworded and narrowed in the Code to state, following that initial 
sentence, that: ‘They should not do so in order to gain financial or other material 
benefits for themselves, their family or their friends’.132 This is striking because it 
qualifies ‘acting in the public interest’ as meaning not to seek personal financial 
benefits. Consequently, the principle only prohibits bribery or certain conflicts of 
interest. It does not, however, prohibit financial or other benefits for the political 
party of the MP. Thus, ‘selflessness’ is likely grounded in the conflict of interest 
and anticorruption rules of the Commons.133 The principle of ‘integrity’ expands 
upon this. As originally drafted, it states that: 
Holders of public office must avoid placing themselves under any 
obligation to people or organisations that might try inappropriately to 
influence them in their work. They should not act or take decisions in 
order to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, their 
family, or their friends. They must declare and resolve any interests and 
relationships.134 
When adapted in the Code, ‘integrity’ states that: 
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Holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial 
or other obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might 
influence them in the performance of their official duties.135 
There are three important facets to this adaptation. First, the decision was taken 
to incorporate the latter sentence of the Nolan definition of integrity into the 
definition of ‘selflessness’ in the Code. As such, selflessness, in terms of acting in 
the public interest, means that office holders should act with integrity by not 
seeking personal financial gain. Second, the vague term, ‘inappropriately’, is 
omitted in the revised definition which makes the requirement more explicit. 
However, third, whilst the Code retains the former part of the Nolan definition 
on integrity, it alters the principle to a normative requirement in its adapted 
definition. A decision-maker ‘must’ avoid placing themselves under any 
obligation is changed to ‘should not’. Nevertheless, it is explicit that office-holders 
should not place themselves under any obligation to outside influences by 
individuals and organisations that might influence them. The meaning of 
‘obligation’ appears to entail contractual obligations only. This is highlighted in a 
Resolution of the House of Commons which Ewing and Bradley call an 
‘important statement of principle’.136 The House resolved that: 
It is inconsistent with the dignity of the House, with the duty of a Member 
to his constituents, and with the maintenance of the privilege of freedom 
of speech, for any Member of this House to enter into any contractual 
agreement with an outside body, controlling or limiting the Member’s 
complete independence and freedom of action in Parliament or 
stipulating that he shall act in any way as the representative of such outside 
body in regard to any matters to be transacted in Parliament; the duty of 
a Member being to his constituents and to the country as a whole, rather 
than to any particular section thereof.137 
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The principle of ‘objectivity’ as originally drafted, states that office-holders ‘must 
act and take decisions impartially, fairly and on merit, using the best evidence and 
without discrimination or bias’.138 This is clearly not applicable to MPs (for the 
reasons given below) which is why the same principle is completely redefined in 
the Code. It states that ‘in carrying out public business, including making public 
appointments, awarding contracts, or recommending individuals for rewards and 
benefits, holders of public office should make choices on merit’.139  
This change highlights that MPs are not impartial beings which aligns with 
the examination of the role of MPs above. If this were a requirement, it would be 
explicitly stated which can be seen with the role of the Speaker of the House of 
Commons whose political impartiality ‘is one of the office’s most important 
features […] Once elected, the Speaker severs all ties with his or her former party 
and is in all aspects of the job a completely non-partisan figure’.140 It is also a clear 
expectation of those working in the Civil Service where impartiality has long been 
required141 and which is subject to constant scrutiny.142 This is because the political 
impartiality of the Civil Service is seen as an important counterweight to the 
partisanship of politicians.143 It is also seen in the House of Commons Library 
which ‘provides impartial information and research services for Members of 
Parliament and their staff’.144 Thus, the expectation of impartiality is clearly stated 
where it is required. MPs are partisan and are not expected to act impartially.  
For these reasons, the adapted definition of ‘objectivity’ in the Code limits 
its meaning to MPs making decisions on their ‘merits’. This, itself, is restricted to 
specific decisions such as public appointments, awarding contracts, or 
recommending individuals for rewards and benefits. That list is not exhaustive, 
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but the context suggests that decision-making on merits does not extend to the 
decision-making role of MPs more broadly. This also has implications for the 
principles of ‘selflessness’ and ‘integrity’ analysed above. It correlates that the 
partisan nature of MPs (as implicitly recognised by the adaptation of ‘objectivity’ 
in the Code) means that the accrual of financial benefits by MPs for their parties 
is not contrary to the principle of selflessness. The benefit is not a personal one, 
and the MP is merely fulfilling their partisan obligation to their party which is not, 
on the wording of the Code, contrary to the public interest. 
However, that is not to say that normative arguments do not exist that MPs 
should assess ideas on their merits beyond what is covered in the Code; 
particularly where lobbying is involved. MPs need not be impartial, but they 
should make decisions by assessing the inherent worthiness of an idea as opposed 
to favouring ideas which gained prominence because of lobbying underpinned by 
corruption or political inequalities. In this manner, the statement of Colin Challen 
MP noted above is pertinent: ‘MPs are elected not only as representatives but also 
mediators’.145 Two factors arise. First, how MPs balance their personal views 
against other views. Second, how MPs mediate between different lobbying 
influences externally. 
In both cases, this balancing exercise is an art and not science. MPs can act 
as ‘trustees’ by forming their own judgements when making decisions, and they 
can also function as delegates. For example, in their judgement, an MP may 
believe that leaving the EU is wrong. Against that, is a referendum in which 
citizens have voted to leave. The MP may feel that following the result of a 
referendum would be to accord weight to an external factor which is wrong. They 
might believe that they are not making a decision on the merits of an idea and 
disregard the referendum outcome (a strict Burkean interpretation). However, 
considering the analysis above, it is submitted that for most MPs a referendum 
would carry significant weight in their determination of the merits of an idea. Of 
course, this can only be taken so far because it is impossible to gauge the views 
of the people on every decision. Additionally, the subjective views of MPs aside, 
it can be hard to judge which external views they should accord greater weight to. 
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As such, it is submitted that, at the very least, MPs should assess ideas on 
their merits or inherent worthiness in the sense that they should not give greater 
weight to representations arising from lobbying that is underpinned by corruption 
or political inequality. ‘Corruption’ (in terms of personal financial gain influencing 
decisions) is clearly against the rules and will be explored in Chapter 4 in more 
detail. ‘Political inequalities’ that have led to decisions being accorded greater 
weight are not explicitly prohibited and raise all manner of normative debates 
which are considered in Chapter 5. For this stage, it is argued that lobbying can 
undermine objectivity by restricting genuine opportunities to influence to the 
most powerful and wealthy in society. 
Linked to ‘objectivity’ is the principle of ‘openness’ in the Code. In its 
original form, it states that ‘holders of public office should act and take decisions 
in an open and transparent manner. Information should not be withheld from 
the public unless there are clear and lawful reasons for so doing’.146 This is 
qualified in the adapted form to state that MPs ‘should be as open as possible 
about all the decisions and actions that they take. They should give reasons for 
their decisions and restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly 
demands’.147 It is left open who determines what the wider public interest ‘clearly 
demands’, but one Resolution highlights that it is MPs who make that judgement 
(with regard to declaring interests at least). Where a Member has the opportunity 
to speak he will: ‘Declare his interest at the beginning of his remarks […] It will 
be a matter for his judgement, if his interest is already recorded in the Register, 
whether he simply draws attention to this or makes a rather fuller disclosure’.148 
Another principle, ‘honesty’, as originally worded, states that ‘holders of 
public office should be truthful’.149 The definition of ‘honesty’ in the Code has 
little to do with ‘truthfulness’. It states that MPs ‘have a duty to declare any private 
interests relating to their public duties and to take steps to resolve any conflicts 
arising in a way that protects the public interest’.150 That is mostly a rewording of 
                                                          
146 UK Government, ‘The 7 Principles’ (n 129). 
147 House of Commons, The Code of Conduct (n 10) 4. 
148 ibid 49, Resolution of 12 June 1975, amended on 9 February 2009: Members’ Financial 
Interests (Declaration). 
149 UK Government, ‘The 7 Principles’ (n 129). 
150 House of Commons, The Code of Conduct (n 10) 4. 
Chapter 3 – The ‘Purpose’ of Office-holders 
81 
the requirements in the Code on ‘selflessness’ and ‘integrity’, adding only that 
MPs should be truthful about their conduct where those principles are engaged.  
Only two of the principles as drafted are straightforward because they are 
much the same as their original form. The principle of ‘accountability’ in the Code 
states that office-holders are ‘accountable for their decisions and actions to the 
public and must submit themselves to whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their 
office’.151 The principle of ‘leadership’ states that MPs should ‘promote and 
support these principles by leadership and example’.152  
Therefore, the principles of selflessness, integrity, objectivity, 
accountability, openness, honesty and leadership are revealing. A common theme 
is that MPs should act in the public interest and one can determine, to an extent, 
how to gauge when the public interest is undermined by reference to those 
principles. It is clear that MPs should not seek personal financial gain from their 
role. This is seen with ‘selflessness’ which reveals that MPs should not use their 
office for personal gain. It is also seen with ‘integrity’ which holds that MPs 
should not be placed under any contractual obligation to outside individuals or 
organisations which might influence them in the performance of their duties. The 
principle of ‘honesty’ reinforces those principles.  
For ‘objectivity’, MPs should make decisions on their merits for certain 
decisions; although what that means in practice is vague. Thus, it was argued that 
making decisions on their ‘merits’ in the lobbying context ought to mean that 
MPs should assess ideas on their merits or inherent worthiness in the sense that 
they should not give greater weight to representations arising from lobbying that 
is underpinned by corruption or political inequalities (explored in more detail at 
the end of this chapter and in Chapters 4 and 5). The principle of ‘openness’ is 
about the transparency of that process, but that says little about how the decision 
itself should be made. ‘Accountability’ is about scrutiny and similarly offers little, 
beyond MPs evading their accountability obligations, about when decisions are 
not in the public interest. ‘Leadership’ merely reinforces the importance of the 
principles. 
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Together, the principles paint a complex picture of what MPs should do. 
This is to be expected when considering the analysis above which reveals a 
complex picture of what representation means in the UK. Nevertheless, one can 
derive that the role of MPs is clearly defined with regard to personal financial or 
other gain and conflicts of interest (integrity). Their role is loosely defined with 
regard to making decisions on their merits (objectivity). That is because there are 
different views about what is right or good. An official’s view of the ‘merits’ will 
be influenced by different factors such as their view on politics. Thus, normative 
arguments were made about when lobbying might undermine decision-making 
based on the process of decision-making rather than the content of the matters 
which are being decided. An important query underlying the analysis above is how 
much importance should be attached to the Code and resolutions. In this regard, 
the Recall of MPs Act 2015 gives much force to them. 
1.2.2 The Recall of MPs Act 2015 
Under the Act, constituents can force MPs to stand down and face a by-election 
where certain criteria are met. A recall petition is triggered where an MP: 
(a) is convicted of a custodial sentence; or 
(b) the House of Commons Committee on Standards suspends an MP 
for breaching the Code of Conduct (and other rules); or 
(c) an MP is convicted under section 10 of the Parliamentary Standards 
Act 2009 which deals with providing misleading information 
regarding allowances.153 
If one condition is met, the petition is triggered, and a by-election is held where 
10% of constituents sign the petition.154  
The Act has been criticised because, in practice, it affords little power to 
constituents, and decisions about recall are made by MPs instead of an 
independent body. It is a committee of MPs that will ultimately judge whether the 
conduct right or wrong. Nevertheless, the Act codifies the rights of citizens to 
remove MPs where they fall below expectations. The Commons Committee on 
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Standards has the power to investigate matters ‘relating to the conduct of 
Members, including specific complaints in relation to alleged breaches of the 
Code which have been drawn to the Committee’s attention by the 
Commissioner’.155 Any member of the public can make a complaint to the 
Commissioner about potential breaches by MPs under Part V of the Code of 
Conduct.156 The relevant provisions under Part V state that: 
10. Members shall base their conduct on a consideration of the public 
interest, avoid conflict between personal interest and the public interest 
and resolve any conflict between the two, at once, and in favour of the 
public interest. 
11. No Member shall act as a paid advocate in any proceeding of the 
House. 
12. The acceptance by a Member of a bribe to influence his or her conduct 
as a Member, including any fee, compensation or reward in connection 
with the promotion of, or opposition to, any Bill, Motion, or other matter 
submitted, or intended to be submitted to the House, or to any 
Committee of the House, is contrary to the law of Parliament.157 
Thus, whilst it is unlikely to be triggered, there is now a legal mechanism for 
constituents to remove MPs where—because of a serious breach—they have not 
acted in the public interest. The ‘public interest’ is not defined in this context, but 
it would likely be gauged taking into account the Code and resolutions because 
the Act refers specifically to them. A recall can also be triggered where an MP has 
received a custodial sentence. For example, where an MP is convicted of bribery 
and sentenced to prison, this can trigger a complaint and recall.  
It is acknowledged that a recall petition being triggered because an MP has 
not acted in the public interest is very unlikely to succeed. The Committee on 
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Standards would need evidence of serious malfeasance and some MPs would 
disagree about what their purpose is. As Judge notes: 
If there is neither a simple single conception of what MPs should do, nor 
agreement upon what they actually do, it is extremely difficult to 
determine what they are responsible for, in the sense of individual 
culpability (beyond personal malfeasance or misfeasance), and the 
grounds upon which they should be recalled.158 
Nevertheless, the existence of the Act and the requirements underlying it are 
unprecedented. At most, it means that MPs can be removed for not acting in the 
public interest (the meaning of which is decided by a committee). That gives force 
to the importance of those principles but also highlights the difficulty in finding 
a breach because they are so vague. This also demonstrates that there is an 
evolving attitude in Parliament which emphasises the importance of the public 
interest as a purpose. As Wright notes, it is ‘indicative of a changing political 
culture and opens up a much wider debate. It invites discussion about the nature 
of political accountability and how it might be strengthened. It also requires us to 
think freshly about both representative and direct democracy’.159  
1.3 Summary: The Role of MPs 
The role of MPs has evolved since 1774 when Burke conceived of the trustee 
model of representation. Since then, there has been a proliferation of public 
engagement whereby MPs have sought to give citizens more opportunities to 
influence the political agenda. That is not to say that the trustee model no longer 
exists; it clearly does for some MPs. However, most MPs do seriously weigh the 
views of the public when discerning what the public interest is. It would be 
surprising for the House of Commons not to give effect to a referendum result 
or for a petition not to be debated seriously. It would be seen as regressive and 
undemocratic for public engagement initiatives to be reversed and for the House 
to become more insular. As Oliver summarises, the democratic system has shifted 
‘from government and Parliament strongly legitimated by the process of election 
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to government […] to a system where legitimacy has to be won through success 
in meeting the needs of the people, through openness, and responsiveness 
through participatory arrangements’.160 Nevertheless, defining the role of MPs is 
not simple. Whilst the nature of representation is changing, it retains elements of 
the old and new which brings about contradictions regarding defining a purpose. 
Thus, as noted above, the following passage from Judge appears to be an accurate 
reflection of the role of MPs: 
MPs are primarily representatives of their party, increasingly attentive to 
their territorial constituencies, marginally more descriptive of the 
population at large than two decades ago, yet retain a propensity to assert 
the value of their own independent judgement [...] Burkean notions of 
‘trusteeship’, co-exist alongside more contemporary collectivist 
theories.161  
From this complex dynamic four points emerge for the diversion framework. 
First, an overriding purpose of MPs is to act in the public interest which is 
evidenced in the analysis above. Second, the public interest is served by 
considering the views of citizens (increasingly ascertained through 
deliberative/participatory initiatives) when making decisions. Third, the success 
of that aim can be tested by reference to values and principles which are given 
effect through the Commons Code and resolutions. These matter because the 
Recall of MPs Act 2015 enshrines them in statute along with ‘the public interest’ 
as a purpose against which to gauge a breach of that statute.  
Fourth, the values and principles used to gauge the public interest are clear 
in some places but not in others. They are clear with regard to impropriety akin 
to bribery or other financial impropriety. These pertain to the ‘integrity’ of the 
individual which is a criterion developed in Chapter 4. It will be seen in that 
chapter how individually corrupt conduct such as breaches of the law, violations 
of codes and the undermining of independence, can indicate when integrity is 
undermined. Questions will be created in that chapter to establish clearly when 
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MPs have not acted with ‘integrity’ thereby causing a diversion from acting in the 
public interest. 
The values and principles are unclear for ‘objectivity’; stating only that 
decisions should be made on their merits in some circumstances. It is argued that 
making decisions on their ‘merits’ ought to mean that MPs should assess ideas on 
their merits or inherent worthiness in the sense that they should not give greater 
weight to representations arising from lobbying that is underpinned by corruption 
or political inequality. Specific determinations about whether decisions are made 
on their merits are guided by questions developed in Chapter 5 arising from the 
political equality literature.  
2. Peers and the Public Interest 
There may be a lower empirical expectation that peers should act in the public 
interest because they are unelected. The Lords also institutionalises the Anglican 
Church which is arguably unrepresentative of the religious divide today. It has an 
honours system and is seen as a status of privilege that is disconnected from the 
realities of working citizens. It is an institution very different in nature to the 
Commons. Nevertheless, it is argued that the Lords have followed a public 
interest mantra, recognising that it is their overarching purpose. They are not 
compelled to act this way, but they recognise that they should do so—particularly 
where lobbying is involved. Two important points are revealed by the analysis 
below. First, peers attach great importance to deliberation in determining the 
public interest; using that information to hold the Government to account—to a 
greater extent than the Commons—and thus to act in the public interest. This 
aim is expressly stated in reports as being the main overarching purpose. Second, 
the Lords, unlike the Commons, have expressly incorporated the Nolan 
Principles into their Code without alteration. 
2.1 Examining the Role of Peers 
The Lords is not a perfect embodiment of deliberation and is open to criticisms 
‘that peers [do not] necessarily represent their [the people’s] interests in the 
chamber. Peers have no mandate from voters, and so have no obligation to 
represent their interests beyond the general imperative to obey party whips (which 
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they usually do)’.162 Further, the unelected nature of the Lords, for some, 
undermines its legitimacy and, therefore, its power to perform deliberation 
effectively.163  
However, it is also true that following the enactment of the House of Lords 
Act 1999 (which significantly reduced the membership of the Lords) that the 
Lords has been ‘re-energised’.164 As a result, it is much more active in holding the 
Government to account by inflicting defeats. From 1980–1997, the Lords 
inflicted 241 defeats on various Conservative Governments165 compared with the 
period of 1997–2017 in which the Labour, Coalition and Conservative 
governments suffered 688 defeats.166 One recent defeat in 2015 was on the issue 
of tax credits where there were worries that a Government proposal would leave 
millions of people financially worse off.167 Significantly, the defeat broke a 
constitutional convention established in 1911 that the Lords should not block 
financial legislation. It is, thus, a strong indicator of the lengths to which peers 
will go to uphold their view of the public interest and underlines that impression 
that, since 1999, the House of Lords has ‘developed a reputation for rigorous 
scrutiny, high quality and frequently non-partisan debate, and a willingness to 
challenge the government’.168  
This greater scrutiny of the Government has also coincided with the 
increasingly deliberative nature of the Lords which takes public opinion 
seriously.169 Farrington argues that the Lords subscribe to the idea of deliberation 
to a greater extent than the Commons.170 Peers ‘often think of themselves as 
undertaking surrogate representation of interests and groups outside party 
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political issues’.171 Indeed, interviews reveal that peers believe their role is to 
represent public opinion or be guided by it in a broad sense.172 Moreover, peers 
are less likely to be distracted from this aim by party loyalty. The Lords has many 
experts, who have a lifetime membership which frees them from the constraints 
of party loyalty and patronage.173 They are less susceptible to the influence of party 
whips than MPs and are less worried about adhering to the ideological alignment 
of a party. The result is many experts across a number of fields and ‘the presence 
of a large body of crossbenchers who are open to persuasion and who may lean 
to the left or right as the occasion demands’.174 Farrington argues that: 
Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that the House of Lords can be 
said to possess a degree of non-electoral legitimacy by virtue of its greater 
representativeness of the public’s political views than the Commons, the 
willingness of (many) peers to engage in surrogate representation and 
support unpopular causes, the propensity for deliberative debate in the 
House, and the Lords’ increased capacity to challenge the government 
and exert impact on policy.175 
Finally, membership between the parties is more evenly spread in the Lords than 
the Commons. The Lords is, in a sense, more representative than the Commons 
because ‘it has been a cross-party maxim of the post-1999 chamber to ensure that 
no one party could command an overall majority’.176 This contributes to an open 
and inclusive deliberative environment in which a variety of voices are heard.177 
These points are echoed by Parkinson who argues that the Lords is to an extent 
more inclusive than the Commons because of the ‘rough parity between parties 
[which] gives those groups a more effective deliberative voice than the latter, 
whilst the appointed nature of the Lords gives a parliamentary platform for some 
minorities and some perspectives that they would otherwise lack’.178  
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Therefore, peers are arguably less constrained than MPs in their ability to 
uphold the public interest, and the suggestion is that deliberation plays a more 
central role. This is reflected in an analysis of committee reports and the House 
of Lords Code of Conduct. 
2.2 Defining ‘Integrity’ and ‘Objectivity’ 
Like MPs, peers are bound by a Code which uses the same rules and restates in 
several provisions the requirement for peers to ‘base their actions solely upon 
consideration of the public interest’.179 Unlike the Commons, they subscribe to 
the Nolan Principles as defined by the CSPL.180 On the ‘public interest’, the 
relevant provisions of the Code are: 
7. In the conduct of their parliamentary duties, Members of the House 
shall base their actions on consideration of the public interest, and shall 
resolve any conflict between their personal interest and the public interest 
at once, and in favour of the public interest. 
12. A Member with a relevant interest is free to take part in the public 
business of the House subject to: the resolution of any conflict between 
personal and public interest in favour of the public interest (paragraph 7 
of the Code). 
16. Members are required under paragraph 7 of the Code to base their 
actions on consideration of the public interest. 
19. At the same time, in their parliamentary work, and whenever they act 
in their capacity as parliamentarians, Members are required to base their 
actions solely upon consideration of the public interest.181 
Additionally, in 2009, the Lords recognised that one of the overarching principles 
underlying the Code was to act in the public interest.182 In 2011, the Leader’s 
Group report on working practices strongly emphasised the public interest as 
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being a core purpose of the Lords. They noted that ‘the House should make the 
best possible use of all its available resources […] so as to serve the public interest 
better’,183 and that ‘in all its work, the House seeks to serve the public—to act in 
the public interest and to facilitate public engagement in its work’.184 Furthermore, 
the Report consistently used the term ‘public interest’.185 As such, the Lords has 
expressed, quite emphatically, that its purpose is to act in the public interest. It 
also has broader rules for assessing when the public interest is undermined. 
Its Code states that members ‘should observe the seven general principles 
of conduct’ of the CSPL which ‘will be taken into consideration when any 
allegation of breaches of the provisions in other sections of the Code is under 
investigation’.186 The definitions of the Nolan Principles are broader than in the 
Commons Code. Acting solely in terms of the public interest is covered by 
‘selflessness’. ‘Integrity’ requires that Members ‘must not’ (as opposed to ‘should 
not’) place themselves under financial obligations. ‘Objectivity’ requires that 
Members ‘must act and take decisions impartially, fairly and on merit, using the 
best evidence and without discrimination or bias’. ‘Openness’ means that 
decisions should be taken transparently unless there are ‘lawful’ reasons for not 
doing so. ‘Honesty’ means that Members should be truthful.187 Those principles 
‘should act as a guide to Members in considering the requirement to act always 
on their personal honour’.188 ‘Personal honour’ is unique to the culture of the 
Lords.189 The term: 
Has been used within the House for centuries to describe the guiding 
principles that govern the conduct of Members; its meaning has never 
been defined, and has not needed definition, because it is inherent in the 
culture and conventions of the House. These change over time, and thus 
any definition of ‘personal honour’, while it might achieve temporary 
‘legal certainty’, would quickly become out-moded […] the term ‘personal 
honour’ is ultimately an expression of the sense of the House as a whole 
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as to the standards of conduct expected of individual Members […] 
Members cannot rely simply on their own personal sense of what is 
honourable. They are required to act in accordance with the standards 
expected by the House as a whole. ‘Personal honour’ is thus […] a matter 
for individual Members, subject to the sense and culture of the House as 
a whole.190 
The Code states when lobbying might undermine the personal honour of a 
Member. For example, personal financial benefits are consistently prohibited by 
the Code.191 Regarding the decision-making process, the Code states that ‘some 
lobbying can give rise to suspicion of improper influence over Parliament. 
Members must have regard to such public perceptions. Members’ dealings with 
lobbyists should always be governed by the principles of integrity and openness 
[of the CSPL]’.192 Significantly, the Code then states that: 
Members should take particular care not to give the impression of giving 
greater weight to representations because they come from paid lobbyists; 
representations should be given such weight as they deserve based on 
their intrinsic merit. Members must in their dealings with lobbyists 
observe the prohibitions on paid advocacy and on the provision of 
parliamentary advice or services for payment or other reward. Members 
should decline all but the most insignificant or incidental hospitality, 
benefit or gift offered by a lobbyist.193 
This passage is notable because it states that decisions should be made on the 
intrinsic merits of ideas. In essence, the passage articulates that members must 
have regard to ‘objectivity’ when making decisions or when mediating between 
different lobbying influences which aligns with analysis of MPs above. 
However, despite the articulations in the passages above, which are broader 
than those in the Commons, the system of enforcing those principles is 
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convoluted which tends to undermine their importance in practice. Where a 
member of the public is concerned about some conduct, they may complain to 
the House of Lords Commissioner for Standards for violations of the Code.194 
Where a breach is found, the Sub-Committee on Lords’ Conduct reviews the 
findings and recommends an appropriate sanction to the Committee for 
Privileges and Conduct.195 That Committee then presents its findings to the 
House who makes a final decision.196 Sanctions are found under section 1 of the 
House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Act 2015. Members may be 
temporarily suspended or expelled from the Lords. The effect of this is explained 
in the House of Lords Reform Act 2014. Under section 4(2) a member becomes 
disqualified from attending the proceedings of the Lords. Under section 4(8), an 
expelled member may not subsequently become a member of the House. 
This process is much more convoluted than in the Commons. Complaints 
are passed through several committees who shall act ‘in accordance with the 
principles of natural justice and fairness’. Nevertheless, the Code expressly 
identifies that the purpose of members is to act in the public interest which means 
that personal financial gain is prohibited (integrity) and that decisions should be 
made on their merits (objectivity). The underlying principles are, therefore, similar 
to those in the Commons. Further, there is a statutory mechanism (albeit, one 
which barely involves the public) for removing members deemed to have 
breached the Code for not acting in the public interest. 
2.3 Summary: The Role of Peers 
Since 1999, the Lords has become much more active in holding successive 
governments to account on issues which, members would argue, reflect public 
misgivings on certain policies such as the defeat on tax credits. Members are less 
constrained than MPs by party loyalty and are not as strongly influenced by career 
progression opportunities since most are older and have established careers. They 
are guided by broad public opinion on issues and have determined that their 
purpose is to act in the public interest. Like the Commons, this is made explicit 
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in a Code which incorporates the Nolan Principles. However, the Lords go 
further by integrating the definitions of the Nolan Principles as defined by the 
CSPL. These are much broader and are considered when investigating and 
sanctioning Members.  
Therefore, the expectations of peers to act in the public interest go further 
than MPs. However, for the diversion framework, the same articulated ‘purpose’ 
is sought for MPs, peers and ministers to keep the framework consistent. Thus, 
‘integrity’ here also means the accrual personal financial benefits which are clearly 
prohibited in the Lords. For ‘objectivity’ it is submitted that peers should assess 
ideas on their merits or inherent worthiness in the sense that they should not give 
greater weight to representations arising from lobbying that is underpinned by 
corruption or political inequality. This is slightly broader than the articulation 
stated in the passage earlier which specified ‘paid lobbyists’ (the lobbyists for the 
diversion framework need not be paid). However, the explicit inclusion of 
‘objectivity’ as defined by the CSPL in the Code—that decisions should be made 
impartially, fairly and on merit, using the best evidence and without discrimination 
or bias—supports the use of ‘objectivity’ as defined for the diversion framework. 
For those reasons, like MPs, it is submitted that peers should also act in the public 
interest and that a diversion from the public interest can be tested using the 
principles of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’. 
3. Ministers and the Public Interest 
The analysis below reveals that, unlike the Commons and Lords, there are few 
expressions holding that ministers should act in the public interest. Consequently, 
a normative argument is made at the end of this section that ministers should act 
in the public interest by upholding ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’ in the same manner 
articulated above. The analysis is undertaken in three parts. First, the role of 
ministers in terms of upholding the public interest is examined by reference to 
the relationship between the Government and citizens. Second, codes and rules 
are analysed. It will be seen that the ‘public interest’ is lacking in those rules and 
the criterion of ‘objectivity’ is explicitly omitted. Thus, third, the normative 
arguments noted above are articulated and justified. 
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3.1 Examining the Role of Ministers 
The relationship between the Government and citizens is very different to that 
between Parliament and citizens. Instead of being ‘rule by the people’,197 the 
Government is a problem that should be controlled.198 
This can be seen with elections. Whilst ministers seek to uphold their 
manifesto pledges,199 they are not bound to keep their promises as was noted by 
Lord Brandon of Oakbrook in Bromley LBC v Greater London Council.200 His 
Lordship stated that it is ‘entirely wrong’ for elected officials to ‘regard themselves 
as bound to […] their election promises, whatever the cost and other 
countervailing considerations may turn out to be’.201 Indeed, there are sometimes 
high profile cases of governments ‘breaking promises’.202 Underlying this are 
questions about the importance of manifestos because most voters may not read 
them.203 Even if voters are aware of pledges because of media dissemination of 
that information,204 it is questionable how accurately and fairly those pledges are 
presented in a very pluralised media in the UK.205 Therefore, it has been argued 
that elections are a ‘tool’ used by the electorate to control the choices of office-
holders who are conscious of the need for future re-election.206  
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As such, it is unsurprising that the Government is not seen as a device for 
executing the will of the people but as an authority over citizens.207 Indeed, the 
actions of ministers often seem ‘to have little clear relationship to a defensible 
conception of the public interest’.208 Part of that is simply because of the demands 
of the role. Ministers do not have the time for broad deliberations to reach 
decisions that reflect the ‘balance of reasons’ in the ‘public interest’.209 Instead: 
Life for senior politicians is a stimulating, enervating and exhausting blur 
of appointments, questions, airplanes, meetings, negotiations, limousines, 
briefings, hotel rooms, debates in the legislature, church basements, 
phone calls, decisions, community centres, speeches, boardrooms, 
interviews, more questions, appearances and controversies […] the 
general lack of preparation for members, their constant arriving and 
leaving, the shortage of time, the phone calls, the reading and writing of 
messages, the fatigue and drowsiness, the effects of alcohol and food […] 
it absorbs the totality of the energy and imagination of any typical human 
being for as long as it lasts.210 
This busy reality keeps ministers away from constituents and creates difficulties 
for them in coming to conclusions about what people want and to articulate the 
preferences of citizens.211 That is not to say ministers do not consider the views 
of citizens; they usually consult with interested parties, the wider public and derive 
political information from special advisers (see below).212 However, the 
relationship between citizens and ministers is mostly characterised as involving a 
set of political factors (such as elections and polls) which help to exercise 
constraints on the Government that are constant rather than intermittent. 
Consequently, it is unsurprising that the ‘public interest’ is barely expressed in the 
rules pertaining to ministers. 
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3.2 The Omission of the ‘Public Interest’ in Rules 
3.2.1 The Ministerial Code and the Annex 
Ministers follow the Ministerial Code213 which is not afforded the same 
importance as the Codes for the Commons and Lords. Hine and Peele highlight 
that: 
For the government, the Code has never been the ‘public framework of 
rules against which conduct should be judged’. It was never intended to 
be a justiciable code like others, and no government has accepted pressure 
of the CSPL and the PASC for it to be seen this way.214 
It is, therefore, unsurprising that there is no requirement in the Code for ministers 
to act in the public interest. Faulkner and Everett note that: 
Beyond relevant provisions of the criminal and civil law and parliamentary 
rules of conduct affecting Members generally there are few if any ‘rules’ 
regarding ministerial responsibility which guide and bind ministers in their 
official capacity.215 
The furthest the Code goes to establishing such duties is found in the following 
provision of the Code: 
1.2 The Ministerial Code should be read against the background of the 
overarching duty on Ministers to comply with the law and to protect the 
integrity of public life. They are expected to observe the Seven Principles 
of Public Life.216 
However, there is little reiteration of the Nolan Principles within the Code itself. 
They are annexed to the Code along with any mention of the ‘public interest’. 
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Thus, for the Ministerial Code, the Nolan Principles are a footnote. Aside from 
those principles, there are typical provisions regarding conflicts of interest: 
f. Ministers must ensure that no conflict arises, or appears to arise, 
between their public duties and their private interests.217  
The provision requires that ministers act in the interests of the public ahead of 
any personal interests, but the ‘public interest’ is not emphasised in the same 
manner as the rules for the Commons and Lords. There is also a more decisive 
division between the tasks of representatives in their role as ministers versus their 
role as constituency MPs: 
6.5 Ministers are free to make their views about constituency matters 
known to the responsible Minister by correspondence, leading 
deputations or by personal interview provided they make clear that they 
are acting as their constituents’ representative and not as a Minister.218 
This contrasts with the Commons where MPs argue that their role is to act in the 
interests of constituents. For ministers, there is an acceptance that their decisions 
could conflict with those of their constituents. This duality of functions highlights 
a divergence regarding the role of office-holders in their capacity as ministers 
versus their role as MPs which is underlined in the following provision: 
7.23 Gifts given to Ministers as constituency MPs or members of a 
political Party fall within the rules relating to the Registers of Members’ 
and Lords’ Interests.219 
Finally, the Code is not underpinned by statute and has a weak process for 
investigating breaches.220 The Prime Minister decides whether allegations will be 
referred to an Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests—a role for which 
selections are not subject to open recruitment or pre-appointment hearings and 
for which the Prime Minister decides whom to appoint.221 Further, ministers will 
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only resign where there is a clear and serious failing and is thus seldom resorted 
to.222 
Therefore, the ‘public interest’ is not expressed in the Ministerial Code 
except for in the Nolan Principles annexed to the Code. The Code draws a clear 
distinction between the work of individuals in their capacity as ministers and as 
MPs which underlines that ministers operate under different expectations. They 
are not representatives but exist to pursue the Government’s programme. At 
most, it could be argued that annexing the Nolan Principles should mean that 
ministers follow the relevant principles that articulate the public interest otherwise 
they should be omitted from the Code. However, that is not a clear enough 
threshold to establish that as a purpose. 
3.2.2 The Code of Conduct for Special Advisers 
Special advisers are a type of civil servant that occupy roles in the Treasury and 
Downing Street pursuant to Part 1 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance 
Act 2010. In their role, they support ministers by providing political advice and 
assistance. They are fully integrated into the functioning of government223—or as 
one MP has described it, ‘glued at the hip’ of ministers which underlies their 
potential influence.224 For these reasons, they are an obvious target for lobbyists. 
This has led to calls for them to be covered by the TLA 2014 but was resisted by 
the Government of the time. The remnants of that tussle can be seen in section 
2(4) of the Act which states that future regulations may amend the Act to include 
special advisers.  
An analysis of the Code of Conduct of Special Advisers is particularly 
illuminating not for what it stipulates but for what it explicitly omits. This reveals 
much about the nature of Government with regard to its purpose. The Code 
states that special advisers are:  
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Bound by the standards of integrity and honesty required of all civil servants 
as set out in the Civil Service Code. However, they are exempt from the 
general requirement that civil servants should be appointed on merit and 
behave with impartiality and objectivity, or that they need to retain the 
confidence of future governments of a different political complexion.225 
It was noted above that ‘impartiality’ is only required where it is explicitly stated 
such as for civil servants. The Code for special advisers recognises that people 
working in government are also not bound by such a principle and has thus 
exempted a select few civil servants (special advisers) working in government 
from that obligation.226 As the Code states, ‘they are employed to serve the 
objectives of the Prime Minister, the Government and the Minister(s) for whom 
they work’.227  
Therefore, the Code reveals that special advisers are not required to act 
with impartiality or objectivity which underlines how ministers are also not 
generally expected to be ‘objective’ as defined by the Nolan Principles. Instead, 
special advisers serve the Prime Minster and other ministers who set objectives 
and targets based on the Government’s programme. 
3.3 A Normative Purpose of Ministers 
Acting in the public interest is not a purpose of ministers. The relationship 
between the Government and citizens is different to that between citizens and 
Parliament. Government is a problem to control and not a mechanism through 
which the public interest is upheld. Further, there are few rules regarding the 
public interest. The Ministerial Code relegates the Nolan Principles to an annex 
rather than incorporating them, and the Prime Minister makes any disciplinary 
decisions in an arbitrary process. The Code of Conduct for Special Advisers 
explicitly omits the principles of objectivity and impartiality; noting that the role 
of special advisers is to serve the objectives of the Prime Minister and other 
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Ministers. This underlines that people in government are not expected to be 
objective. 
Nevertheless, the analysis above does not detract from normative 
arguments about the ‘public interest’ acting as a useful as a high-level principle 
against which problematic lobbying of ministers can be gauged. For the Lords 
and Commons at least, the analysis offers a very narrow conception of the public 
interest; that MPs and peers should act with integrity by not taking financial or 
other inducements. For objectivity, MPs and peers should assess ideas on their 
merits or inherent worthiness in the sense that they should not give greater weight 
to representations arising from lobbying that is underpinned by corruption or 
political inequality. It is argued that these should also apply to ministers. 
On integrity, Ewing argues that, as a general principle, parties with a 
mandate have a duty to govern in the public interest and that should not be 
compromised by offers of personal favours, corruption or conflicts of interest.228 
On objectivity, Rowbottom suggests that objections to legislative strategies could 
be advanced on the grounds that money (such as donations from lobbyists) might 
cause government decisions to be based on factors other than the merits of the 
policy in question.229 Indeed, it would be surprising if ministers would not also 
agree with such conceptions. It should certainly be held by a Prime Minister that 
the integrity of a minister is undermined and that it would not be in the public 
interest if they take a bribe or if there was a blatant conflict of interest. It is also 
uncontroversial to argue that the ministers should consider the merits of ideas 
when making decisions and, in doing so, be sensitive to lobbying underpinned by 
corruption and political inequalities.  
Any UK Government today recognises that some forms of lobbying may 
result in decisions that are not in the public interest. That is why ministers are 
prohibited from lobbying the Government for two years under the Ministerial 
Code.230 It is also why there have been significant regulatory developments of 
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British Public Life since the 1990s which have arisen specifically in response to 
lobbying scandals involving ministers.231 Therefore, it is rational to argue that 
ministers should not be diverted from acting in the public interest by problematic 
lobbying, and that the criteria of integrity and objectivity are sensible gauges to 
assist with such a determination. 
4. Summary: The Meaning of ‘Integrity’ and ‘Objectivity’ 
It has been argued that two criteria can be used to gauge when there has been a 
diversion from the purpose of acting in the public interest.  
The criterion of ‘integrity’ is uncontroversial and can be adapted from the 
codes analysed. It means that ‘holders of public office should not place 
themselves under any financial or other obligation to lobbyists that might 
influence them in the performance of their official duties’.232 There are clear 
expressions for MPs, peers and ministers that they must act with integrity in this 
regard. Additionally, the requirement to act with integrity is an established 
principle of legislative ethics. Thompson notes that decision-makers should play 
by the rules.233 They have obligations to the institution they belong to and their 
colleagues, and those who abuse privileges cause damage to the legislative 
process.234 Following codes, resolutions, laws—especially linked to personal 
financial gain—are matters of integrity. Specific questions to test when officials 
are not acting with integrity are created in Chapter 4. 
The criterion of ‘objectivity’ is more complex. The analysis above reveals 
that ‘objectivity’ does not mean that office-holders should make decisions 
‘impartially’. However, it is argued that ‘objectivity’ can mean that decisions 
should be made on their ‘merits’. However, the ‘merits’ means something broader 
than the context offered in the Commons Code of Conduct which limits ‘merits’ 
to specific tasks such as public appointments. Instead, it means something similar 
to the following passage in the Lords Code of Conduct: 
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Members should take particular care not to give the impression of giving 
greater weight to representations because they come from paid lobbyists; 
representations should be given such weight as they deserve based on 
their intrinsic merit.235 
This conception, however, does not go far enough because it states that member 
should not give the ‘impression’ of giving greater weight to the representation of 
‘paid’ lobbyists. It should simply be the case that they ‘should not’ give more 
weight to representations arising from lobbying that is concerning. Thus, it is 
argued that ‘officeholders should assess ideas on their merits or inherent 
worthiness in the sense that they should not give greater weight to representations 
arising from lobbying that is underpinned by corruption or political inequality’. 
Specific questions to test when officials are not acting with objectivity are created 
in Chapters 5. This use of ‘objectivity’ pertaining to ‘merits’ is justified in the 
lobbying context for two reasons. 
First, objective decision-making based on merits is stated clearly in the 
codes of both the Commons and Lords and is, therefore, already used. Although, 
the ‘merits’ means different things to those institutions which highlights that it is 
not a rigid concept. It is also a well-established principle within the field of 
legislative ethics and is thus supported in the literature. Indeed, Thompson argues 
that officials should make decisions on their merits. This does not mean they 
should remain completely independent.236 Instead, the aim is to be independent 
of influences that are ‘clearly irrelevant’ to the merits of policies or promoting the 
public goods.237 The phrase ‘clearly irrelevant’ is not helpful and, thus, the 
questions developed in Chapters 4 and 5 are preferred. At this stage, it is 
hypothesised that influences which will undermine the goal of objectivity are 
those which have gained prominence because of lobbying efforts underpinned by 
corruption or political inequalities. For example, where wealthy individuals exert 
significant influence over a decision in their self-interest, and others cannot 
compete with that effort financially, then objectivity may be undermined because 
of financial inequalities. This would not be the case where 100,000 people donate 
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£1 to raise awareness for a cause. That issue gained attention because most could 
afford £1 to promote the cause which is in the interests of many people. 
Second, lobbying is clearly recognised as a problem by decision-makers and 
others, and there have been significant developments in the regulation of British 
public life since the 1990s in response to lobbying scandals. That is abundantly 
clear from the sources analysed above which enunciate specific rules on lobbying. 
The criterion of objectivity is necessary to gauge many of the problems with 
lobbying because there are matters which ‘integrity’ alone simply will not capture. 
Lobbying is a complex phenomenon. In this regard, it will be seen in the following 
chapters that ‘objectivity’ is a sufficient gauge for those complexities. 
For these reasons, it is argued that objectivity, as defined for the diversion 
framework, is a justified gauge for testing whether office-holders have been 
diverted from acting in the public interest because of problematic lobbying. 
5. The Relevance of ‘Undermining Public Trust’ 
Finally, it is important to explain why the ‘public trust’ is relevant to Part 2 of the 
diversion framework. In the definition of ‘institutional diversion’ lobbying should 
divert decision-makers from their purpose of acting in the public interest or 
should weaken their ability to act in the public interest, including weakening either 
the public’s trust in Parliament or the Government or their inherent trustworthiness 
because of that influence. 
Lessig argues that some institutions require that the public trust their 
recommendations. Influences which make it difficult to trust those 
recommendations are ‘therefore a corruption of it’.238 The public might lose 
confidence in democracy which ‘seems like a charade, we lose faith in its process’ 
and participation declines.239 Alternatively, he argues that the inherent 
trustworthiness of an institution might be weakened if people are not given 
reasons to trust it.240 Similarly, Thompson notes the importance of sustaining 
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public confidence.241 The actions of officials are crucial for maintaining public 
trust, and they should provide assurances that they are acting for the right 
reasons.242  
That is not to say that greater regulation will restore public trust.243 It is 
acknowledged that regulation may lower public confidence further by, for 
example, revealing problems that were previously unknown.244 However, the 
effect of regulations aside, there are public concerns about lobbying. The British 
public has very little trust in politicians, with less than one-third of citizens in 
polling expressing that they trust politicians.245 Polls reveal that 88% of people 
believe that lobbying poses a big or significant risk to the policy making process.246 
Further, the increased regulations that arise from lobbying scandals highlight how 
office-holders are also concerned with the damaging effect of lobbying on public 
trust. Indeed, one of the purposes of the CSPL (created in response to lobbying 
scandals in the 1990s) was to foster greater public trust in the political system.247 
The need to enhance public confidence was also recognised in the Government’s 
Anticorruption Plan in 2014 which states that: 
Well-publicised events concerning MPs expenses and lobbying have 
damaged public confidence in the Parliamentary system. The 
Government is committed to supporting the Parliamentary authorities to 
put in place proportionate controls to address corruption risks and ensure 
public confidence.248  
Thus, there are significant concerns about trust in the political process being 
undermined by lobbying. It is, therefore, sensible that ‘undermining trust’ forms 
                                                          
241 Thompson, ‘Two Concepts’ (n 9) 12 
242 Thompson, Ethics in Congress (n 234) 19–24. 
243 Richard L Hasen, ‘Book Review: Fixing Washington’ (2013) 126 Harv L Rev 550, 568. 
244 Hine and Peele (n 127) 15, 211 & 302; see generally, Jacob Rowbottom, ‘Corruption, 
Transparency, and Reputation: The Role of Publicity in Regulating Political Donations’ (2016) 
75(2) Cambridge Law Journal 398. 
245 Hine and Peele (n 127) 5. 
246 Alliance for Lobbying Transparency, ‘YouGov Poll Shows Overwhelming Public Support for 
Changes to Lobbying (Scotland) Bill’ (ALT, 3 January 2016) 
<http://www.lobbyingtransparency.org/blog/2016/1/6/yougov-poll-shows-overwhelming-
public-support-for-changes-to-lobbying-scotland-bill> accessed 23 December 2016. 
247 Hine and Peele (n 127) 62. 
248 UK Government, UK Anti-Corruption Plan (HM Government, December, 2014) 28, para 4.27. 
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part of the institutional diversion framework. Whether regulation restores trust 
can be determined in other studies.  
Conclusion 
For Part 2 of the diversion framework, it is argued that ‘acting in the public 
interest’ is a rational purpose for gauging when lobbying causes a diversion. 
Further, the criteria of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’ are sufficient for testing whether 
office-holders have been diverted from that purpose. These criteria flow not only 
from the detailed analysis undertaken above but also from Lessig and 
Thompson’s analyses on legislative ethics. In this regard, the approach in this 
thesis uses both Lessig and Thompson’s approaches and combines the ‘public 
interest’ and ‘norms of office’ approaches highlighted in Chapter 2. Acting in the 
‘public interest’ offers a positive high-level principled approach to identifying a 
‘purpose’; similar to Lessig’s approach. At the same time, gauging a diversion 
from that purpose by reference to the criteria of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’ builds 
upon Thompson’s more granular approach of determining when ethics have been 
breached by reference to ‘principles’. 
Therefore, the purpose of ‘acting in the public interest’ and the criteria of 
‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’ from Part 2 of the diversion framework. Chapters 4 
and 5 will develop Part 1 as well as Part 2 further. Chapter 4 establishes elements 
for identifying individual corruption and institutional corruption for Part 1. It 
develops specific questions for testing when ‘integrity’ is undermined for Part 2. 
Chapter 5 establishes the elements of political equality for Part 1, and the develops 
specific questions to test when ‘objectivity’ is undermined for Part 2. 
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4 
Identifying Corruption Concerns and Testing for 
a Diversion Using ‘Integrity’ 
____________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
There are broadly three concerns expressed about lobbying in the literature; 
individual corruption, institutional corruption and political equality. In this thesis, 
it is contended that the concerns are not articulated clearly or coherently. This 
chapter offers a coherent structure for identifying corruption concerns by 
establishing the elements of individual corruption and institutional corruption for 
Part 1 of the diversion framework. Further, building on Chapter 3, specific 
questions are developed for Part 2 to test when ‘integrity’ has been undermined 
thereby causing a diversion. ‘Integrity’ may also be undermined because of 
political equality concerns but is more likely a corruption concern and so the 
questions are developed in this chapter. The scope of this chapter is highlighted 
in Figure 1 below: 
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Figure 1: The Scope of Chapter 4. 
 
The sections below analyse and outline four elements of individual corruption 
arising from laws, codes and resolutions and three elements of institutional 
corruption. Institutional corruption theory was developed by Dennis Thompson 
in the 1990s and has been adapted by Lawrence Lessig who develops a theory of 
dependence corruption. It is argued that the elements in Thompson’s theory are 
too contingent and too complicated for the institutional diversion framework and 
that Lessig’s elements are insufficient. Thompson’s elements are too contingent 
because there are too many steps for identifying a corruption. They are too 
complicated because he uses terminology that is overly complex and unnecessary. 
Lessig’s elements are insufficient because a dependency cannot describe many of 
the problems with lobbying; although it describes an important one. As such, 
both theories are adapted to offer three elements for identifying institutional 
corruption that are easier to follow, but which are sufficient for an analysis of 
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complex lobbying concerns in the UK. The analysis below begins with individual 
corruption.  
1. The Elements of ‘Individual Corruption’ 
The most obvious concern which may cause a diversion is individually corrupt 
conduct. The focus here is on the conduct of lobbyists and decision-makers 
working in their official capacities as opposed to their private lives. For office-
holders, Thompson distinguishes between personal and legislative ethics:  
The public may think less of politicians who enjoy hard-core pornography 
or commit adultery, but as long as they keep these activities private and 
do not let them affect their public responsibilities, legislative ethics does 
not proscribe them […] Conversely, some conduct that is permissible or 
even praiseworthy in personal ethics may violate the principles of 
legislative ethics. Returning a favor or giving preference to a friend is 
often admirable in private life, but […] is more often ethically 
questionable and sometimes even criminal [in the legislative context].1 
Therefore, a line is drawn in legislative ethics between the conduct of individuals 
in their official capacities and their private lives. In reality, that distinction may be 
blurred by a ‘trial by media’ whereby politicians resign because of some corrupt 
private conduct. However, for legislative ethics, the distinction is maintained. It 
is not only the conduct of politicians that is relevant but also the conduct of 
lobbyists. 
Below, it is argued that there are four ‘elements’ of individual corruption 
that may arise in the lobbying context. Namely, bribery, impermissible donations 
to political parties, lobbying whilst unregistered and conflict of interest rules. 
1.1 Element One: Bribery 
Bribery is prohibited by the Bribery Act 2010 (BA), codes of conduct and 
resolutions. It a concern because it is immoral.2 In the criminal law context, the 
                                                          
1 Dennis F Thompson, Ethics in Congress: From Individual to Institutional Corruption (The Brookings 
Institution 1995) 12. 
2 Scott Turow, ‘What's Wrong with Bribery’ (1985) 4(4) Journal of Business Ethics 249, 250. 
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moral ‘content’ of bribery can be divided into three elements. Culpability (the 
mental element such as intent or belief), harmfulness (the degree to which harm 
is caused) and wrongfulness (the violation of specific moral norms like cheating, 
deception or promise-breaking).3 Since lobbying pervades the political process, 
bribery in the lobbying context poses particularly sensitive risks to society. It may 
lead to inappropriate grounds for decision-making, create political instability, 
distort markets, undermine legitimacy or the credibility of institutions, stifle 
development, waste resources, undermine public confidence, lead to unfair 
outcomes, injustice and inefficiency.4 The BA 2010 was enacted to deal with such 
concerns.5 It may be surprising then that the BA 2010 does not contain a specific 
offence covering the conduct of public officials. Indeed, there were concerns 
during the bill stages of the BA 2010 that public officials should be labelled 
explicitly because higher standards are expected of them.6 Nevertheless, those 
concerns were unwarranted because the Act clearly covers the conduct of public 
officials as well as lobbyists.  
Under section 3(2), the functions and activities covered include ‘functions 
of a public nature’, ‘activities connected with a business’, ‘performed in the course 
of a person’s employment’ or ‘performed by or on behalf of a body of persons’. 
The terms are undefined, but Section 16 states that ‘this Act applies to individuals 
in the public service of the Crown as it applies to other individuals’. Therefore, 
the Act clearly covers the conduct of public officials such as those working within 
Parliament and the Government. It also covers the conduct of professional 
lobbyists or any citizen who engages in lobbying. Further, sections 3(3) and 3(4) 
highlight the expectation that public officials perform their duty in ‘good faith’ 
and with ‘impartially’. As such, the BA 2010 covers public officials and thereby 
                                                          
3 Stuart P Green, ‘What’s Wrong With Bribery’ in R.A. Duff and Stuart Green (eds), Defining 
Crimes: Essays on The Special Part of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2005) 151. 
4 ibid; Jeremy Horder, ‘Bribery as a Form of Criminal Wrongdoing’ [2011] 127 Law Quarterly 
Review 37, 42–43. 
5 There were several laws prior to the BA 2010 on bribery. For an excellent overview of the 
development of those laws, from the Victorian period to the present day, see, David Hine and 
Gillian Peele, The Regulation of Standards in British Public Life: Doing the Right Thing? (Manchester 
University Press 2016) Ch 2. 
6 Peter Alldridge, ‘Reforming bribery: Law Commission Consultation Paper 185: (1) Bribery 
Reform and the Law - Again’ [2008] Criminal Law Review 671, 678. 
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covers the lobbying of decision-makers in Parliament and the Government. 
Sections 1, 2 and 7 of the Act detail where lobbying may breach the Act. 
Section 1 covers bribing another person, making it an offence for a person 
(‘P’) to offer, promise or give a financial or other advantage to another person in 
two cases. First, where P intends the advantage to bring about the improper 
performance by another person of a ‘relevant function’ or ‘activity’, or to reward 
such improper performance.7 Second, where P knows or believes that the 
acceptance of the advantage offered, promised or given in itself constitutes 
improper performance of a relevant function.8 ‘Improper performance’ means 
performance which amounts to a breach of an expectation that ‘a person will act 
in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust’.9  
The test for deciding whether a function or activity constitutes improper 
performance is what a reasonable person would expect in relation to the 
performance of the function or activity.10 For example, if a person offers ‘a sum 
of money to a Member of Parliament, knowing or believing that acceptance of 
the offer would mean that a reasonable person in the UK would consider that 
MP to have breached the expectation placed in him by the public by virtue of 
being in a position of trust, then [that person] will have committed an offence’.11 
Therefore, section 1 covers bribery from the perspective of a lobbyist offering a 
bribe. Section 2 covers bribery from the standpoint of the official receiving a 
bribe. 
Under Section 2(1), an offence is committed where P requests, agrees to 
receive or accepts a financial or other advantage with the intention of performing 
a relevant activity improperly. The improper performance may be conducted by 
someone other than the person receiving an advantage, and a request can be made 
through a third party. The advantage should be accepted or requested in 
anticipation of, or as a reward for, the improper performance and it does not 
matter whether the person giving the advantage knows or believes that the 
                                                          
7 Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance (MOJ, 2011) 10. 
8 ibid. 
9 ibid. 
10 ibid. 
11 David Aaronberg and Nichola Higgins, ‘Legislative Comment: The Bribery Act 2010: All Bark 
and No Bite...?’ [2010] Archbold Review 6, 7. 
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performance is improper. Therefore, section 2 covers the conduct of an official 
receiving a bribe.  
Further, there are provisions regarding bribery by corporations which are 
relevant to companies offering lobbying services or companies which have in-
house lobbyists. Section 7 creates a corporate liability offence for commercial 
organisations which fail to prevent bribery. An offence is committed under 
section 7(1) where a person working for a commercial organisation bribes another 
person to obtain or retain business or an advantage for the company. There is a 
defence available to organisations who can prove they have in place adequate 
procedures for preventing bribery (these are called proportionate procedures, 
top-level commitment, risk assessment, due diligence, communication, training 
and monitoring and review).  
Those working as lobbyists in a corporate capacity may thus breach the BA 
2010 where they—on behalf of their company or organisation—provide gifts, 
charitable and political donations, demands for facilitation payments or 
hospitality and promotional expenditure.12 Whilst hospitality is not prohibited by 
the BA 2010 prosecutors may investigate if it is thought that hospitality is 
provided to bribe someone. In determining a potential breach, prosecutors will 
look at the level of hospitality offered, the way in which it was provided and the 
level of influence the person receiving it has on the business decision in 
question.13 Whilst the guidance to the Act indicates that hospitality can be 
‘employed as bribes’,14 it concedes that hospitality is ‘very unlikely to engage the 
Act’ under section 7.15  
Most likely, a prosecution will not be sought where a company creates a 
document that will ‘pass muster’ that it has in place the adequate procedures noted 
above.16 In practice, corporate hospitality is more likely a concern about 
institutional corruption or political inequality (covered in Chapter 5) rather than 
individual corruption. It is, nevertheless, possible for hospitality to satisfy the 
                                                          
12 Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance (n 7) 22. 
13 Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Quick start guide (MOJ, 2010) 7. 
14 Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance (n 7) 12. 
15 Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Quick start guide (n 13) 7. 
16 David Aaronberg and Nichola Higgins, ‘All Hail the Bribery Act - The Toothless Wonder!’ 
[2011] 6 Archbold Review 1, 5. 
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elements of individual corruption and is, for that reason, considered here. The 
BA 2010 thus legislates for conduct which covers the work of public officials and 
those who attempt to influence them.  
Ultimately, bribery is rare and the threshold for proving it is high. Only a 
very serious and obvious breach is likely to be prosecuted. Further, section 7 is 
unlikely to be engaged for corporate hospitality. Nevertheless, lobbying may fall 
within the elements of the BA 2010 either where a person, in their capacity as a 
public official, accepts a benefit in return for a political favour or where the 
lobbyist offers a benefit. In such circumstances, the public official is receiving a 
personal benefit which does not serve any institutional purpose and is wholly for 
the benefit of the individual. Bribery through lobbying is, therefore, prohibited 
and is one method by which office-holders can become diverted from their 
purpose of acting in the public interest. 
The prohibition of bribery has also long been established by codes of 
conduct and resolutions of Government and Parliament. For resolutions, as long 
ago as 1695, the House of Commons resolved that: ‘The Offer of any Money, or 
other Advantage, to any Member of Parliament, for the promoting of any Matter 
whatsoever, depending, or to be transacted, in Parliament, is a high Crime and 
Misdemeanour, and tends to the Subversion of the Constitution’.17 The 
Resolution is thus concerned with the corrupt influence of money through 
bribery. It is also specifically concerned with bribery in the lobbying context as 
evidenced by the Resolution being encapsulated within the House of Commons 
Code of Conduct within the ‘Lobbying for Reward or Consideration’ section.18  
There were further resolutions in subsequent years. In 1858, the House 
resolved that: ‘It is contrary to the usage and derogatory to the dignity of this 
House, that any of its Members should bring forward, promote or advocate, in 
this House, any proceeding or measure in which he may have acted or been 
concerned for or in consideration of any pecuniary fee or reward’.19 Another 
                                                          
17 Resolution of 2 May 1695: Against offering Bribes to Members, see House of House of 
Commons, The Code of Conduct together with The Guide to the Rules Relating to the Conduct of Members 
(HC 2015, 1076) 51. 
18 ibid. Furthermore, the Resolution makes clear the specific concern of the bribe causing a 
‘subversion of the constitution’. 
19 ibid 52, Resolution of 22 June 1858, Reward to Members. 
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Resolution arose in 1947 when an MP, WJ Brown, agreed to be the ‘Parliamentary 
General Secretary’ for a Civil Service union. Following this, the House resolved 
that: 
No Member of the House shall, in consideration of any remuneration, 
fee, payment, reward or benefit in kind, direct or indirect, which the 
Member or any member of his or her family has received, is receiving, or 
expects to receive—  
(i) advocate or initiate any cause or matter on behalf or any outside 
body or individual,  
or  
(ii) urge any other Member of either House of Parliament, 
including Ministers, to do so,  
by means of any speech, Question, Motion, introduction of a Bill or 
amendment to a Motion or Bill, or any approach, whether oral or in 
writing, to Ministers or servants of the Crown.20 
The resolutions demonstrate that Parliament has consistently maintained that 
bribery in the lobbying context to be criminal. Indeed, each resolution was passed 
in response to a specific scandal. For example, the Resolution of 1695 was passed 
following a bribe to the Speaker by the City of London in connection with the 
passage of a bill.21 Therefore, individuals accepting personal benefits in such 
circumstances are acting corruptly. Further, the codes of conduct for MPs and 
Lords also prohibit bribery as does the Ministerial Code. The House of Commons 
Code states that: 
The acceptance by a Member of a bribe to influence his or her conduct 
as a Member, including any fee, compensation or reward in connection 
with the promotion of, or opposition to, any Bill, Motion, or other matter 
                                                          
20 ibid 52, Resolution of 15 July 1947, amended on 6 November 1995 and 14 May 2002: 
Conduct of Members. 
21 David Judge, Representation: Theory and Practice in Britain (Routledge 1999) 104. 
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submitted, or intended to be submitted to the House, or to any 
Committee of the House, is contrary to the law of Parliament.22 
Furthermore, under section 173(1)(b) Representation of the People Act 1983, a 
person convicted of a corrupt or illegal practice shall vacate their office if they are 
already elected to a seat in the Commons. The House of Lords Code states that 
Members: 
Must not seek to profit from membership of the House by accepting or 
agreeing to accept payment or other incentive or reward in return for 
providing parliamentary advice or services.23 
The Ministerial Code states that: 
It is a well established and recognised rule that no Minister should accept 
gifts, hospitality or services from anyone which would, or might appear 
to, place him or her under an obligation.24 
Whilst the rules consistently prohibit bribery, they are limited in their focus on 
the receiver of the bribe; the public official. Therefore, a drawback of the 
resolutions and codes for the diversion framework is their narrow focus on the 
receiver of the bribe (the decision-maker) and omission of the briber (the 
lobbyist). Nevertheless, the BA 2010 provides adequate coverage for both. 
1.2 Element Two: Impermissible Donations 
Another form of individual corruption relevant to lobbying arises in the context 
of permissible donations under electoral law. Donations are relevant because they 
can be used by lobbyists to influence politicians.25 Section 54 Political Parties, 
Elections and Referendums Act (PPERA) 2000 defines what are permissible 
donations to political parties in the UK. Section 61 covers offences concerned 
with the evasion of restrictions on donations. A person commits an offence where 
they knowingly enter into, or knowingly do, any act which facilitates (whether by 
                                                          
22 House of Commons, The Code of Conduct (n 17) 5. 
23 House of Lords, Code of Conduct for Members of the House of Lords (HL 2015, HL Paper 3) 4. 
24 Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code (Ministerial Code, 2015) 17. 
25 The issue arose recently in Cruddas v Calvert [2015] EWCA Civ 171, [2015] EMLR 16. 
Chapter 4 – Corruption and Integrity 
116 
means of any concealment or disguise or otherwise), the making of donations to 
a political party by any person other than a permissible donor. In this regard, the 
Act covers dishonest and corrupt conduct which may arise in the context of 
donations being used to lobby. Lobbyists giving impermissible donations to 
influence would, therefore, be covered by this element in the diversion 
framework. 
1.3 Element Three: Lobbying Whilst Unregistered 
This offence affects a narrow range of individuals under the TLA 2014. Under 
section 12(1), a person cannot carry out a business of consultant lobbying without 
being registered on the lobbying register. Under section 12(2), a consultant 
lobbyist also cannot lobby where their return on the register is inaccurate or 
incomplete. It is an offence for failing to submit information when requested 
under section 12(3), or for supplying inaccurate information under section 12(4). 
The sanction is a summary conviction or a fine under section 12(7). Whilst these 
offences are strictly not ‘corruption’ offences; it is unlikely that a summary 
conviction will be imposed unless there is clearly dishonest and evasive conduct 
which pertains to the corruption of the individual in their professional capacity. 
Therefore, these offences are included under ‘individual corruption’ in the 
diversion framework. 
1.4 Element Four: Conflicts of Interest 
Conflict of interest rules are relevant because they pertain not only to individually 
corrupt personal benefits but also to the undermining of independence (which is 
relevant to testing whether integrity has been undermined). Where conflict of 
interest rules are contravened, independence most likely has been too which will 
result in a diversion 
The House of Commons Code states that MPs shall ‘avoid conflict 
between personal interest[s] and the public interest and resolve any conflict 
between the two, at once, in favour of the public interest’.26 Members are also 
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required to declare their interests in the Register of Members’ Financial 
Interests.27 MPs cannot enter into contractual arrangements which fetter their 
‘complete independence in Parliament’.28 This rule extends to lobbyists: ‘nor may 
an outside body (or person) use any contractual arrangement with [an MP] as an 
instrument by which it controls, or seeks to control, his or her conduct in 
Parliament, or to punish that Member for any parliamentary action’.29 The Code 
states that: 
The rules on lobbying are intended to avoid the perception that outside 
individuals or organisations may reward Members, through payment or in 
other ways, in the expectation that their actions in the House will benefit 
that outside individual or organisation, even if they do not fall within the 
strict definition of paid advocacy.30 
The House of Lords Code contains the same statement on conflicts of interest as 
in the Commons.31 Further, Members of the Lords have a range of outside 
interests which are encouraged in the Code for the expertise that members bring 
from their experience. This includes directorships of companies, public bodies or 
even trade unions.32 However, this must be considered alongside the following 
rule: 
The prohibition on accepting payment in return for parliamentary 
services means that Members may not, in return for payment or other 
incentive or reward, assist outside organisations or persons in influencing 
Members of either House, ministers or officials. This includes seeking by 
means of participation in proceedings of the House to confer exclusive 
benefit upon the organisation (the “no paid advocacy rule”); or making 
use of their position to lobby, or to help others to lobby, Members of 
either House, ministers or officials, by whatever means. A Member may 
never provide parliamentary services in return for payment or other 
                                                          
27 ibid Rule V, Provision 13. 
28 ibid Ch 3, para 3. 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid Ch 3, para 4. 
31 House of Lords, Code of Conduct (n 23) Rule 7. 
32 ibid Rule 18. 
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incentive or reward (regardless of whether the Member intends to register 
and declare the interest).33 
For ministers, the Ministerial Code states that ‘Ministers must ensure that no 
conflict arises, or could reasonably be perceived to arise, between their public 
duties and their private interest, financial or otherwise’.34 Further, upon leaving 
office, ministers are ‘prohibited from lobbying Government for two years’.35 That 
rule is justified to avoid suspicion that they ‘might be influenced by the hope or 
expectation of future employment with a particular firm or organisation’ or that 
‘an employer could make improper use of official information to which a former 
Minister has had access to’.36 
Thus, there are conflict of interest rules applying to MPs, peers and 
ministers which deal with lobbying not strictly confined to bribery. Nevertheless, 
they pertain to the independence of the office-holder and are, therefore, elements 
which can be used to identify individual corruption under Part 1 of the 
framework. 
1.5 Summary: Individual Corruption and Institutional Diversion 
In summary, the first concern about lobbying falling within the institutional 
diversion framework is individual corruption of which there are four elements. 
Namely, bribery, impermissible donations, lobbying whilst being unregistered and 
conflicts of interest. The specific provisions of those elements are accounted for 
by statute, codes and resolutions and can be used to identify individual 
corruption. For example, one would apply the provisions of the BA 2010 to 
identify a concern about bribery or the rules on conflicts of interest to identify 
those concerns. It is only necessary to establish one of the four elements of 
individual corruption before moving to the test in Part 2 of the framework 
(developed at the end of this chapter). The next section examines the elements of 
institutional corruption. 
                                                          
33 ibid Rule 22. 
34 Cabinet Office (n 24) Rule 7.1. 
35 ibid Rule 7.25. 
36 ibid Annex B, Rule 1(a) & (b). 
 
Chapter 4 – Corruption and Integrity 
119 
2. The Elements of ‘Institutional Corruption’  
In this section, Thompson’s theory of institutional corruption37 is examined 
alongside Lessig’s theory of dependence corruption.38 Their theories are helpful 
for identifying concerns about insidious forms of lobbying. Indeed, institutional 
corruption theory moves beyond blatant bribery scandals to consider ‘the 
shadowy world of implicit understandings, ambiguous favors, and political 
advantage’.39 Lord Scott described this type of ‘insidious’ conduct in the House 
of Lords40 case of Magill:41 
[T]his is a case about political corruption. The corruption was not money 
corruption. No one took a bribe. No one sought or received money for 
political favours. But there are other forms of corruption, often less easily 
detectable and therefore more insidious. Gerrymandering, the 
manipulation of constituency boundaries for party political advantage, is 
a clear form of political corruption. So, too, would be any misuse of 
municipal powers, intended, for use in the general public interest but used 
instead for party political advantage […] Political corruption if left 
unchecked, engenders cynicism about elections, about politicians and 
their motives and damages the reputation of democratic government.42 
In the following sections, the theories of Thompson and Lessig are analysed, 
adapted and merged into a coexistent theory of ‘institutional/dependence 
corruption’ consisting of three elements (all of which are necessary when applied) 
for Part 1 of the diversion framework. Below, the three elements are detailed. The 
first two are uncontroversial. However, both academics offer a different third 
element to which significant changes are made in this chapter. Thompson’s third 
element is too contingent and complicated. It is too contingent because there are 
many steps involved and is too complicated because he uses terminology that is 
overly complex and unnecessary. Lessig’s third element is insufficient because his 
                                                          
37 Thompson, Ethics in Congress (n 1). 
38 Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress - and a Plan to Stop It (Twelve 
2011). 
39 Thompson, Ethics in Congress (n 1) 7. 
40 Now the Supreme Court of the UK. 
41 Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] 2 AC 357.  
42 ibid 503, para 132. 
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description of a ‘dependency’ does not account for many concerns about 
institutional corruption.  
2.1 Element One: A Political Benefit to an Official  
The first element is understood by considering the distinction between individual 
corruption and institutional corruption.43 As noted above, for individual 
corruption, a public official taking a bribe in return for a political favour is 
receiving a personal benefit which is not part of the official’s job description. The 
exchange (and whatever influence it may have) does not serve any institutional 
purpose and is, therefore, individual corruption. For institutional corruption, the 
focus is on political benefits rather than personal benefits. Where an official accepts, 
for example, a donation; this is a political benefit.44 The rationale for this element 
is explained by Thompson who argues that: 
When the pursuit of political gain undermines the very process the money 
is supposed to support, politicians not only fail to do their job, they 
disgrace it. They betray the public trust in a more insidious way than when 
they use their office for personal gain, which is after all incidental to their 
role. When they pursue political gain improperly, they betray their duty 
while doing it.45 
It should be emphasised that when Thompson speaks of ‘improper’ gain, he 
describes gains which ‘betray the public trust’ rather than gains that are illegal. 
Thus, there is a distinction between individual corruption and institutional 
                                                          
43 Thompson emphasises that underlying both individual and institutional corruption is the use 
of a public office for private purposes. He states that the agents of institutional corruption are 
‘greedy individuals, grasping factions, and private corporations and organizations that seek to 
control collective authority for their own exclusive purposes. The essence of corruption in this 
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necessary for the diversion framework because one can identify a corruption without reference 
to ‘private interests’. Indeed, Lessig notes that the independence of an institution can be 
diverted whether or not that diversion is caused by private interests. See Dennis F Thompson, 
‘Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy’ (2005) 73 Geo Wash L 
Rev 1036, 1038; Lessig, Republic, Lost (n 38) 338, fn 5. 
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corruption. Whether public officials ‘disgrace’ their job would depend on the 
conduct as not all political gain is improper (considered below). 
2.2 Element Two: A Systematic Service to a Lobbyist 
The second element is that there must be a service provided by the public official 
to the lobbyist. Further, the service offered must be systematic: there is a 
‘persistent pattern of relationships, rather than in episodic or one-time 
interaction’ whether it is the same relationship ongoing or a pattern of behaviour 
by the same official with different recipients.46 Thompson argues that the 
systematic nature of the service makes institutional corruption so destructive 
compared with individual conduct which can be rooted out and removed: 
When the service is provided in a continuing relationship or regular 
practice, especially when the recipient itself is an institution, habits and 
routines are established, expectations generated, and a culture of influence 
developed. This makes it much harder to stop the corruption, or even to 
see the practices as corrupt. When the recipients are organized as 
lobbyists (or more generally when they are financially dependent on 
powerful economic interests in society), the corruption becomes 
embedded in the routines of government.47  
Thus, where a public official, on one occasion, offers their services to a lobbyist, 
this would not fall within institutional corruption. Conversely, where there are 
exchanges between the public official with the same lobbyist time and again, this 
is systematic and thus institutionally corrupt (if the other elements are also 
satisfied). Equally, the exchange may not be with the same lobbyist; a systematic 
service also arises where there is a pattern of behaviour with different people. 
2.3 Element Three: An Improper Exchange  
Significant changes are made to the content and structure of the third element 
articulated by Thompson and Lessig. The logic underpinning the changes is 
detailed below. However, it is helpful to state the adapted form of the element 
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here. Namely, the benefit to the public official (element one) and the systematic 
service given to a lobbyist (element two) is collectively called an ‘exchange’. For 
the third element, that ‘exchange’ must be ‘improper’. To identify impropriety, 
one applies the elements of individual corruption (outlined above) or political 
equality (detailed in Chapter 5). Applying these establishes the reason for the 
impropriety and that there has been an institutional corruption. In this manner, 
there is much crossover between institutional corruption, individual corruption 
and political equality. 
2.3.1 Thompson’s Approach 
Thompson’s articulation of the third element of institutional corruption is 
needlessly complex. He argues that there must be an improper connection 
between the benefit obtained and the service given. The improper connection 
must ‘manifest a tendency that disregards the democratic process’.48 Satisfying 
this element is made overly complex due to the additional sub-elements he 
introduces which makes his theory too contingent and too complicated.49 First, 
one is required to establish a ‘tendency’: 
We have to show only that the official accepted the benefit and provided 
the service under institutional conditions that tend to cause such services 
to be provided in exchange for benefits, or give rise to a reasonable belief 
that such an exchange has taken place.50 
One example of a ‘tendency’ that can damage the democratic process is that of 
access provided to lobbyists: ‘When [officials] travel with lobbyists, providing easy 
and routine access denied to ordinary citizens, they are likely to be participating 
in institutional corruption’.51 Second, having established a ‘tendency’, one is then 
required to show that the tendency ‘disregards’ or ‘weakens’ the democratic 
process by causing ‘damage’ to a core process of the institution. Thompson argues 
                                                          
48 This contrasts with individual corruption where the link between the benefit and service is the 
motive of the individual. 
49 These stages are not explicitly stated by Thompson but were deciphered by Lessig. See 
Lawrence Lessig, ‘Institutional Corruptions’ [2013] Edmond J Safra Working Papers, No 1, 7. 
50 Thompson, ‘Two Concepts’ (n 44) 12. 
51 ibid. According to Thompson, the task of legal regulation is to ‘identify the principles and the 
accompanying procedures that discourage such tendencies’. He notes that the most general 
principle is that ‘officials should make decisions on the basis of considerations that are relevant 
to promoting the purposes of the institution’. 
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that political corruption is a condition in which private interests distort public 
purposes by influencing government to disregard the democratic process. Where 
private interests are subjected to the rigors of a robust democratic process, they 
may earn a legitimate place on the public agenda, and may ultimately be 
transformed into public purposes. However, if those interests are promoted in 
ways that bypass or short-circuit the democratic process, they become agents of 
corruption.52 The corruption ‘occurs not simply because private interests are 
promoted, but because they are promoted without due regard for the rules of a 
legitimate process’.53 
When a legislator accepts a campaign contribution, even while doing a 
favor for the contributor, the political benefit (and any influence it may 
have) may or may not be corrupt. It is not corrupt if the practice promotes 
(or at least does not damage) political competition, citizen representation, 
or other core processes of the institution. But it is corrupt if it is of a type 
that tends to undermine such processes (as indicated by the violation of 
legitimate procedures), and thereby frustrates the primary purposes of the 
institution.54 
Third, to measure whether a practice has ‘damaged’ the democratic process, 
Thompson refers to three principles of legislative ethics. These principles are 
independence (deciding on the merits), fairness (playing by the rules), and 
accountability (sustaining public confidence):55 
Together, the principles imply that a connection is more likely to generate 
institutional corruption the less closely the contribution is connected to 
the merits of conduct it is intended to influence, the less fairly distributed 
the services are, and the less accessible the connection is to the public’.56  
From a regulatory perspective, if the risk of abuse is high then one can justify 
restricting or prohibiting practices that are otherwise legitimate.57  
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The three stages of Thompson’s test are summarised as follows. An institutional 
corruption arises where a benefit is provided to a public official and the public 
official provides a service in return which is systematic in nature. There must be 
an improper connection between the benefit and the service. The improper 
connection is corrupt in some circumstances but not others, and we can use 
certain indicators to determine when there is corruption. The complexity of the 
institutional corruption test is illustrated in Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2: An Overview of Institutional Corruption. 
 
Thompson’s third element is rich in detail but is too contingent and too 
complicated for the institutional diversion framework. First, the terminology used 
in 3(a) (Figure 2 above) unnecessarily restates the elements 1 and 2 of the 
framework. One must establish a ‘tendency’ which means that there must be a 
systematic exchange of a benefit and service. The term ‘tendency’ makes the 
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analysis needlessly complicated when one is essentially seeking to highlight that 
an ‘exchange’ has taken place. Whilst it is straightforward to test whether an 
official has accepted a benefit and provided a service, it is harder to decipher when 
that exchange has ‘tended to cause such services to be provided in exchange for 
benefits, or give rise to a reasonable belief that such an exchange has taken place’. 
The language is unclear which requires further enunciation of what a ‘tendency’ 
means.  
Matters become more complex in sub-element 3(b) which has three sub-
elements itself. It must be established that the ‘tendency’ or ‘exchange’ weakens 
the democratic process. First, the private interest must ‘distort’ public purposes. 
Second, private interests must be promoted without due regard for the rules. 
Third, the elements 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2) must ‘corrupt’ the institution. They are 
corrupt in 3(b)(3) if they ‘damage’ or ‘undermine’ certain principles. Thus in 3(c), 
one tests for ‘damage’ by reference to three principles. 
It is submitted that this approach is too contingent and too complex. 
Establishing a ‘tendency’, ‘distortion’, ‘weakening’, ‘damage’ and ‘corruption’ is 
unnecessary. This problem is highlighted by Lessig who, like Thompson, focuses 
on the corruption of the US Congress from an institutional perspective.58 Lessig 
notes that whilst Thompson provides a ‘perfect description of how money can 
corrupt in politics’ the problem is that: 
Political competition, citizen representation or other core processes are 
very hard ideas to define in a very compelling and clear way. Each evoke 
tones of debate about what is proper political competition, citizen 
representation or other core processes. My challenge was to ask how do 
we get a conception that fits perfectly within this frame but is actually 
easier to grapple with and understand, to see precisely what the problem 
is?59 
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2.3.2 Lessig’s Approach 
To that end, Lessig develops ‘dependence corruption’ which he considers as an 
instance of the corruption of citizen representation. Lessig’s theory broadly aligns 
with the first and second elements of institutional corruption given by 
Thompson. However, Lessig’s approach is also not followed for two reasons. 
First, he introduces an additional element of ‘establishing an intended 
dependency’ of the institution which is illogical within the diversion framework. 
Second, he offers a different third element that is insufficient for identifying 
institutional corruption concerns in the lobbying context. It should be 
emphasised at the outset that Lessig’s approach is less concerned with 
dependencies that exist because of the internal constitutional structure of political 
parties and more concerned with external dependencies. Thus, as will be seen in 
Lessig’s example below, a political party with a close union membership is unlikely 
to result in a ‘dependence corruption’ because the party is ultimately dependent 
upon the ‘people’ broadly conceived. Anyone can join a union and influence the 
policies of the party whereas most are precluded from joining professional 
business associations that lobby political parties. 
Thus, to achieve a less contingent understanding of institutional 
corruption, Lessig focuses on the concept of ‘independence’ querying whether 
there is a better ‘frame’ for examining if certain acts are corrupting or not.60 He 
reformulates the idea of independence to that of an institution with the proper 
dependence. He states that: 
I want to see if in at least some contexts, we can make this problem 
simpler than Thompson sees it. Simple, as in less contingent. Institutional 
corruption certainly is, as Thompson defines it, about tendencies. But can 
we short-circuit the complex reckoning of “tendencies” to see why at least 
our Congress, in the context of our tradition, is obviously institutionally 
corrupt.61  
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For Thompson, ‘independence’ means that a member should act on reasons 
relevant to the merits of public policies or reasons relevant to advancing a process 
that encourages acting on such reasons.62 Lessig argues that this approach ‘feels 
unsatisfying’ when applied to two examples.63 In the first example, a large union 
encourages members to vote in general elections for politicians that have achieved 
at least 90% on the union score card. Further, the politician votes in Parliament 
in a way to assure that he receives 90% or more on the union’s score card.64  
In the second example, there is a large association of businesses 
representing a large pool of wealth. The association regularly and reliably directs 
large donations to the candidate that achieves support of 90% or more on the 
association’s score card. Again, the politician votes in a way to ensure they receive 
90% or more on the score card.65 In both situations, the politicians are receiving 
a benefit (donations) and are offering a service ‘under institutional conditions that 
tend to cause such services to be provided in exchange for benefits’.66  
Finally, Lessig focuses on the principle of ‘independence’ to establish an 
improper connection between the benefit and the service and thus to determine 
whether there is a corruption in either scenario. Lessig argues that Thompson’s 
conception of ‘independence’ (that the institution is independent to the extent 
that deliberations are on the merits), ‘feels unsatisfying when used to guide the 
adjudication’ between his two hypothetical scenarios.67 He states that: 
In both cases, the tendency of the influence is to tempt a legislator 
towards tracking the particular interest rather than tracking “the merits.” 
[…] the reasonable soul, unable to peer into the deliberative process of 
an ordinary legislator, would be justified in believing that it was the power 
that each represented – rather than a fair reading of “the merits” – that 
was guiding the legislator’s behaviour.68  
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Therefore, for Lessig, the politician’s independence has been compromised not 
because the politician has voted without assessing what the merits are. Instead, 
the politician’s independence has been compromised because of the power of the 
union and association. Thus, he seeks to develop another conception of 
‘independence’, called dependence corruption, which he argues better shows 
when conduct is corrupting or not.69  
To explain dependence corruption, Lessig uses the allegory of ‘Lesterland’ 
(which he likens to the political system in the United States). In Lesterland there 
are two elections. The first is the ‘Lester election’ in which only the ‘Lesters’ can 
vote (the Lesters are the wealthiest people in Lesterland). Only candidates who 
do very well in the Lester election can participate in the second general election 
(because they need to raise enough money to take part in the general election). 
Lesterland, therefore, has a two-step democratic process because candidates first 
have to clear the Lester election hurdle before they can clear the general election. 
Lessig argues that candidates are thus dependent upon the Lesters even though 
they are also dependent on the ‘people’.70 This situation produces what Lessig 
calls a ‘subtle, understated, perhaps camouflaged bending to keep the Lesters 
happy. That bending is how this alternative influence manifests itself’.71 The result 
is that: 
Over time, no doubt, members get good at speaking in a way that inspires 
that essential funding. They learn to talk about the issues the funders care 
about; they spend very little time talking about the issues most Americans 
care about.72 
Consequently, ‘an institution can be corrupted in the same way individuals within 
that institution become dependent upon an influence that distracts them from the 
intended purpose of the institution. The distracting dependency corrupts the 
institution’.73 Like Thompson, Lessig explains how a dependency develops over 
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time as set patterns of interaction whereby a resistance develops to breaking that 
pattern (a systematic service). The ‘resistance’ is a form of reward which is hard 
if not impossible for some to give up.74 This does not mean that an individual is 
‘evil or bad’; their conduct may be accepted or not even considered a problem by 
others (especially within the institution itself).75 Lessig notes that this is best 
understood ‘when we think of an institution in which key individuals have 
become distracted by an improper, or conflicting, dependency’.76 He provides an 
example of how dependence corruption might arise: 
Imagine a young democracy, its legislators passionate and eager to serve 
their new republic. A neighbouring king begins to send the legislators 
gifts. Wine. Women. Or wealth. Soon the legislators have a life that 
depends, in part at least, upon those gifts. They develop a sixth sense 
about how what they do in their work might threaten, or trouble, the 
foreign king. They avoid such topics. They work instead to keep the 
foreign king happy, even if that conflicts with the interests of their own 
people.77 
Therefore, Lessig’s argues that representatives in the US have at least two 
dependencies which conflict (one on the ‘funders’ and one on the ‘people’). They 
conflict because there is ‘no way to view “the Funders” as either representative 
of “the People” or aligned with the interests of “the People”’.78 This view about 
‘conflict’ supposedly complements Thompson’s theory because it allows us to 
understand institutional corruption. It allows one to see that the Framers of the 
US Constitution were ‘also exercised about “independence” […] but understood 
“independence” to be a function of the proper dependence”.79 This can be 
understood by an analogy of the judiciary. An independent judiciary is not a 
judiciary that is free to do as it pleases but is dependent upon the law.80 
Dependence corruption is a type of institutional corruption because it also 
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involves a ‘tendency’ that evolves within Congress. A conflicting dependency 
weakens the effect of the intended dependence.81  
The question is thus where dependence corruption would fit into the 
institutional corruption framework. Lessig states that dependence corruption 
would be limited to ‘political gain’. If the intended dependence were so intended 
because it ‘tended to promote the institution’s interest’, then dependence 
corruption would concern gain that in general tends to promote ‘interests of the 
separate and conflicting dependency’.82 This has been criticised by Thompson 
who argues that: 
To determine whether a dependency is improper we usually have to refer 
to the procedures necessary for the institution to fulfill its purposes. 
Understanding those procedures and purposes is where the critical work 
is to be done.83  
Lessig retorts that this is ‘simply not true’ because one can see ‘instances of 
“dependence corruption” without knowing anything about the “procedures 
necessary for the institution to fulfill its purposes”’.84 Dependence corruption 
makes things ‘much simpler […] although getting to that simple resolution will 
require a couple more steps’ explains Lessig.85 He argues that dependency does 
not say anything about the theory of representation that a government should 
embrace: ‘Instead, what a theory of “dependence corruption” says is that 
regardless of the theory of representation, permitting a separate dependence to 
evolve corrupts the design that “the People” were to be the exclusive dependence’ 
(as according to the US Constitution).86 The only finding that one needs to make 
is that the ‘competing dependence is conflicting’. We can measure ‘conflict’ 
through the test of ‘possibility’: ‘is it possible for any member of “the People” to 
also be a Lester? Could anyone, if any so chose?’.87 
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Returning to his example of the association and the union that turn out 
their members to vote for candidates achieving 90% on the scorecard, he states 
that the economic reality for most people is that they could not in any sense 
choose to become a ‘Funder’. For unions, the common currency is citizenship 
because everyone is entitled to join a union and thus the influence of the union 
cannot be conflicting because its members are made up of ‘the People’. 
Membership of the association, however, is premised on simple currency. Only 
those with enough money could join the association and influence the candidate.88 
The result is that the association creates a dependency that conflicts with the 
dependency intended (a dependency upon the people). This conflict is a 
corruption.89 Figure 3 below brings together Lessig’s theory to illustrate how it is 
structured.  
Figure 3: An Overview of Lessig’s Dependence Corruption 
 
Dependence corruption provides a mechanism through which to identify 
institutional corruption. The core elements of institutional corruption theory—a 
benefit to the public official and service to the citizen—remain. The difference is 
that dependence corruption first requires one to establish the intended 
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dependence of the institution. It also lays down a new test for the final element. 
Instead of establishing an ‘improper connection’ and a ‘tendency’ by reference to 
several processes and principles which are measured by ‘damage’; dependence 
corruption introduces the test of a conflict measured by ‘possibility’. This 
approach is less contingent than Thompson’s but is problematic for three 
reasons.  
First, as noted above, Lessig’s conception requires that one must establish 
an intended dependence of the institution. Enunciating a ‘dependence’ is not 
achievable within the institutional diversion framework because an intended 
dependence of Parliament and the Government cannot be identified from the 
UK’s constitution. One could analyse the history books for the same period from 
which Lessig determines the purpose of Congress. Historically, in the 1700s, there 
were concerns that the House of Commons was corrupt because its dependence 
on the people gradually subsided into an ‘utter dependence’ on the King and his 
ministers.90 The belief was that the House of Commons should be dependent on 
the people and not the King. However, drawing historical parallels from the UK’s 
experience does not assist with an enunciation of the intended dependence of 
Parliament today; it is not a concept that has been a part of constitutional thought. 
It also says nothing about the ‘intended dependence’ of the House of Lords or 
the Government. That is probably why Thompson specifically raises concerns 
about the usefulness of dependence corruption to an analysis of the UK 
Parliament: 
Members of parliaments in Europe and the U.K. do not depend on 
campaign contributions in the same way or to the same extent. But 
although they are not subject to “improper dependency,” they may still 
provide access and other advantages to private interests, and therefore 
participate in institutional corruption. (This is another reason not to base 
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Review 2014) 21; Thomas Curson Hansard and Great Britain Parliament, Cobbett's Parliamentary 
history of England: From the Norman conquest, in 1066. To the year, 1803, vol 19 (William Cobbett ed, 
TC Hansard 1814, digitised 2010) 347–348; (on ‘utter dependence’) Jerrilyn Greene Marston, 
King and Congress: The Transfer of Political Legitimacy, 1774-1776 (Princeton University Press 2014) 
38. 
 
Chapter 4 – Corruption and Integrity 
133 
the analysis of institutional corruption entirely on the idea of 
dependency).91 
Thompson overstates the point that MPs do not depend on contributions. 
Historically, it was well documented that MPs were dependent on a wealthy few. 
Indeed, in 1760 many MPs had election expenses paid for by a patron to whom 
the MP became dependent.92 In this way, a considerable degree of influence was 
exercised by the patron. MPs were essentially employed to further the interests of 
patrons.93 Over time, new forms of patronage arose such as the relationship 
between MPs and trade unions in the Twentieth Century.94 Indeed, in modern 
times, it is trite to note that the Conservative Party depend greatly on donations 
from business and the Labour Party from trade unions.95 Although, it should be 
emphasised that the mere existence of a dependency does not necessarily cause 
an ‘institutional diversion’. 
As noted above, if a party is dependent on a particular group, it would not 
be of concern as long as others are not precluded from the same opportunities to 
influence. For example, in the context of trade unions and the Labour Party, the 
unions undertake important functions such as representing collective interests.96 
This is accounted for in statute under the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992. Unlike companies, unions are not simply seeking to 
attain ‘value for their money’.97 Instead, they fight for the rights of workers98 and 
act as a counterweight to party leaderships seeking to centralise control.99 In this 
regard, the following statement by Lessig requires clarification. He notes that 
‘nothing in the analysis of ‘dependence corruption’ says that the story couldn’t be 
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reversed. It is certainly possible to imagine a democracy where ‘the Lesters’ are 
‘the Unions’’.100 Lessig’s contention is true but not where political parties have 
internalised democratic structures consisting of broad affiliated members that 
have voting powers and the ability to shape policy. 
Nevertheless, whilst the concerns about a dependency are unlikely to be 
relevant in that context, there may be genuine other concerns about a dependency 
on external lobbyists. In this regard, there is very little transparency about 
lobbying activities to determine precisely whether parties are or are not subject to 
an improper dependency (that is, in part, the purpose of creating this framework; 
to encourage such an analysis). Therefore, it is important that ‘dependence’ 
remains part of the framework because it is relevant to lobbying concerns in the 
UK. 
However, the institutional diversion framework already defines the 
‘purpose’ of the institutions. Appending an ‘intended dependence’ would, at 
worse, create an additional purpose for the framework which would 
overcomplicate it or, at best, slightly reformulate the purpose as already identified 
in Chapter 3. One could reframe the purpose of ‘acting in the public interest’ as 
the need to be ‘dependent upon the public to serve their interests’ but the term 
‘dependent’ has no constitutional or other foundation as noted above. The 
‘purpose’ of ‘acting in the public interest’, however, clearly arises from the analysis 
in Chapter 3. For these reasons, it is not possible, or necessary, to retain Lessig’s 
newly added element of establishing the intended dependence of the institution. 
The second point relates to Lessig’s analysis of ‘power’ and ‘merits’. In the 
passages above, Lessig rejects a reading of corruption on the ‘merits’ because that 
requires one to determine what the public good is. He notes that ‘conceptions of 
the good are deeply rich and plural’ which means that ‘political culture gives us 
no clear guidance about the “public good”’.101 As a result, he argues that ‘all that’s 
left for adjudication is power’.102 That it is the power of unions or associations 
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which guides a legislator’s behaviour rather than a fair reading of the merits.103 
Over time, decision-makers get good at acting in a way that encourages funding. 
Consequently, the issues which receive the most attention are those which the 
funders care about as opposed to the majority.104  
The contention that all one can adjudicate is power, is not true for the 
institutional diversion framework because a diversion from the ‘public good’ or 
‘public interest’ can be tested using the criteria of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’ (as 
will be explored later in this chapter and Chapter 5). Further, Lessig’s separation 
of ‘merits’ and ‘power’ is an odd distinction to maintain because they are so closely 
linked. The power of the funder (or lobbyist as is the case in this thesis) is precisely 
a power that causes the official not to make decisions on their merits. In most 
cases, the public interest is undermined because someone has leveraged their 
power (only attainable by a small number of people) to skew the decision-making 
process in their favour. It would not be contrary to the public interest if unions 
leveraged their power because anyone can join a union. However, it may be 
contrary to the public interest if ten wealthy people were able to skew the 
decision-making process using money because few people would be able to 
compete financially. In those circumstances, the ability of a decision-maker to 
make a decision on their ‘merits’ could be undermined. In this regard, Lessig’s 
dismissal of a fair reading of the ‘merits’ in favour of ‘power’ negates from a 
clearer understanding of the issues. Thompson is correct when he states that ‘we 
usually have to refer to the procedures necessary for the institution to fulfill its 
purposes’.105 An analysis of lobbying should not ‘shortcut’ these important 
considerations. In this manner, dependence corruption is insufficient for 
analysing lobbying concerns alone. 
The third issue concerns Lessig’s sub-element of ‘possibility’. The test for 
‘possibility’ is whether ‘it is possible for anyone to be a ‘Lester’ or a ‘funder’. If 
not, then a conflicting dependency arises because the politician is dependent on 
the ‘funder’ as opposed to the ‘people’. Thus, a ‘conflicting dependency’ must be 
measured through the concept of ‘possibility’. However, this is problematic 
                                                          
103 ibid 9. 
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because other potential consequences arise from a ‘dependency’ that are not 
accounted for by ‘possibility’. Thus, Thompson criticises Lessig’s framework for 
being unnecessary and insufficient on these grounds: 
Improper dependency does not seem necessary because other relationships 
can give rise to institutional corruption. A politician may not depend on 
the lobbyists he travels or parties with (they may not even contribute to 
his campaign), but they get greater access and thereby more opportunities 
for influence than other citizens.106 
[…] 
It does not seem sufficient because many instances of improper 
dependency look very much like familiar individual corruption. A 
politician may come to depend on receiving a retainer, a special deal on 
his mortgage or rental housing, or a job for his wife or child. Whether or 
not he returns the favor, the dependency creates the potential for a quid 
pro quo exchange.107 
Thompson rightly highlights that dependence corruption seems to cross over 
with both individual corruption and political equality issues. For individual 
corruption, if an official depends on a bribe from a lobbyist to pay his mortgage, 
the concern is about bribery not ‘possibility’. In that scenario, the concern is not 
that everyone could not possibly have the money to pay such a bribe (because 
one would be advocating bribery), the concern is about individual corruption 
which arises because of a dependency. This is recognised by Lessig: 
“Dependence corruption” is not necessarily exclusive to “institutional 
corruption.” The most extreme instances of “dependence corruption” are 
plainly individual: think of a drug addict, selling his vote for access to 
illegal narcotics.108 
For political equality, Lessig’s element of ‘possibility’ crosses over explicitly with 
a political equality concept. Namely, in Chapter 5, the concept of the ‘unequal 
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opportunity to influence’ which is developed for the ‘political equality’ part of the 
diversion framework. Just as many people might not have the possibility to be 
wealthy ‘funders’ who create a relationship of ‘dependency’, most do not have the 
same opportunities to create a ‘dependency’ because they are not wealthy. It will be 
seen in Chapter 5 that ‘opportunity’ or ‘possibility’ is clearly an equality concept 
which can arise in many contexts; whether dependence corruption or otherwise. 
That chapter also highlights a second core concept of equality called the ‘equality 
of arms’. A rich account is given of both elements and derivative sub-elements 
flowing from them. Consequently, only applying ‘possibility’ would render the 
framework insufficient as there are other relevant factors that should not be 
omitted. 
Nevertheless, despite crossing over with individual corruption and political 
equality, dependence corruption can help to identify an institutional corruption 
characterised as a ‘dependence’. This is noted by Lessig: ‘that it overlaps individual 
corruption doesn’t mean it can’t help us see institutional corruption’.109 In this 
regard, it should be remembered that the purpose of the institutional diversion 
framework is to offer a detailed and holistic understanding of the concerns about 
lobbying. Since both Thompson and Lessig identify different ways in which an 
institutional corruption can be identified, both theories are helpful. An either-or 
approach, particularly when analysing lobbying conduct which is a complex 
phenomenon, would result in an incomplete analysis.  
2.3.3 The Approach in this Thesis 
Taking into account the analysis above, the third element for identifying 
institutional/dependence corruption is adapted as follows. Namely, the benefit to 
the public official (element one) and the systematic service given to a lobbyist 
(element two) are together called an ‘exchange’. For the third element, that 
‘exchange’ must be improper. The exchange will be characterised as one of 
‘dependency’ where relevant to give a more detailed articulation of the concern. 
To identify why the exchange (whether articulated as a dependency or not) is 
improper, the elements of ‘individual corruption’ (identified earlier in this 
chapter) or ‘political equality’ (identified in Chapter 5) are applied. In this way, a 
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clear identification of the underlying concern can be undertaken but in a manner 
that is consistent throughout the framework, and which highlights complex 
crossovers. Part 2 of the framework can then be used to test whether the 
institutional/dependence corruption causes the institution to divert from its 
purpose. Figure 4 below outlines the adapted approach to identifying 
institutional/dependence corruption. The logic is explained below. 
Figure 4: Identifying the Elements of Institutional Corruption in the Diversion 
Framework 
 
In Figure 4, a less contingent version of the institutional corruption and 
dependence corruption frameworks is developed for Part 1 of the diversion 
framework. This is best understood by an example.  
Part 1 
Identify 
Institutional/Dependence 
Corruption Elements: 
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Consider a politician who has consciously afforded, on more than one 
occasion, more assistance to a wealthy lobbyist on a matter of policy than to the 
public. The lobbyist has a history of donating large sums to the politician’s party, 
and the politician wishes to encourage more donations in the future. The 
institutional/dependence corruption framework is engaged in the following 
manner. First, the politician has obtained a benefit (the donation). Second, the 
politician has provided a systematic service because he has afforded assistance on 
more than one occasion to the lobbyist. Third, there is potentially an improper 
exchange for reasons of an improper dependency or some other impropriety. 
If the official depends on the benefit, Lessig’s dependence approach is 
engaged. However, instead of following Lessig’s test of ‘power’ (because it is 
insufficient), ‘conflict’ (because one is not measuring a conflicting dependency) 
and ‘possibility’ (because it is insufficient), one identifies whether the 
‘dependency’ is improper by applying the elements of individual corruption 
and/or political equality. Satisfying those elements will highlight precisely where 
the impropriety has arisen. In this regard, a ‘dependency’ operates to provide 
greater insight into the concern rather than being a necessary element.  
Returning to the example of the lobbyist. Assume that the politician’s party 
needs the lobbyist’s donations otherwise the party will have a deficit for its 
election campaign. A concern about a dependency is identified because the party 
depends on that money to cover its deficit. Next, one considers the elements of 
individual corruption and/or political equality to determine if the dependency is 
improper. In this scenario, the element of ‘unequal opportunity to influence’ will 
arise because the donor is being afforded more opportunities to influence (this 
element will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter). This is a concern 
where the party depends on the donations of a narrow external interest as 
opposed to depending on the donations of its membership base. 
But what of an ‘improper exchange’ that is nothing to do with a 
‘dependency’? The framework in Figure 4 also offers a much simplified and less 
contingent route than Thompson’s theory. Instead of establishing a ‘tendency’ 
and asking whether it ‘weakens the democratic process’ or causes ‘damage’ etc., 
again, one simply identifies whether the elements of individual corruption or 
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political equality apply. If they do, the reason for the impropriety is identified. 
This approach operates the same way except that ‘dependency’ is omitted as an 
issue. 
It is, therefore, possible for both theories to coexist within a logical and 
simplified framework. The new framework satisfies the requirements of both 
dependence and institutional corruption in a manner that is consistent with the 
lobbying context in the UK and which avoids conflict between the two theories. 
It also allows for an encompassing approach to determining when conduct is or 
is not institutionally corrupt and when that conduct causes a diversion. The next 
section develops the questions for the criterion of ‘integrity’ for Part 2 of the 
framework which is used to test whether a diversion has occurred. 
3. ‘Integrity’ Criterion to Test for a ‘Diversion’ 
In Chapter 3, it was argued that the criteria of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’ can be 
used to test for a diversion from the purpose of acting in the public interest in 
Part 2 of the framework. Here, questions are developed to test when ‘integrity’ 
has been undermined by lobbying thereby causing a diversion. In Chapter 5, 
questions are developed to test whether ‘objectivity’ has been undermined. 
‘Integrity’ is defined as follows: 
Holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial 
or other obligation to lobbyists that might influence them in the 
performance of their official duties.110 
Whilst a House of Commons resolution indicates that an ‘obligation’ might be a 
‘contractual agreement’,111 it was argued in Chapter 3 that there are cases which 
could extend beyond contractual agreements. Indeed, institutional/dependence 
corruption could place an office-holder under an obligation that might influence 
them in the performance of their duties. The obligation need not be a financial 
one nor one arising from a bribe—although financial obligations are most likely 
to be involved. Therefore, to test whether integrity has been undermined, three 
questions are developed which arise from the analysis above on corruption. The 
                                                          
110 Adapted from the House of Commons, The Code of Conduct (n 17) 4. 
111 ibid 52. Resolution of 15 July 1947, amended on 6 November 1995 and 14 May 2002. 
Chapter 4 – Corruption and Integrity 
141 
three questions can be used to test when integrity has been undermined thereby 
causing a diversion. Only one question must be answered in the affirmative to 
establish whether integrity has been undermined. 
First, does the lobbying conduct breach or potentially breach any law? If 
someone is guilty of bribery under the BA 2010 or any law covering corrupt 
conduct, their integrity is clearly and obviously called into question. Second, does 
the concern contravene, or potentially contravene, code of conduct or other rules 
on financial gain? Again, these rules pertain specifically to the integrity of the 
individual. Third, is the independence of the institution or individual 
compromised? ‘Independence’ is relevant because it is recognised as an element 
of central importance for institutional/dependence corruption by both 
Thompson and Lessig. The integrity of an individual will be called into question 
where their independence is compromised. It also arises explicitly from the 
conflict of interest rules identified under ‘individual corruption’ and is thus an 
appropriate question. 
If any of the three questions are answered in the affirmative, the integrity 
of the individual may have been undermined. For example, an official who tables 
a question in Parliament for their future employer has a conflict of interest which 
undermines their integrity thereby causing a diversion. Corruption concerns may 
also undermine objective decision-making because of political inequalities, but 
different questions are asked to make such determinations in Chapter 5. 
Therefore, taking into account the analyses in this chapter concerning individual 
corruption, institutional corruption and the questions regarding integrity; the 
institutional diversion framework is developed to include those elements in 
Figure 5 below: 
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Figure 5: The Institutional Diversion Framework Developed 
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Conclusion 
Thompson’s conceptually rich theory of institutional corruption has offered a 
method to analyse more insidious forms of corruption that are harder to detect 
and describe. His theory is a cornerstone in this field but is too contingent and 
unnecessarily complex for an analysis of lobbying in the UK. It also omits the 
important idea of a ‘dependency’ which Lessig has powerfully advocated (but 
which is insufficient on its own). The analysis above reveals that ‘institutional 
diversion’ can have the best of both worlds. Both theories can co-exist within a 
clear and logical structure from which a diversion can be tested. Both theories are 
needed for the diversion framework because lobbying is a complex phenomenon. 
Lobbying could be a problem because of an individual who is corrupt, an 
improper dependency or some other improper exchange that causes a diversion. 
Only a framework that accounts for such diversity can assist in identifying the 
underlying concerns with lobbying holistically. Further, the questions for 
‘integrity’ developed for Part 2 of the framework, offer tests to determine when 
corruption causes a diversion. The questions arise explicitly from the analysis in 
this chapter. The next chapter establishes the elements of political equality and 
develops the criterion of ‘objectivity’. The framework is applied to examples in 
Chapter 6. 
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5 
Identifying Political Equality Concerns and 
Testing for a Diversion Using ‘Objectivity’ 
____________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, Part 1 of institutional diversion was developed by 
establishing the elements for identifying individual corruption and institutional 
corruption. For Part 2 of the framework, questions were developed to test when 
the lobbying conduct identified in Part 1 of the framework, undermines ‘integrity’ 
causing a diversion. In this chapter, there are two aims. First, the elements for 
identifying concerns about political equality are developed for Part 1 of the 
framework. As noted in Chapter 4, there is much crossover between institutional 
corruption and political equality. That crossover is also analysed more explicitly 
in this chapter. Second, questions are developed for Part 2 of the framework to 
test when the criterion of ‘objectivity’ is undermined by lobbying thereby causing 
a diversion. The scope of this chapter is highlighted in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: The Scope of Chapter 5. 
 
Whilst political equality issues have long been prevalent in the context of elections 
in the UK (such as the fight for universal suffrage or limits on general election 
expenditure),1 there has been a lesser focus on political equality and lobbying. The 
main exception is Rowbottom who applies political equality concepts throughout 
his book to numerous issues.2 He pinpoints many of the relevant concepts but 
does not offer an overarching framework that ties all the concepts together, a 
method of applying those concepts consistently and a test for establishing when 
a diversion has occurred (from a political corruption standpoint). Nevertheless, 
his analysis remains very relevant and will be complemented throughout this 
chapter with points of crossover highlighted. To develop a coherent structure, 
                                                          
1 Jacob Rowbottom, ‘Political Donations and the Democratic Process: Rationales for Reform’ 
[2002] Public Law 758, 766. 
2 Jacob Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics (CUP 2010). 
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this chapter draws on the work of Ringhand as a starting point. She offers a 
convenient framework on political equality in the British campaign finance 
context,3 but it must be adapted for the institutional diversion framework in the 
lobbying context. There are nuanced differences between political equality 
concerns in the campaign finance context and the lobbying context. The 
adaptation will ensure that lobbying concerns can be identified clearly and 
holistically. The approach of the analysis is detailed below. 
1. A Political Equality Framework for Identifying Lobbying 
Concerns 
Ringhand analyses political equality in the British campaign finance debate.4 She 
identifies three commonly used concepts of equality in academic and other 
literature which are ‘equality of arms’ between political parties, ‘equality of 
influence’ between citizens, and ‘equality of access in the marketplace of ideas’.5 
She argues that the three concepts are ‘rarely independently valuable concepts’ 
and are, instead, valuable to the British campaign finance debate when they are 
understood as promoting one of four principles that underlie those concepts.6 
The four principles are: 
Political equality requires the state to show equal respect and concern for 
each of its citizens; that wealth in society should be equitably distributed; 
that representative democracy should constitute a deliberative search for 
a greater public good rather than a struggle between self-interested 
                                                          
3 Lori A Ringhand, ‘Concepts of Equality in British Election Financing Reform Proposals’ 
(2002) 22 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 253; various inequalities are also highlighted by 
Rowbottom. This crossover will be highlighted where it arises. Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted 
(n 2) Ch 1. 
4 Ringhand (n 3). 
5 ibid 254; Hasen also categories political equality arguments into three categories similar to 
Ringhand’s concepts. However, Hasen’s approach is not followed; first, because Ringhand’s 
concepts cover a broader range of equality issues which is pertinent for the lobbying sphere and, 
second, because her approach is more flexible than Hasen’s for an application to the lobbying 
context. See, Richard L Hasen, ‘Is ‘‘Dependence Corruption’’ Distinct from a Political Equality 
Argument for Campaign Finance Laws? A Reply to Professor Lessig’ (2013) 12(3) Election Law 
Journal 305, 311–13. 
6 Ringhand (n 3) 253. 
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entities; or that democratic self-governance requires public access to the 
widest possible variety of information.7 
Ringhand argues that the three concepts of equality are used to advance one or 
more of those four principles.8 However, the four principles involve complex 
questions of democracy and distributional fairness and are thus not 
uncontroversial. Nevertheless, the campaign finance debate could be enhanced if 
advocates of reform focus on articulating or defending the four underlying 
principles as opposed to using vague language about equality.9 
Ringhand’s ‘concepts’ and ‘principles’ are helpful for both Parts 1 and 2 of 
the institutional diversion framework. Specifically, the ‘concepts’ will be adapted 
into ‘elements’ used to identify concerns about lobbying and political equality for 
Part 1. The ‘principles’ will be converted into questions which are used in Part 2 
to determine whether ‘objectivity’ has been undermined (thereby causing a 
diversion). However, before developing those parts, three adaptations to 
Ringhand’s framework are necessary. 
First, the analysis below reveals that only two elements of equality are 
needed to identify lobbying concerns rather than three. The elements are ‘equality 
of arms’ and ‘equality of influence’. Second, the latter element is renamed to the 
‘equality of the opportunity to influence’ because it will be seen how in the 
lobbying context, that element pertains to the opportunity to influence rather than 
the relative financial power or influence of a lobbyist which is accounted for by 
‘equality of arms’. Thus, ‘equality of the opportunity to influence’ is concerned 
with the opportunities that lobbyists have to lobby. These two elements cross 
over a lot. In many cases, the opportunity to influence will be dictated by the 
financial power of a lobbyist. However, that is not always the case. For example, 
a former government minister may have greater opportunities to lobby their 
                                                          
7 ibid 254; the principle of equal respect and concern highlights a Dworkinian view of 
democracy. See generally, Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 
(Harvard University Press 2002); see also Jacob Rowbottom, ‘Government Speech and Public 
Opinion: Democracy by the Bootstraps’ (2017) 25(1) The Journal of Political Philosophy 22, 29. 
8 Ringhand (n 3) 254. 
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former colleagues which has little to do with their relative financial wealth as 
against other lobbyists. As such, these are distinct elements. 
Further, it will be seen that Ringhand’s third concept (access in the 
marketplace of ideas), and other concepts which are considered but which are not 
part of Ringhand’s framework (such as participation) are best thought of as sub-
elements of which the underlying concerns are ‘unequal arms’ or ‘unequal 
opportunity to influence’. For example, a person may have fewer opportunities 
to access an MP and participate in politics because an MP has granted greater access 
to a wealthy lobbyist. In such a case, the ‘equality of arms’ and the ‘equality of 
opportunity to influence’ remain the underlying equality issues from which the 
lack of participation is predicated. Ultimately, it is argued below that there are six 
sub-elements which flow from the two core elements. They are access to the 
marketplace of ideas, loudness in the marketplace of ideas, controlling the 
marketplace of ideas, controlling decision-makers and the political process, the 
economy of attention and political participation. The sub-elements identify 
insidious problems that are harder to detect.10  
Third, the ‘principles’ noted by Ringhand are adapted below to develop 
questions to test whether ‘objectivity’ has been undermined in Part 2 of the 
framework. In this way, political equality plays a role in defining the standards 
from which office-holders deviate as Rowbottom recommends.11 However, in 
this chapter, one of the principles is omitted: the ‘equal distribution of wealth’. 
The unequal distribution of wealth is the greatest (although not the only) 
underlying concern about lobbying, but the desire to equalise the distribution of 
wealth in society is not instructive for the institutional diversion framework. 
Lobbying regulation will not resolve that problem (if it is indeed a problem) nor 
will lobbying regulation change the capitalist nature of society (which the concern 
appears to stem from). This is alluded to by Rowbottom who notes that ‘difficulty 
                                                          
10 None of the six sub-elements are necessary for identifying a concern about political equality. 
Only one of the core elements (‘arms’ or ‘opportunity’) is necessary and the sub-elements merely 
help to provide a richer account of the underlying issue. Further, Rowbottom highlights five 
(although, they appear to be three) ‘non exhaustive’ concepts which arise from wealth 
inequalities. Although he does not use the same labels, the concepts he highlights are the 
economy of attention, equality of participation and the marketplace of ideas which cross over 
with the sub-elements applied in this chapter. Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted (n 2) 2–5. 
11 ibid 82. 
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stems from the tension of a system of government where inequalities are deemed 
a necessary part of its economic system, but bases the democratic system on 
political equality’.12 The goal of reform is, therefore, better targeted towards 
protecting the decision-making process from inequalities arising from the 
economic system (which may itself be unfair).13 Thus, what is more relevant for 
the framework is an analysis of the inequalities brought about by wealth, rather 
than the disparity of wealth in society itself. Nevertheless, wealth remains a 
fundamentally important part of this analysis because it can be used to generate 
unequal opportunities to influence politicians.14 As Rowbottom notes: 
Giving greater weight to one set of votes rather than to another offends 
the individuals’ sense of inclusion in the political process. Similarly 
allowing one wealthy individual to have a greater voice than other 
participants sends out a signal that one set of individuals are worth more 
than another group.15 
In this regard, the share of income is significantly skewed towards the top 1% of 
people at a time when office-holders have followed policies favoured by the 
financial industry, and which are usually preceded by a ‘torrent’ of lobbying.16 
Groups with large incomes can spend significant sums to influence political 
outcomes,17 causing decisions of individual legislators to mirror the interests of 
the wealthy.18 As a consequence, policies may develop which are more supportive 
of those concentrated interests than to the wider public.19 As such, wealth remains 
the undercurrent that pervades throughout the analysis of political equality and 
lobbying.20 
                                                          
12 Rowbottom, ‘Political Donations’ (n 1) 768. 
13 ibid. 
14 Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted (n 2) 31. 
15 Rowbottom, ‘Political Donations’ (n 1) 771. 
16 Stewart Lansley, ‘Inequality, the Crash and the Ongoing Crisis’ (2012) 83(4) The Political 
Quarterly 754, 756 and 758–59.  
17 Wyn Grant, Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain (2nd edn, Harvester Wheatsheaf 
1995) 23. 
18 Julian Bernauer, Nathalie Giger and Jan Rosset, ‘Mind the Gap: Do Proportional Electoral 
Systems Foster a More Equal Representation of Women and Men, Poor and Rich?’ (2015) 36(1) 
International Political Science Review 78, 79. 
19 Dorie Apollonio, Bruce E Cain and Lee Drutman, ‘Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond 
the Corruption Paradigm’ (2008) 36 Hastings Const LQ 13, 43. 
20 For an analysis of wealth and democratic politics see, Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted (n 2) Ch 
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Therefore, the three adaptations of Ringhand’s framework are, first, to 
remove ‘access in the marketplace of ideas’ as one of the core elements of political 
equality (although it remains as a sub-element). Second, to rename ‘equality of 
influence’ to the ‘equality of the opportunity to influence’. Third, to remove the 
‘equal distribution of wealth’ in society as a principle to be promoted (meaning 
the principle will not be adapted into a question to test for ‘objectivity’ being 
undermined for Part 2). Under Part 1, it is only necessary to identify one of the 
two core elements before moving to the test in Part 2 of the framework. The sub-
elements are not necessary but help to provide a richer account of what concern 
the core elements identify in each scenario (much like ‘dependency’ does in 
Chapter 4). The next section develops the elements of political equality used in 
Part 1: the ‘equality of arms’ and the ‘equality of the opportunity to influence’. 
2. The Core Elements of Political Equality 
Below, the two elements as detailed in the campaign finance context are analysed 
and are adapted to identify concerns about lobbying. 
2.1 Element One: Equality of Arms 
The first element of political equality is the ‘equality of arms’. In the campaign 
finance literature, it means the unequal playing field between the major political 
parties in terms of their ability to spend money during elections to influence 
voters.21 It also means the degree of equality of spending between the major and 
minor political parties so that minor parties are not excluded from the political 
process.22 The concern is that significant differences in spending during elections 
could give some parties an unfair advantage.23 In other words—as noted by the 
CSPL—no party should have an electoral advantage due to their greater wealth 
over other parties.24 As Ewing explains, one party may enjoy a much larger 
financial advantage over others because it is supported by ‘the patronage of a few 
                                                          
21 Ringhand (n 3) 257; Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted (n 2) 124–25. 
22 Ringhand (n 3) 257; Andrew Scott, ‘‘A Monstrous and Unjustifiable Infringement’?: Political 
Expression and the Broadcasting Ban on Advocacy Advertising’ (2003) 66(2) Modern Law 
Review 224, 240–41. 
23 Ringhand (n 3) 258. 
24 Committee on Standards in Public Life, The Funding of Political Parties in the United Kingdom: 
Volume 1 Report (CSPL, Cm 4057-I, 1998) 117. 
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wealthy individuals or institutions’ despite other parties having more individual 
members, supporters and donors.25 The purpose of regulation is to ensure that 
significant disparities in spending do not occur; largely through the 
implementation of spending restrictions.26 Thus, the central concern of ‘equality 
of arms’ in campaign finance is the disparities in wealth between different parties. 
Of the principles noted by Ringhand, it is the first principle—that the state 
should show equal concern for citizens—which regulation seeks to protect. 
Ringhand argues that equality of arms between political parties is important not 
because parties should have the right to spend equal amounts of money. Instead, 
it is about ensuring that ‘spending equality between political parties protects the 
equality of citizens by showing equal respect and concern for their political 
preferences’.27 This is echoed by Sunstein who argues that government has a 
legitimate interest in ensuring that political liberties ‘have real value to the people 
who have them’.28 That value is undermined where office-holders do not treat 
citizens with fairness and respect.29 Therefore, protecting equality of arms means 
parties should act equally as proxies for citizens during elections,30 and that there 
should be an element of democratic fairness regarding equality of spending 
between parties, or at least the opportunity to spend.31 It is on this basis that 
‘equality of arms’ supports the principle that the state should show equal concern 
for citizens.  
Equality of arms also supports the principle of self-governance. Citizens 
will be more exposed to the ideas of different parties if those parties are better 
able to express their views.32 Disparities in wealth might compromise expression 
and, as a result, undermine attempts for democratic self-governance to succeed. 
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Self-governance, therefore, provides another concern which justifies regulation 
aimed at promoting equality of arms amongst parties.33  
It is straightforward to adapt equality of arms in the campaign finance 
context to identify concerns about lobbying under Part 1. Instead of an unequal 
playing field between political parties regarding their ability to spend money 
during elections and influence voters; the concern is that of an unequal playing 
field between those who lobby regarding their ability to spend money influencing 
officials. There are serious concerns in particular about the disproportionate 
influence of corporate lobbyists ‘whose turnover dwarfs the national income of 
entire countries, [and who] command a level of financial firepower that it is 
impossible for any other voice to match in the competition for political viability 
and persuasion’.34 Consequently, some argue that the sheer scale and cost of the 
lobbying industry ‘makes a level playing field appear all but impossible’.35 In 
practice, this leads to some lobbyists having more opportunities than others to 
influence because of wealth. 
Indeed, there is much consensus in the US literature that money buys access 
and that lobbyists hope to gain (and maintain) access through donations.36 Hasen 
notes how lobbyists with access are in the best position to influence the political 
process directly. Opportunities for access are gained by using wealth advantages 
that help to cultivate relationships with public officials or their staff by raising 
campaign contributions or offering future employment, all of which can 
contribute to a culture of reciprocity.37 Such concerns are echoed in the UK where 
the issue of privileged access was expressed in evidence given to the Public 
Administration Select Committee (PASC) in its report on lobbying in 2009.38 
Professor Miller stated that there are concerns regarding the ‘privileged access of 
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lobbyists and vested interests being able to secure privileged access to MPs, civil 
servants and ministers’ which is ultimately a concern about ‘there not being a level 
playing field’.39 Those with resources and narrow interests have a greater ability 
to lobby by donating or by hiring lobbyists who have easier access to politicians 
and can influence legislators to ‘tailor’ their policies towards their needs.40 This is 
harder to achieve for the poor even if they try to organise because they lack the 
resources and face the barrier of an institution that is potentially biased towards 
the wealthy.41  
Underlying this, the main cause is thus wealth inequality but the specific 
principles promoted remain the same as those articulated by Ringhand. The first 
principle of ‘showing equal concern for the political preferences of citizens’ 
remains pertinent in two aspects. First, professional lobbyists are not acting 
equally as proxies for citizens because they represent those who hire their services. 
Second, citizens who are not professional lobbyists cannot represent themselves 
to the same extent as wealthier professional lobbyists. In contrast to the campaign 
finance context, the second principle is also arguably relevant in the lobbying 
context. That principle—on enhancing deliberation in the political process—is 
supported by Sunstein who argues that regulation should promote political 
deliberation and reason-giving.42  
In the lobbying context, competition between different lobbyists with 
widely varying levels of wealth may squelch deliberation where those with the 
greatest financial resources have greater influence. This could happen where 
donations to political parties have the effect of skewing policy decisions in favour 
of the donor lobbyists.43 The third principle of self-governance is also relevant 
because office-holders and citizens may be exposed to fewer ideas. This is a slight 
variation on the campaign finance analysis where citizens are exposed to fewer 
ideas from political parties. In the lobbying context, that remains true but with 
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the added consequence of Government and Parliament having less exposure to 
citizen preferences.  
Overall, the concerns about ‘equality of arms’ are very relevant to the 
lobbying context and have an even broader application. Of course, that is not to 
say that all the concerns are founded in the UK context and are subject to a more 
detailed analysis in Chapter 6. However, they are potential concerns nonetheless 
and are justifiably part of the political equality framework. Thus, the first element 
for ‘political equality’ under Part 1 of the framework is ‘equality of arms’ which 
means an unequal playing field between those who lobby regarding their ability 
to spend money influencing decision-makers.  
2.2 Element Two: Equality of the Opportunity to Influence 
The second element is created by adapting Ringhand’s concept of ‘equal influence 
among citizens’. In the campaign finance context, ‘equality of influence’ means 
the disproportionate ability of wealthy citizens to influence political parties by 
making large donations. Ringhand explains that ‘[t]he idea, simply put, is that 
elected oﬃcials are inﬂuenced by those who give them money and that people 
with large amounts of money should not be allowed to acquire undue inﬂuence 
just because they can make large political contributions’.44 This is similar to 
Dworkin’s view that citizens are equal, and the unjust distribution of wealth in 
society should not equate to an unfair level of influence over the political 
process.45  
It has been argued that if everyone had an equal share of resources, wealth 
would be ‘no more of an inappropriate basis of political inequality than political 
commitment or well-developed leadership skills’.46 This has led to calls for ‘a clear 
separation of wealth from power’ so that people are treated as equals.47 However, 
others take a different view, arguing that unequal distribution of wealth is not the 
main problem.48 Strauss imagines a system in which citizens have an equal ability 
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to support candidates financially. A contributor could punish or reward 
candidates directly for the positions they take by making or withholding 
donations. Politicians would earn campaign donations in correlation to how 
closely their actions aligned with the preferences of her constituents.49 His 
concern is that the corrupting influence of money would persevere in such a 
scenario because politicians would ‘do no more than implement the self-
interested preferences of individuals or groups that give them money’.50 Strauss’s 
aversion to that dynamic is based upon his belief that representatives should 
exercise independent judgement and act in the broader public interest.51 
Although, it appears that the purpose of independent judgment is different to that 
of the ‘trustee model’ explored in Chapter 3. The purpose of exercising 
independent judgement here is to protect those with a weaker voice when 
compared to organised interests who have a stronger ability to influence. 
The crux of the issue for Ringhand and Strauss is, therefore, different to 
the unequal distribution of wealth. Their concern is the tendency of officials to 
vote in accordance with the wishes of self-interested individuals instead of 
engaging in a deliberative process whereby the ‘public good’ is ascertained.52 Even 
if wealth were equalised, politicians would continue to respond to those who 
contribute to them or their party which would undermine the deliberative goals 
of democracy. This concern has also been expressed in the ‘pressure group’ 
literature in the UK where it has been argued that pressure groups represent 
selfish special interests that have little interest in the unified will and common 
good.53 In achieving the selfish goal of the group, they attempt to conceal their 
true purpose behind supposed idealistic objectives, giving the appearance that 
their goals are aligned with the general public.54 Ultimately, the influence of these 
vested interests makes desirable societal change difficult to achieve.55 
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Despite the concern about self-interested entities, Ringhand accepts that 
the solutions to unequal influence tend to revert to financial equalisation measures 
such as limits on the amount that individuals can contribute to political parties.56 
She notes that restricting private contributions may, at best, limit the total sum of 
money received by political parties from ‘blatantly self-interest sources’.57 The 
solutions, therefore, target wealth distribution which only partly addresses the 
specific concern about a lack of deliberation.  
Further, Ringhand and Strauss are keen to distinguish between cause and 
consequence. Unequal influence (brought about by the unequal distribution of 
wealth) undermines deliberation because politicians will respond to those who 
donate to them. In the US, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that legislators 
tailor policies to the demands of donors.58 This is often described using different 
‘distortion’ terminology in the US literature; the ‘distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form 
and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s 
political ideas’.59 This is mainly described as an equality concern in the US60 but 
has also found expression in the UK in relation to third parties. For example, 
Ewing notes that, without limits, third parties can spend high in elections and 
thus distort the election process by spending more than political parties.61 
Whilst the analysis above about equality of influence arises from the 
campaign finance literature; it is mostly a concern about lobbying. The context is 
campaign finance: someone wealthy is donating money to the election campaign 
of a party. However, where that is done to influence the political process (which 
Ringhand is concerned about), that is a lobbying problem and not only a 
campaign finance matter. Certainly, it is not a lobbying issue if the donation is a 
mere gift and does not influence the political process in any way; but such donations 
are not a concern because they are not meant to influence. Therefore, the 
observations of Ringhand, Dworkin and Strauss, technically pertain to a concern 
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about lobbying. When Dworkin describes the problem of the unequal distribution 
of wealth allowing some people to donate more money than others and, through 
that donation, they achieve greater influence; he is describing a concern about 
lobbying. When Strauss and Ringhand opined about the tendency of officials to 
respond (because of the influence of money) to the self-interested groups donating 
to them as opposed to engaging in deliberations; they described a lobbying 
concern. Recognising this point allows one to consider the issue more holistically. 
Consider influence that is not based on wealth. The concern is not that 
everyone should have the same level of influence on every issue. Political 
influence cannot and should not be singularly measured by wealth. As Sunstein 
notes, ‘there is no good reason to allow disparities in wealth to be translated into 
disparities in political power’ whether that is wealth garnering more influence or 
poverty leading to an absence of influence.62 Unequal influence arises in different 
guises which are sometimes encouraged,63 and lobbyists often rely on information 
and expertise to influence officials.64 For example, it is more desirable that doctors 
have greater influence over policy affecting the duties of doctors than engineers. 
That policy will have a direct impact on the work of doctors who will be best 
placed to inform and influence the proposed policy. An engineer will likely have 
no expertise or interest in the policy, and it will be desirable for them to have less 
influence. This point is captured in evidence given to the PASC from the 
Chartered Institute of Public Relations (CIPR)—one of the self-regulatory bodies 
of lobbyists in the UK—who state that: 
It is undoubtedly the case that some organisations have more inﬂuence 
over Parliament and Government than others—and it is inevitable that 
this should be the case.  
(…) 
Some organisations are simply far larger—and represent far more 
important groups—than others. It seems to us to be logical and 
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acceptable that the CBI and the TUC should have more inﬂuence than, 
for instance, a small single-issue pressure group.65 
The CIPR take the point too far. The ‘importance’ of an organisation should not 
justify greater influence but those with greater expertise or experience on an issue 
should. Ringhand argues that unequal influence of this sort adds ‘value to our 
political discourse’,66 and—as Dworkin rightly notes—attempting to equalise 
such influence ‘would require too much sacrifice of official independence and 
other values’.67 Reformers are thus not concerned with levelling desirable 
inequality of influence but instead, inequalities in the opportunity to influence which 
are based on wealth.68 Those with wealth have the opportunity to develop a ‘close 
nexus’ with office-holders giving them a disproportionate ability to influence the 
political process.69 
This is distinct from the issue as described in the campaign finance context 
where wealth may cause a distortion. Indeed, wealth may have caused a 
‘distortion’, but there is a more nuanced point; that such a distortion could not 
have been achieved without the opportunity to influence which arose because of 
wealth. That disproportionate opportunity to influence based on wealth is the key 
point.70 Opportunity could arise because someone wealthy donated a significant 
amount of money to a party to influence it, or it could arise where someone 
wealthy hires an expensive lobbyist to lobby politicians. It could arise where a 
bank uses an in-house team of lobbyists to influence policy. Most could not afford 
to donate a significant amount to a party, hire a lobbyist or instruct a team of in-
house lobbyists; they do not have the wealth to generate those opportunities. 
Influence of this sort is problematic because wealth dictates the level of 
opportunity which may itself lead to the distortion. It should be emphasised that 
it may not only be wealth that is problematic. A former minister with contacts 
and access because of their previous employment is another manifestation of that 
unequal opportunity. Nevertheless, wealth inequality is the main concern. 
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The lack of opportunity has consequences for the same principles 
described by Ringhand. First, the institution may not show equal concern for the 
preferences of citizens if people do not have the same opportunities to express 
those concerns. Second, there may be less deliberation because wealthy lobbyists 
will have greater opportunities to influence the political process. Third, 
democratic self-governance may be undermined because politicians and the 
public will have less access to information since not everyone will have the same 
opportunity to express their views.  
Thus, the second element for ‘political equality’ in Part 1 of the diversion 
framework is ‘equality of the opportunity to influence’. Below, it is argued that 
there are six sub-elements deriving from the two core elements which can help to 
provide a rich account of the underlying concerns. 
3. Six Sub-Elements of Political Equality 
There are six broad concerns about political equality that derive from the two 
elements analysed above. These concerns can be thought of as ‘sub-elements’. 
However, they do not need to be present to identify a concern about ‘equality of 
arms’ or ‘equality of the opportunity to influence’. Instead, they offer a more 
detailed analytical account of the underlying lobbying concern in a given case. 
3.1 One: Access to the Marketplace of Ideas 
The third concept of equality noted by Ringhand is that of ‘equality of access in 
the marketplace of ideas’.71 It is argued in this section that the marketplace of 
ideas does not raise a distinct core concept of equality but highlights different 
ways in which ‘unequal arms’ and the ‘unequal opportunity to influence’ manifest 
in the lobbying sphere. Specifically, the ‘marketplace’ can be divided into three 
sub-elements of the two core concepts which are not necessary to establish but 
may offer a richer account of the underlying concern. 
There is much literature in the US on the ‘marketplace’ and it is not the 
purpose of this thesis to venture too far into that literature because the analysis 
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would involve extraneous doctrinal analyses of US law not relevant to this thesis.72 
Instead, the ‘marketplace’ is used simply because it offers a vivid 
conceptualisation of insidious lobbying concerns articulated by writers in the UK. 
For Ringhand, the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is an unregulated market where ideas 
can freely compete for acceptance from the public and decision-makers.73 It was 
alluded to by Cave and Rowell in the following passage when they considered the 
‘control’ of ‘the intellectual space in which officials make policy decisions’:  
Lobbyists today, though, do far more than seek ear-time with 
government. Politicians and officials do not make decisions in a vacuum. 
They are influenced by what the media says, the views of influential others 
— business leaders, think tanks, commentators — and sometimes public 
opinion. The game thus played by the influence industry is to control the 
intellectual space in which officials make policy decisions. They have 
developed a number of sophisticated techniques to achieve this audacious 
aim.74 
It is posited that the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is the same as the ‘intellectual space’. 
Both are a theoretical space in which ideas compete to influence decision-makers 
who will be informed by the ideas in that marketplace when making decisions. 
Conceptually, it is helpful to think of the ‘marketplace’ in the lobbying context as 
a market consisting of various ‘stalls’. Those stalls include the media, academia, 
think-tanks, businesses, protestors and unions amongst others. They produce 
outputs in the form of ideas distributed through various channels such as reports 
or research. The important distinction between lobbying arising from the market 
versus other types of lobbying is that the influence is indirect. A professional 
lobbyist might meet with a politician and attempt to influence them directly. 
However, in the marketplace, nobody is meeting with a politician directly and no 
one is directing ideas to specific office-holders. Instead, ideas are distributed freely 
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and politicians may happen to read them and be influenced by them. In general, 
‘the ideas that survive or prevail will be those espoused either by the most 
powerful or the most numerous in society’.75 The concern in the lobbying context, 
however, is more complex.  
In this regard, Ringhand’s articulation of this marketplace requires some 
development. On the one hand, she describes the equality concern as the need 
for ideas to have ‘roughly equitable substantive exposure in the marketplace of 
ideas’.76 In this context, speech that becomes too loud, ought to be limited by the 
state to give even parity to the quieter voices that do not have the resources to 
express themselves loudly. On the other hand, Ringhand describes a concern 
about having ‘access to the marketplace of ideas’.77 In this respect, the public ought 
to have access to a variety of ideas to make informed decisions. As such, there is 
a distinction between lobbyists having access to the marketplace and ideas having 
equal influence (loudness) once they are aired in the marketplace.  
On access to the marketplace, Ringhand is concerned with decision-makers 
needing to have access to the marketplace of ideas to make informed decisions. 
In the lobbying context, one is concerned with the ability of citizens to have access 
to the marketplace of ideas to have the opportunity to circulate their ideas (and 
thereby lobby indirectly). This is not a distinct core element of equality but a sub-
element of ‘equality of arms’ or ‘the opportunity to influence’. It might be argued 
that anyone can access the marketplace of ideas and so this is a moot point. For 
example, a large protest group can circulate ideas in the marketplace when 
protesting, and so there is no issue of access to the marketplace. However, 
protests or petitions aside, there are other organisations which have many 
resources, whose output citizens may or may not be able to influence which 
precludes access and thus the opportunity to influence. Indeed, some ideas will 
never make it to the marketplace78 because those organisations have high entry 
barriers which make them difficult to participate in.79  
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Consider the example of well-financed think-tanks which produce reports 
for circulation in the marketplace of ideas. Being able to influence the output of 
those think-tanks becomes an important factor in one’s ability to have access to 
the marketplace of ideas because think-tanks have so much influence. Some 
think-tanks are open to outside members. The Bow Group (a Conservative think 
tank) advertises membership for a fee of £40.80 The Centre for Policy Studies (a 
Thatcherite think-tank) advertises membership for £100.81 Therefore, in some 
cases, citizens are not precluded from having access to the marketplace. Whilst 
membership fees are variable; they are palatable for citizens adamant on being 
able to influence the output of ideas into the marketplace and, as such, have access 
to it by means other than protests or petitions. However, this is not always the 
case; some think-tanks do not advertise memberships (such as the Social Market 
Foundation). Further, it is questionable how much influence members have 
within those organisations. Much depends on their internal democratic structure 
and their funding arrangements.82  
If one considers the media, the issues become even more complex about 
the extent to which citizens can influence outputs. There are huge variables 
involved which will either support citizen participation or not and thus determine 
their ability to access the marketplace of ideas. An individual might influence the 
media without paying money, influence a think-tank with a £40 membership fee 
or be entirely precluded from influencing a ‘stall’ because they are not financially 
supporting it. As such, equality of arms and the equality of the opportunity to 
influence have variable relevance in this context. 
The main concern is where the opportunity to participate is precluded 
entirely on the grounds of wealth. There are legitimate reasons why influence may 
be precluded for other reasons. It is legitimate for a staunch Labour Party member 
to have little influence over the policy of a Conservative think-tank—the purpose 
of that think-tank being to advance a Conservative agenda. It is legitimate for a 
citizen with no expertise in aeronautical engineering to have no influence on 
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academic research into that subject matter. Equality of access to the marketplace 
of ideas is relevant to equality where a citizen is precluded from participating in 
an organisation such as a think-tank only on financial grounds.83 In that case, the 
citizen cannot have the opportunity to influence the final output of that think-
tank which circulates ideas into the marketplace. As Ringhand notes, the issue is 
thus one of ‘the political rights of citizens as speakers to participate in public 
political discourse’. 84 This is, therefore, a sub-element of equality of arms and 
equality of the opportunity to influence because the opportunity (or lack thereof) 
to access the marketplace is dictated by financial inequalities. 
3.2 Two: Loudness in the Marketplace of Ideas 
The next issue articulated by Ringhand is that of the relative ‘loudness’ of ideas 
once they are circulating in the marketplace of ideas. Equality is relevant here in 
the sense that ideas should have equal airing or circulate equally within the market 
so that one idea does not have market dominance over another idea.85 The aim is 
to protect the interests of listeners in ‘having a wide variety of ideas available for 
public consumption in the marketplace of ideas’.86 Therefore, the ‘loudness’ of 
speech is important because officials need to hear many sides of a debate to make 
informed decisions,87 which is a necessary pre-condition for informed self-
governance.88 The underlying assumptions of this idea have been questioned by 
those who query whether speech can be drowned-out in present times when 
citizens have access to many forms of social and other media.89 
In the campaign finance context, ‘dominant’ speech is dictated by large 
donations to political parties. Some argue that, in such cases, the state should 
intervene to restrict ‘the overpowering speech to protect the equal speech rights 
of others’.90 The target of regulation is usually to implement contribution and 
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expenditure limits in elections.91 A recent example of the latter can be seen with 
spending cap being lowered on third party expenditure in UK general elections 
in Part 2 of the TLA 2014. The principle promoted being that of equal respect 
and concern for individuals since the concept is about the equality rights of 
speakers.  
As such, this element is both about the power of money to influence the 
relative loudness of an idea, and the need to protect listeners from hearing mainly 
the loudest voices. It is not about the differences in the influence of an idea in a 
given situation (the equality of influence between ideas) because it is desirable that 
some ideas carry more influence than others as noted earlier in this chapter. The 
ideas of doctors produced in a report should have more influence (both directly 
and indirectly) on policy involving medical practice than a report produced by 
engineers on the same issue. However, wealth should not preclude an engineer 
from having a loud voice (which may, in any case, be given less weight because 
of its lack of influence). Where wealth does preclude participation, then ‘loudness 
in the marketplace of ideas’ becomes a relevant sub-element which offers a richer 
account of the core concepts. The inequality of arms between lobbyists should 
not preclude good ideas from being heard. Possibilities for unfairness become 
particularly acute where the marketplace of ideas is itself controlled by lobbyists.  
3.3 Three: Controlling the Marketplace of Ideas 
In the passage above, quoted from Cave and Rowell’s book, they noted how a 
game is played by lobbyists ‘to control the intellectual space in which officials make 
policy decisions’.92 This concept is also alluded to in the US literature with 
Issacharoff highlighting that a source of corruption may be significant 
expenditures ‘capturing the marketplace of ideas’.93 Gilens and Page call it the 
‘second face’ of power: ‘the ability to shape the agenda of issues that policy makers 
consider’.94 
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To control the marketplace of ideas, lobbyists attempt to exert influence 
over as many ‘stalls’ in the market as possible. Lobbyists who control more stalls 
will have greater opportunities for indirect influence by exposing officials to one 
side of an argument, increasing the likelihood that the office-holder will be 
persuaded by a certain narrative.95 For example, sophisticated lobbyists might 
fund the research of think-tanks, academics and influence media stories on an 
issue.96 In such circumstances, lobbyists have exercised significant control over 
the marketplace of ideas without politicians being directly aware of their 
influence. The official might reasonably believe that they are relying on various 
and distinct sources of information when making decisions. However, unseen to 
them, was the significant level of control over the marketplace by lobbyists. The 
fingerprints of the sophisticated lobbyists could rest on numerous seemingly 
distinct sources which they have worked hard to infiltrate and influence. This 
would not be the case where lobbyists use their ‘arms’ advantage to pay £50,000 
and join a political party donor club to meet officials directly. In those 
circumstances, officials will be very aware of where an idea has come from 
whereas they will be less aware of a lobbyist’s influence arising from their control 
of the marketplace.  
This poses an unseen challenge for the decision-maker who not only has 
to gather relevant information, but also has to prioritise it, decipher it and 
understand the implications of implementing policy related to it.97 A greater 
diversity of information will assist the official in understanding the complex issues 
involved and in balancing priorities.98 However, this might be a challenge too far 
where the marketplace has been controlled by concentrated powers who might 
also have manipulated public opinion through the media or stifled debate.99  
Thus, control of the marketplace highlights an indirect facet of influence as 
opposed to the obvious direct influence. Lobbyists are not just competing to 
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influence politicians directly but are attempting to control stalls within the 
marketplace which can be used to influence the political process indirectly. The 
more control they can exercise over the market, the more opportunities that will 
arise to influence. Achieving control in this context is, therefore, about the 
principle ‘equality of arms’ because lobbyists will need many resources to control 
the marketplace more broadly. ‘Equality of the opportunity to influence’ is also 
relevant because more control equates to more opportunity. As such, controlling 
the marketplace is not a core element of equality but constitutes a sub-element 
which describes another way in which unequal arms and opportunity can manifest 
in the lobbying sphere.  
For these reasons, loudness within, and control of, the marketplace of ideas 
promotes the same principles offered by Ringhand. First, politicians cannot show 
equal respect and concern for each of its citizens where lobbyists have infiltrated 
the source of information influencing their decisions and can project that 
information loudly. In that regard, potential solutions might include either giving 
citizens more control over the marketplace so that they can compete in 
influencing the political process, or by seeking greater transparency over how the 
marketplace is controlled thereby ensuring more informed decisions at the 
political level. Second, where a smaller number of entities control the 
marketplace, this will undermine the goal of representative democracy in 
constituting a deliberative search for a greater public good. Instead, the process 
will constitute a struggle between self-interested groups vying for control and, 
therefore, influence. Equally, self-interested groups will compete to project their 
ideas loudest. The concern is not with the battle between political parties that are 
struggling for the self-interests that they represent. Instead, the concern is with 
external lobbyists. Some lobbyists will have more resources than others to 
compete which creates greater opportunities for influence. Third, office-holders 
and the public will not have access to the widest possible variety of information 
because the marketplace is potentially controlled by a small number of lobbyists, 
or because other information is drowned out in the market by the loudness of 
wealthy lobbyists.  
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This control of information feeds into other sub-elements not explicitly 
highlighted in the analysis above; the control of the decision-making process itself 
and the economy of attention. 
3.4 Four: Controlling Decision-Makers and the Political Process 
Much has been written in corruption and economics literature about the capture 
of institutions, office-holders and the decision-making process. By controlling the 
political system itself, lobbyists can exert much influence (examples of this are 
explored in Chapter 6). The underlying theory is explained by Kaufmann who 
notes that  
Where the rules of the game, laws and institutions have been shaped, at 
least in part, to benefit certain vested interests, some forms of corruption 
may be legal in some countries. […] For instance, soft forms of political 
funding are legally permitted in some countries, through the creative use 
of legal loopholes, and may exert enormous influence in shaping 
institutions and policies benefiting the contributing private interests, and 
at the expense of the broader public welfare. A similar problem is seen in 
favouritism in procurement, where […] a transparent and level playing 
field may be absent, without necessarily involving illegal bribery.100 
It is not only donations that have this effect but also relationships. Where close 
relationships are established with decision-makers, mutually beneficial outcomes 
are sought which may be detrimental to others.101 Thus, whilst the political 
process may be captured by bribes, this approach recognises influences that arise 
without recourse to bribes,102 and by capturing or controlling the process itself, 
lobbyists can ‘remove public policy from the realm of democratic—i.e. 
contestable—decision-making’.103 In this regard, studies of European countries 
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show that ‘captor firms enjoyed clear private advantages in association with 
aggregate social costs [and that] the impact of inequality on influence [generates] 
a self-reinforcing dynamic in which institutions are subverted’.104  
It is hypothesised that the main concerns with lobbying with regard to 
capture will arise in three cases in the UK (and most likely where there is 
institutional/dependence corruption). First, where a promise of employment is 
given to a decision-maker who is exercising their decision-making function.105 
That promise could act as a form of control over their decision-making function 
on matters of interest to their future employer. Second, where decision-makers 
are currently (or have been) members of organisations that are seeking to lobby. 
For example, politicians who act as both regulators and advisers run the risk of 
being controlled to the extent that they are not exercising their decision-making 
function properly. Those with long-standing interests in an organisation seeking 
to lobby may retain strong connections and be controlled in the sense that their 
decision-making will be skewed to favour that connection. Third, where lobbyists 
donate financially or offer other support to political institutions (such as 
seconding staff), they may be able to exert control over the decision-making 
processes of the institution.  
These hypotheses are tested in Chapter 6 which considers examples of 
lobbying in practice. Whilst officials can be controlled; it should be remembered 
that they will also exert a significant degree of control over which ideas to consider 
which pertains to the next sub-element. 
3.5 Five: The Economy of Attention 
The economy of attention is defined as: 
Focussed mental engagement on a particular item of information. Items 
come into our awareness, we attend to a particular item, and then we 
decide whether to act. Attention occurs between a relatively unconscious 
narrowing phase, in which we screen out most of the sensory inputs 
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around us (we are aware of many things, but not paying attention to 
them), and a decision phase, in which we decide to act on the attention-
getting information.106 
The definition provides for an apt description of the information bombardment 
that public officials are subjected to, whether through direct or indirect lobbying. 
Thus, the question of how politicians decide which information to afford their 
time to is also an important equality issue.107 In this section, it is hypothesised that 
there are three factors which contribute to this attention economy in the lobbying 
context.108 Namely, the structural influences existing within the political system, 
the personal backgrounds of politicians and the revolving door. 
3.5.1 Structural Influences Within the Political System 
Four structural influences are relevant to equality and lobbying. First, 
globalisation and a general pro-business environment have created a structural 
skew towards wealthy interests,109 with concentrated interests and corporations 
arguably dominating the political system.110 Rather than networks influencing 
governance, a hierarchy prevails. There is an asymmetric power model in which 
some groups are advantaged (corporations), and the rest are disadvantaged.111 
Political parties now compete for private donations and cultivate close 
relationships with business.112 Lobbyists are paid to ensure this paradigm 
continues. It is no coincidence that professional lobbying has increased since the 
Reagan-Thatcher era of the 1970s and 1980s with policies resulting in ‘long-term 
political and economic trends [which] have benefitted those at the top, at the cost 
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of the mass of the middle and lower class’.113 Indeed, Miller and Dinan argue that 
the huge expansion of lobbying in the United Kingdom ‘has been a direct result 
of the business-friendly policies pursued by successive governments’.114  
In the US, there is strong evidence for the unequal responsiveness of 
officials towards wealthy people115 which is caused by lobbyists ‘combating’ for 
the implementation of pro-business policies.116 In the UK, the development of 
that structural influence is more nuanced. Lobbying is ‘less decisive than the 
deployment of political ideas favouring unfettered markets, which over time 
produce a self-perpetuating structural advantage for the richest—an advantage 
that is, in turn, justified by the same ideas’.117 This results in the average citizen 
having little impact on public policy;118 especially outside of election periods.119 
Instead, close relationships develop between powerful groups and decision-
makers which has the effect of excluding people from the political process rather 
than involving them.120 Indeed, a study of ministerial meetings between 2010 and 
2015 demonstrated that ‘nearly 45% of all meetings held by senior ministers’ were 
with business organisations.121 The same study highlights how business gains far 
higher levels of access than others when one considers government as a whole’.122 
Thus, a ‘structural influence’ biased towards corporations arises which causes 
                                                          
113 Aeron Davis, ‘Embedding and disembedding of political elites: a ﬁlter system approach’ 
(2014) 63 The Sociological Review 144, 146; Hopkin and Shaw (n 109) 349; others argue that 
the seeds were sewn for pro-business policies post-World War 2, see, Pabst (n 99) 1. 
114 William Dinan and David Miller, ‘Sledgehammers, Nuts and Rotten Apples: Reassessing the 
Case for Lobbying Self-Regulation in the United Kingdom’ (2012) 1(1) Interest Groups & 
Advocacy 105, 108. 
115 Thomas J Hayes, ‘Responsiveness in an Era of Inequality: The Case of the U.S. Senate’ 
(2013) 66(3) Political Research Quarterly 585, 595; see generally, Martin Gilens, ‘Inequality and 
Democratic Responsiveness in the United States’ (Conference on the Comparative Politics of 
Inequality and Redistribution, Princeton University, May 11-12 2007). 
116 See generally, Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, ‘Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, 
Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States’ (2010) 
38(2) Politics & Society 152; in the US, there also concerns that this control can lead to ‘rent-
seeking’ activities which means that money and resources are used to capture government 
transfers instead of being used for productive purposes. See Hasen, ‘Lobbying, Rent-Seeking’ (n 
40) 191. 
117 Hopkin and Shaw (n 109) 346. 
118 Gilens and Page (n 94) 575; Stewart Davidson and Stephen Elstub, ‘Deliberative and 
Participatory Democracy in the UK’ (2014) 16 British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 367, 379. 
119 Pabst (n 99) 2. 
120 Grant (n 17) 37. 
121 Katharine Dommett, Andrew Hindmoor and Matthew Wood, ‘Who Meets Whom: Access 
and Lobbying During the Coalition Years’ (2017) 19(2) The British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations 389, 397. 
122 ibid 404. 
Chapter 5 – Political Equality and Objectivity 
172 
politicians to ‘filter out’ broader public concerns and, instead, focus on thinking 
internally about issues to which the system has directed them.123  
Second, ideology will determine which ideas will be given attention. This is 
not a static factor as can be seen with the changing ethos of the Labour Party in 
recent decades with various forms of social democracy espoused by Tony Blair’s 
‘Third Way’,124 and Ed Miliband with the ‘One Nation’ model which emphasised 
social democratic ideals as a critique of capitalism.125 In the Conservative Party, 
David Cameron launched a plan for a ‘Big Society’ in 2010 which would empower 
communities to run post offices, libraries and transport services.126 Ideas 
pertaining to achieving those ideologies (which often change between successive 
governments) would have likely gained the attention of decision-makers. 
However, not only might the attention given to a specific idea aligning with an 
ideology be the source of inequality, but also inequalities generated by the policy 
itself creating a self-perpetuating cycle of inequality. This could be seen, for 
example, with the Cameron Government’s policies which supposedly 
marginalised minorities, making it more difficult for them to defend and promote 
their interests.127  
Third, the methods employed by Parliament to deliberate with the public 
will affect which ideas are given attention to.128 In this regard, some take the view 
that political scandals stem from ‘the failure of decision-makers to properly take 
account of the interests and wishes of the electorate’.129 Many of the issues on 
deliberation and the methods by which decision-makers act in the public interest 
were covered in Chapter 3 and will not be revisited in detail here. However, the 
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calls for greater democratisation and citizen engagement highlight a concern 
about the methods employed to determine the issues important to citizens.130  
Fourth, the internal incentive structure for officials within the Government 
and the party also affects which ideas are given attention to. Hirst notes how 
‘party leaders want an administration which is loyal and responsive only upwards, 
and which reveals only those aspects of policy or the information pertaining to it 
which suit the government’s political purposes’.131 Within the party, an official 
will be conscious of their own career progression prospects.132 To achieve that, 
there is a ‘very strong pressure to pursue official policy’.133 In this regard, the 
attention of office-holders is more likely to be gained if the policy aligns with 
institutional goals or career ambitions.134  
Linked to this is the close relationships that develop within the political 
system. When populist movements arise, there is a perception that party 
establishments defend their self-interests or the interests of their donors instead 
of voters.135 In practice, this means that lobbyists and ‘a small number of 
unaccountable donors and external advisors [are] likely to direct MP behaviours 
towards party and elite objectives’.136 One example is the influence of those in the 
media, which Davis argues has resulted in decision-makers becoming: 
Too close to their sources. At Westminster, specialist lobby 
correspondents tend to remain in post for many years, have on-site 
ofﬁces, share social facilities with politicians (restaurants, bars, sports 
teams), and have organized political access and information supply. The 
close politician-journalist relationships that form over years can mean that 
political reporting agendas and frames are determined entirely by the 
political centre, and political accountability is weakened.137 
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3.5.2 The Background of Decision-makers 
Another dimension to the economy of attention, which flows from the analysis 
above, is the personal and educational backgrounds of politicians.138 When 
assessing the statistics regarding front-benchers following 2001, Davis notes that: 
Looking just at the post-2001, under 50s intake of 20, which included all 
three current main party leaders, there was minimal non-political 
experience. Half had a PPE (Philosophy, Politics and Economics) degree 
from Oxford, purpose made for aspiring politicians. They had a shorter 
pre-politics careers (7–8 years on average), most commonly working on 
policy, in a party or think tank, or in the media, in journalism or public 
relations […] Thus, the newer generation of leaders […] have been less 
socially embedded in wider society than their predecessors and more 
embedded in the political sphere from an earlier point.139 
The most recent statistics when examining the Cabinet Ministers of the 
Government of Theresa May in 2016 show that of the 22 members, 10 attended 
Oxbridge for their university studies and 12 did not.140 Although, it is fair to 
highlight that there is a skewed representation of office-holders who undertook 
the PPE course at Oxford. Their experiences will be very different to those of 
students studying other courses at Oxbridge.141 In terms of careers, 17 of the 22 
members had careers in media, lobbying, law, career politics, banking or working 
for an oil company in one case. Of the remaining five, there was a tax adviser, 
teacher, doctor, an executive of an agricultural business and one worked in 
manufacturing. The careers of the majority of the UK Cabinet in 2016 thus 
reflected a narrow range of sector work in the UK. Added to this are concerns of 
the so-called career politician; a person working mainly as a ministerial aide, 
special adviser, parliamentary researcher, party staffer, in an NGO or think-tank 
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before becoming an MP.142 This leads to criticisms that decision-makers have not 
done ‘proper jobs’ or have not worked in the ‘real world’.143  
However, that is not to say that the narrow backgrounds of decision-
makers has a specific effect on votes in Parliament. Research by Goodwin 
demonstrates that MPs with a scientific background voted no differently in 
Parliament than those without scientific training on the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008.144 Goodwin also finds that there is no strong evidence to 
show that MPs with a scientific background are more likely to vote on scientific 
issues or vote against the wishes of the political party.145 Therefore, whilst the 
narrow backgrounds of politicians might result in a lack of specific industry 
experience, the evidence suggests that (in terms of votes at least) this does not 
affect voting outputs. Indeed, it could be argued that decision-makers are well 
equipped to consider the expertise of others and form good policy based on those 
considerations. It is their job to familiarise themselves with the key issues, and 
they well have much information at their disposal. They are also equipped with 
excellent advocacy skills to fight for the interests of citizens.146 
Nevertheless, there remain pertinent equality issues relevant to this point. 
First, there are doubts about the informational advantages of officials who—
whilst knowing a lot about policies directly affecting them—may know less about 
the human impact of policies that do not affect them.147 Second, the narrow range 
of experience means that it becomes necessary for politicians to seek expertise 
from lobbyists who have aggregated more knowledge on certain issues.148 At the 
same time, lobbyists may possess more money to influence, more access to 
decision-makers and more control over the marketplace of ideas. They will use 
their knowledge to help officials develop policy and provide information about 
the opinions of voters.149 Whilst lobbyists are unlikely to misrepresent such 
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information, they may not be impartial since the purpose of lobbying is to 
advocate certain positions, emphasise certain facts or frame issues in a particular 
way.150 
This should be considered alongside the structural influences noted above. 
The increased professionalization of party leaderships has resulted in parties 
seeking to create stronger links with ‘professional campaign consultants, outside 
lobbyists and big party funders’.151 A biased attention skew of office-holders 
towards lobbyists offering expertise that fits with their ideology, political aims or 
personal views may arise; resulting in equality being undermined. Therefore, 
whilst the narrow background of an MP may not influence the direction of their 
vote, the general lack of broad industry experience of an office-holder might lead 
them to rely on information that is provided or influenced by lobbyists who are 
not impartial. 
3.5.3 The Revolving Door 
Where people move from a narrow range of sectors (such as the nuclear industry) 
to front-bench positions and back, concerns are raised that there is an inherent 
policy bias towards those sectors. This is another way in which the system may 
lead to wealthy people gaining a ‘structural influence over the implementation of 
governmental policy’.152 In practice, the revolving door and personal connections 
result in opportunities to influence that are more readily available to lobbyists 
than to ordinary citizens.153 Having worked as lobbyists previously, Cabinet 
ministers may see professional lobbyists as being a legitimate source of 
information or may be more likely to engage with them.  
Consequently, decision-makers may ‘forego their independent judgment 
and take actions that are in the lobbyists’ clients’ best interests, as distinct from 
the interests of the general public’.154 The revolving door may thus influence who 
officials direct their attention to. It is also linked to the ‘control of the decision-
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making process’ where the revolving door is used as a means of controlling how 
decision-makers act when in office. For example, the promise of future 
employment may exert an unseen form of control on the official’s decisions.  
Thus, the economy of attention highlights various factors that influence 
which issues are given attention to by officials. Both concepts of ‘equality of arms’ 
and the ‘equality of the opportunity to influence’ are engaged because wealth and 
opportunity underpin the concerns. Since the core elements are engaged, so too 
are the same principles highlighted by Ringhand. The ‘economy of attention’ 
operates as a sub-element which can give a detailed account of more insidious 
manifestations of those core elements. 
3.6. Six: Equality of Participation 
It is contended that ‘equality of participation’ is another sub-element of political 
equality which helps to provide a richer account of equality concerns in the 
lobbying sphere. This argument is contrary to that espoused by Overton that 
‘participation’ is a concept distinct from political equality.  
‘Participation’ terminology is often expressed in campaign finance and 
lobbying literature. In the campaign finance literature, it is sometimes argued that 
the role of money should be linked to equality among participants in the electoral 
process.155 In the lobbying context, it is argued that participation can be 
broadened by encouraging citizens to financially support campaigns, issues and 
interest groups.156 The common theme in both fields is that differences in 
participation rates across income groups can help to explain why the views of the 
rich are better heard than the poor.157  
In the campaign finance context, Overton argues that the focus of reform 
should be on increasing citizen participation in the political process as opposed 
to pushing an anticorruption framework or equalising funds between 
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candidates.158 Instead of fighting against systemic wealth inequalities, he believes 
that we should embrace the role of money in politics by encouraging more people 
to participate financially.159 This is to be achieved by encouraging citizens to make 
financial contributions to political parties and candidates so that the majority of 
election funds come from the broadest cross-section of society possible.160 The 
law should recognise that wealth can be a barrier to participation and provide 
incentives which encourage widespread participation rather than equalising the 
voice of people with different incomes.161 
Overton contends that the concept of participation is different to the 
anticorruption and equality approaches. On the former, participation 
acknowledges that money can be a tool for meaningful engagement whereas as 
anticorruption arguments do not espouse that money can play a major role in 
encouraging participation.162 Nevertheless, Overton accepts that participation and 
corruption concerns cross over. He states that: 
Granted, although participation is distinct from anticorruption, the two 
concepts are intertwined. Widespread participation prevents corruption 
by diversifying a candidate’s support so that she is less beholden to a 
narrow group of large donors. Similarly, preventing corruption and the 
appearance of corruption is said to promote participation.163 
Participation also crosses over with dependence corruption (considered in 
Chapter 4 and again below): 
The relationship between participation and anticorruption is further 
complicated depending on one’s definition of corruption. If corruption is 
broadly defined as “dependency” on a small class of large donors, then 
greater participation becomes a solution to the problem of corruption.164 
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Further, on the latter distinction between participation and equality, he argues 
that participation differs from equality. First, in noting the similarities of equality 
and participation, he acknowledges that they are closely linked. For example, 
economic inequality can dampen widespread participation. He also considers the 
argument that participation is a democratic value which is rooted in the idea that 
all citizens are equal. Equality arguments relate to getting money out of politics. 
Participation arguments of getting people back into politics could be another 
equality argument based on the idea of ‘levelling-up rather than levelling down’.165 
Nevertheless, Overton argues that: 
Participation, however, differs from equality. Equality is mathematical 
and allocation-oriented. Participation is about personal engagement, 
being vested in a cause, joining with like-minded individuals, and reaching 
out with and deliberating with neighbors. Participation encompasses the 
special experience individuals enjoy in being engaged in and owning a part 
of a campaign and being connected to something larger than themselves. 
Those feelings extend beyond stuffing envelopes and include giving and 
raising money (in both small and large amounts).166 
This difference is best understood with the example of a voucher program (not 
too dissimilar to that of Strauss considered above) where each citizen is given a 
voucher with a cash value from the state to give to a politician of their choice. 
Overton argues that such vouchers promote mathematical equality because every 
citizen receives a voucher with the same value; which makes money like voting.167 
Such a programme also separately encourages greater participation because 
citizens are given a role in allocating funding to politicians.168  
Whilst it is evident that there can be technical difference between 
participation and equality, that distinction serves no purpose in the institutional 
diversion framework. Participation, according to Overton’s definition, is about 
citizens being engaged and participating in the political process which is strictly a 
                                                          
165 ibid 1283; see generally Joel L Fleishman and Pope McCorkle, ‘Level-Up Rather Than Level-
Down: Towards a New Theory of Campaign Finance Reform’ (1984) 1 JL & Pol 211. 
166 Overton, ‘The Participation Interest’ (n 158) 1284. 
167 ibid 1286. 
168 ibid. 
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distinct concept from equality. However, that concept is mainly used in the 
equality context (alternatively, the corruption context). Encouraging citizens to 
participate more financially is merely an attempt to equalise the ability of some to 
participate or to tackle a deficit in participation. Wealth can cause unequal levels 
of participation across income groups169 and giving more money to poorer groups 
is an equalising measure. This point is noted by Rowbottom who finds that the 
‘analogy between donating and voting as an act of participation points to a need 
to regulate donations to preserve equality’.170 
Furthermore, Overton’s argument that equality is mathematically and 
allocation-oriented as opposed to the participation concept, is not entirely 
convincing. The problem, he argues, is that not enough people participate in the 
political process. The solution is to provide financial incentives so that more 
people participate. That appears to be an attempt at promoting mathematical 
parity as to the numbers of individuals participating. To develop his example 
further about the voucher program; yes, a voucher would separately encourage 
greater participation, however, the motivation for that program arises because 
there is a lack of mathematical equality in the number of people participating. 
Therefore, participation is a sub-element of the concepts of equality of 
arms and the opportunity to influence. Ensuring an equality of arms of spending 
between those who can lobby or spend in elections, and ensuring an equal 
opportunity to influence, are both aimed at reducing equality deficits to enhance 
participation. The same can be said for participation which is also about 
enhancing participation but by different means—giving more money to people 
to increase participation.  
Furthermore, Overton argues that increased participation serves four 
‘functions’. However, those functions are almost indistinguishable from 
Ringhand’s ‘principles’ which the concepts of equality promote—further 
underlying how participation is best thought of as a sub-element of political 
equality. The first ‘function’ of participation is that office-holders become more 
exposed to a variety of ideas which ensures better-informed decisions.171 Second, 
                                                          
169 Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted (n 2) 4. 
170 Rowbottom, ‘Political Donations’ (n 1) 768. 
171 Overton, ‘The Donor Class’ (n 156) 101. 
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this, in turn, gives greater legitimacy to government decisions.172 The first two 
functions are thus the same as Ringhand’s principle that democratic self-
governance requires public access to the widest possible variety of information. 
Third, wider participation encourages governments to redistribute their resources 
to deal with areas of concern identified through greater citizen participation.173 
This function is the same as Ringhand’s first principle that the state should show 
equal concern for the preferences of citizens by enabling them to participate 
more. That marriage is captured in the following passage by Rowbottom: 
Giving greater weight to one set of votes rather than to another offends 
the individuals’ sense of inclusion in the political process. Similarly 
allowing one wealthy individual to have a greater voice than other 
participants sends out a signal that one set of individuals are worth more 
than another group.174 
Fourth, individual citizens become more politically self-fulfilled because they can 
shape and influence the decisions that affect their lives.175 Again, this function is 
not too dissimilar to Ringhand’s principle regarding democratic self-governance. 
Another relevant matter relates to Overton’s voucher scheme. The voucher 
scheme may increase deliberation since politicians would compete for the 
donations of citizens. However, this brings Overton’s argument full circle with 
the considerations noted above by Strauss who exampled a system in which 
everybody has an equal amount of money to spend in an election. This led to 
concerns about the tendency of officials to vote in accordance with the wishes of 
self-interested individuals instead of engaging in a deliberative process whereby 
the ‘public good’ is ascertained.176  
Ultimately, it has been noted elsewhere that an important question is 
whether certain groups can take better advantage of access and influence than 
others; something that would be contrary to democratic norms of equal 
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173 ibid. 
174 Rowbottom, ‘Political Donations’ (n 1) 771. 
175 Overton, ‘The Donor Class’ (n 156) 102. 
176 Ringhand (n 3) 267. 
Chapter 5 – Political Equality and Objectivity 
182 
participation.177 It provides no practical benefit to consider participation as a 
concept distinct from equality when it is a sub-element of ‘equality of arms’ and 
‘equality of the opportunity to influence’. Therefore, for the institutional diversion 
framework, participation describes another way in which unequal arms or the 
opportunity to influence can manifest in the lobbying sphere. It provides a richer 
and more detailed account of the concerns underlying those core elements. 
4. The Crossover Between Institutional/Dependence 
Corruption and Political Equality  
In this section, the crossover between political equality and institutional/ 
dependence corruption explored in Chapter 4 is explained. It is argued that the 
elements of political equality can constitute a sub-element of institutional/ 
dependence corruption. In that chapter, it was determined that there are three 
elements of institutional/dependence corruption. First, there is a political benefit 
to a public official. Second, there is a systematic service given in return. Together, 
the first two elements are characterised as an ‘exchange’ that may or may not 
involve a dependency. Third, one establishes whether the exchange is ‘improper’ 
by applying the elements of individual corruption or political equality.  
For political equality, Thompson clearly incorporates political equality 
elements in this theory of institutional corruption. He argues that an improper 
exchange can weaken the democratic process if it undermines political 
competition or citizen representation—equality ideas ultimately linked to equality 
of arms and the opportunity to influence.178 For dependence corruption, Lessig 
describes how candidates may be unable to fund their campaigns without the 
‘funders’ (the wealthy) and have, therefore, developed a dependence on them.179 
The analysis in Chapter 4 reveals the importance of equality elements to 
dependence corruption. Lessig focusses on concepts such as ‘power’, ‘merits’ and 
‘possibility’ ultimately derived from the core political equality elements. 
                                                          
177 Apollonio, Cain and Drutman (n 19) 32. 
178 Thompson, ‘Two Concepts’ (n 36) 7. 
179 Lawrence Lessig, ‘A Reply to Professor Hasen’ (Harvard Law Review Forum, 20 December 
2012) <http://harvardlawreview.org/2012/12/a-reply-to-professor-hasen/> accessed 21 June 
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Exchanges characterised as dependence corruption highlight opportunities open 
mainly to the wealthy. 
Some academics have argued that dependence corruption is neither about 
political equality nor corruption, but about political participation. Charles analyses 
dependence corruption and argues that: 
The state has delegated a public function, the financing of campaigns, to 
private parties, which have in turn created a barrier for political 
participation, wealth, that some citizens will never be able to overcome. 
This is not an equality problem (levelling up or levelling down). But is also 
not a corruption problem. It is a participation or exclusion problem.180 
Despite Charles’ contention, it is evident that he is describing a political equality 
concern for two reasons. First, and more broadly, the reason why dependence 
corruption usually leads to a participation problem is precisely because of the 
unequal opportunities to influence that some lobbyists have because of their 
unequal arms advantage. In this regard, the same arguments considered above on 
political participation arise in this context. Second, Charles notes how the 
delegation of a public function to private entities has created a barrier to political 
participation. The main query here is why the state has delegated such a public 
function. The answer is, most likely, because of the structural influences that exist 
within the political system that have led to such a delegation, or even the control 
of the decision-making process itself that has led to that delegation. These 
describe sub-elements of the core elements of political equality. In this sense, 
Charles is describing political equality concerns accounted for by the sub-
elements of political equality. 
Further, other academics have criticised dependence corruption for being 
only about political equality rather than corruption.181 Thus, Hasen argues that 
Lessig uses the term ‘dependence corruption’ but is actually talking about ‘the 
distortion of policy outcomes, or skew, caused by the influence of money, 
                                                          
180 Guy-Uriel E Charles, ‘Corruption Temptation’ (SSRN, California Law Review, Forthcoming, 
2013) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2272189> accessed 20 April 2017, 8. 
181 Richard L Hasen, ‘“Electoral Integrity,” “Dependence Corruption,” and What's New Under 
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channelled through lobbyists’.182 Such arguments seek to justify laws ‘on grounds 
that the laws distribute political power fairly and correct a distortion present 
[reducing] the voice of some to enhance the relative voice of others’ (similar to 
the ‘loudness’ arguments above).183 However, Lessig rightly queries why 
dependence corruption cannot identify equality and corruption concerns,184 
arguing that a ‘false dichotomy’ has been presented: 
It is not either corruption or equality. It is both. Our current system for 
funding campaigns is corrupt precisely because it violates a certain kind 
of equality. The violation is not an equality of speech, but an equality of 
citizenship […] To say that a system has been corrupted is to say that it is 
not functioning as designed; something has interfered with its ability to 
function as designed. That interference [the wrong dependence] is the 
corruption. […] Whether strategically it makes sense to continue to 
describe our system as “corrupt” is a small point. That “corruption” is 
inequality is the more important and fundamental agreement.185 
By ‘equality of citizenship’, Lessig means the denial of ‘the equality of equal 
standing as citizens’ or the denial of ‘a role as equal citizens’.186 This is broad but 
indicates that citizens cannot have the same opportunities to participate in the 
political process where the institutions are dependent upon a minority. Ultimately, 
Lessig is right that dependence corruption raises both corruption issues (as 
highlighted in Chapter 4) and equality issues. That is why the 
institutional/dependence corruption elements are structured to determine 
impropriety by reference to individual corruption and political equality as sub-
elements. In fairness to Lessig’s critics, their disagreements are shaped by a desire 
to situate theories of corruption and equality properly within restrictions laid 
                                                          
182 Hasen, ‘Book Review’ (n 37) 571; it is also odd that Thompson engages in a similar criticism 
of dependence corruption when institutional corruption also clearly crosses over with political 
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down by US Supreme Court jurisprudence.187 Fortunately, such doctrinal 
restrictions do not arise in the UK context.188 The analysis above demonstrates 
how political equality can be applied in the third element of 
institutional/dependence corruption. 
5. Summary: Identifying Political Equality Concerns 
In summary, from the analysis above, it is argued that there are two core elements 
of political equality and six sub-elements. These can be used to identify a concern 
with lobbying in Part 1 of the diversion framework. The elements are outlined in 
Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2: Identifying the Elements of Political Equality in the Diversion 
Framework 
 
                                                          
187 Charles expresses frustration when he notes that justifications for reform in the US are 
limited by doctrinal corruption interpretations. He states that ‘to be taken seriously, which 
means to be relevant to the doctrinal debate, all of our discourse must be articulated within the 
corruption framework, which ignores other concerns that ought to be of interest’. See Guy-Uriel 
E Charles, ‘Corruption Temptation’ (2014) 102 Cal L Rev 25, 26. 
188 Indeed, Cain notes that other democracies can do more because their constitution does not 
limit them. See Bruce E Cain, ‘Is “Dependence Corruption” the Solution to America's 
Campaign Finance Problems?’ (2014) 102 Cal L Rev 37, 45. 
Part 1 
Identify 
Political Equality 
 
Elements: 
1. Equality of Arms; or 
2. Equality of the Opportunity to Influence 
 
Sub-Elements 
(a) Access to the marketplace of ideas; or 
(b) Loudness in the marketplace of ideas; or 
(c) Controlling the marketplace of ideas; or 
(d) Controlling the decision-makers and the 
political process; or 
(e) The economy of attention; or 
(f) Equality of participation  
Identify the elements of 
political equality 
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In analysing a concern about lobbying that is linked to political equality, one 
would identify the underlying equality concern (such as ‘opportunity’ or ‘arms’) 
or a sub-element of it (such as control of the marketplace). The next step is to 
develop questions to test for a diversion under the criterion of ‘objectivity’ in Part 
2 of the framework 
6. ‘Objectivity’ Criterion to Test for a ‘Diversion’ 
This section adapts Ringhand’s ‘principles’ analysed above to create questions for 
Part 2 of the institutional diversion framework. The questions will be used to test 
when the criterion of ‘objectivity’ is undermined by lobbying thereby causing a 
diversion. In Chapter 4, three questions were developed to test whether ‘integrity’ 
has been undermined thereby causing a diversion. First, does the lobbying 
conduct breach or potentially breach any law? Second, does the concern 
contravene, or potentially contravene, code of conduct or other rules on financial 
gain? Third, is the independence of the institution or individual compromised? If 
any of the questions are answered in the affirmative, the office-holder may have 
been diverted from their purpose of acting in the public interest because ‘integrity’ 
has been undermined. As noted in Chapter 3, ‘objectivity’ is defined as follows: 
Officials should assess ideas on their merits or inherent worthiness in the 
sense that they should not give greater weight to ideas that have gained 
prominence because of lobbying underpinned by corruption or political 
inequality.  
Since the core elements of political equality promote the principles highlighted by 
Ringhand, it follows that the sub-elements deriving from the core elements will 
do the same. Therefore, the questions that can be used to test when ‘objectivity’ 
is undermined can be derived from the principles she highlights. However, those 
questions must be linked clearly to the definition of objectivity. Thus, in Part 1 of 
the framework, one identifies ‘lobbying underpinned by corruption or political 
inequality’ using the elements outlined in the framework (this is called 
‘problematic lobbying’ in the paragraph below for simplicity). With that 
established, one then determines whether an official has given ‘greater weight’ to 
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an idea, or that their ability to assess an idea on its merits is weakened because of 
that lobbying. This determination is made by asking the following questions. 
First, is the institution (or individual working within it) showing equal 
respect and concern for the preferences of each of its citizens? If they are not, 
they may be giving greater weight to the representations arising from problematic 
lobbying which undermines ‘objectivity’. Second, is the information arising from 
broad public deliberations being favoured over information resulting from 
lobbyists competing in their self-interests? If not, then greater weight may have 
been given to ideas that gained prominence from problematic lobbying. Third, 
do decision-makers have access to the widest possible variety of information? If 
they do not, their ability to make decisions on their merits may be weakened 
which also undermines objectivity. Where any question is answered in the 
negative, objective decision-making may be undermined causing a diversion. In 
this manner, the questions used derive from the analysis of equality principles 
identified above. 
The questions developed in Chapter 4 and this chapter were divided so that 
‘integrity’ pertained to corruption and ‘objectivity’ pertained to equality because 
they are more likely to align with those issues. Nevertheless, the questions can 
cross over both areas. For example, if an official is not showing equal concern for 
citizens because he is accepting a bribe, and thereby not making decisions 
objectively or acting with integrity, this raises both corruption and equality 
concerns. Much will depend on the specific scenario about which questions to 
ask.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 – Political Equality and Objectivity 
188 
Conclusion  
Taking into account the analyses in this chapter, the institutional diversion 
framework can be developed as follows. 
Figure 3: The Institutional Diversion Framework Developed  
 
           Is Integrity Undermined?              OR                   Is Objectivity Undermined 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…the office-holder may have been diverted from their purpose of acting in the public interest, or 
their ability to act in the public interest may have been weakened. 
Part 1.  
IDENTIFY 
(b) Institutional Corruption 
Elements: 
1. Benefit to official; and 
2. Systematic service in return to 
lobbyist; and 
3. An improper exchange 
(improper dependence or other 
impropriety)  
 
(a) Individual 
Corruption Elements 
Part 3 
SOLVE 
 
Apply the elements of individual  
corruption and/or political equality  
to establish ‘impropriety’  
Part 2.  
TEST 
1. Is the office-holder showing equal respect and 
concern for the preferences of each citizen? OR 
2. Is information arising from broad public 
deliberations being favoured over information 
arising from lobbyists competing in their self-
interests? OR 
3. Do citizens and office-holders have access to 
the widest possible variety of information? 
If any question is answered in the negative 
objectivity may be undermined meaning that… 
(c) Political Equality 
Elements: 
1. Equality of Arms; or 
2. Equality of the 
Opportunity to Influence 
  
Sub-Elements 
Consider the six sub-
elements 
Identify the concern using elements of (a) or (b) or (c) in Part 1 
Test if the concern undermines either ‘Integrity’ or ‘Objectivity’ thereby causing a diversion 
Test whether the identified  
concern causes a diversion  
  
Test whether the identified  
concern causes a diversion  
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First, one identifies a lobbying concern by applying the elements of political 
equality in Part 1. The sub-elements can also be used (although they are not 
necessary) to identify further underlying issues and provide a rich account of 
those concerns. The issue is then tested in Part 2 to determine whether it causes 
a diversion from the purpose of acting in the public interest or weakens the ability 
of officials to act in the public interest. The test is conducted by asking questions 
relevant to the criteria of integrity or objectivity (most likely objectivity in the case 
of political equality concerns). Some scenarios may cross over with political 
equality. Thus, political equality can be used as a sub-element for 
institutional/dependence corruption to identify those concerns before moving to 
Part 2 of the framework. The next chapter summarises the framework and applies 
it to specific lobbying concerns in the UK. 
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6 
Applying and Evaluating the ‘Institutional 
Diversion’ Framework 
____________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
There are two aims in this chapter. First, the institutional diversion framework is 
summarised. Second, the framework is applied to concerns about lobbying in the 
UK, and its effectiveness is evaluated for identifying the issues and testing for a 
diversion. 
Practical examples of lobbying have received little academic attention in the 
UK,1 especially when compared with the literature in the US where there are many 
legal and political science studies. However, one recent book by Cave and Rowell2 
has offered a good exploration of the issues in the UK, albeit without linking 
them to the underlying theories synthesised in this thesis. Therefore, this chapter 
will provide an analysis of lobbying examples tied to the theory that has been 
carefully developed. Cave and Rowell’s book offers many useful case studies but 
is not considered in isolation. Indeed, case studies in three broad areas are 
explored.  
First, case studies are analysed from media investigations and books. Those 
case studies are categorised into the concerns about lobbying explored in earlier 
chapters on individual corruption, institutional corruption and political equality. 
The examples highlight the insidious and pervasive nature of some lobbying. 
Second, there is an analysis of a Court of Appeal case involving lobbying. The 
                                                          
1 The exception is Rowbottom who considers lobbying concerns in his book. Jacob 
Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics (CUP 2010). 
2 Tamasin Cave and Andy Rowell, A Quiet Word: Lobbying, Crony Capitalism, and Broken Politics in 
Britain (The Bodley Head 2014). 
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case reveals how some judges have little understanding of how lobbying works in 
practice and that even a rudimentary consideration of the issues highlighted by 
the diversion framework could assist them in reaching better informed 
conclusions. Third, there is an analysis of the influence of lobbying on two 
specific laws in recent years which reveals how lobbyists ‘battle’ to influence the 
provisions of legislation. 
The usefulness of the framework will be evaluated throughout.3 Namely, it 
is asked whether it helps in identifying the lobbying concerns (whether they are 
in isolation or whether they cross over)? Are the integrity and objectivity tests 
useful for identifying why those concerns are problematic and for establishing a 
diversion? Does the concept of an ‘institutional diversion’ help to conceptualise 
the problems clearly? Does that assist with identifying potential issues which 
require regulation? Is the framework a better tool for analysing lobbying concerns 
than the current approach in academic literature? Are there any drawbacks to the 
framework? Can they be overcome and, if so, how? Ultimately, does the 
institutional diversion framework work? The first section summarises the 
framework. 
1. Overview of the Institutional Diversion Framework 
An institutional diversion occurs where: 
Decision-makers working within the institutions of Parliament or the 
Government of the United Kingdom are subject to lobbying—or there is 
some concern about lobbying—which is illegal, legal, ethical or unethical, 
which diverts those decision-makers from their purpose of acting in the 
public interest or weakens their ability to act in the public interest, 
including weakening either the public’s trust in Parliament or the 
Government or their inherent trustworthiness because of that lobbying. 
                                                          
3 The purpose here is to evaluate the effectiveness of the diversion framework in identifying the 
problems with lobbying and not to argue that people should not be able to lobby. Lobbying is a 
democratic manifestation of the right of individuals to band together and express their views, 
vent disenchantment and defend minority interests; see, Duncan Watts, Pressure Groups 
(Edinburgh University Press 2007) 215. 
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From this definition, several points arise for establishing a diversion caused by 
lobbying. First, the framework is restricted to Parliament and the Government 
and those working within those institutions such as MPs, peers and ministers. 
The examples below thus pertain to those decision-makers and their staff who 
form a key part of the decision-making environment. That environment is broadly 
conceived to include all sources that may influence decision-making. Second, 
office-holders must be diverted from their purpose, or their ability to act 
according to their purpose is weakened. In Chapter 3, it was argued that the 
purpose of those officials should be to act in the public interest.  
Third, in testing whether an office-holder has been diverted from their 
purpose of acting in the public interest, the criteria of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’ 
are used. Integrity means that ‘holders of public office should not place 
themselves under any financial or other obligation to lobbyists that might 
influence them in the performance of their official duties’.4 In Chapter 4, three 
questions were developed to test whether lobbying has undermined integrity. 
First, does the lobbying conduct breach or potentially breach any law? For 
example, if someone is guilty of bribery under the BA 2010 or any law covering 
corrupt conduct, their integrity is clearly and obviously called into question. 
Second, does the concern contravene, or potentially contravene, code of conduct 
or other rules on financial gain? Again, these rules pertain specifically to the 
integrity of the individual. Third, is the independence of the institution or 
individual compromised? If any of the three questions are answered in the 
affirmative, the decision-maker may have been diverted from their purpose of 
acting in the public interest, or their ability to act in the public interest may have 
been weakened because ‘integrity’ has been undermined. 
Objectivity means that officials should assess ideas on their merits or 
inherent worthiness in the sense that they should not give greater weight to ideas 
that have gained prominence because of lobbying underpinned by corruption or 
political inequality. In Chapter 5, three questions were developed to test whether 
‘objectivity’ has been undermined, causing a diversion. First, is the institution (or 
individual working within it) showing equal respect and concern for the 
                                                          
4 Adapted from House of Commons, The Code of Conduct together with The Guide to the Rules Relating 
to the Conduct of Members (HC 2015, 1076) 4. 
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preferences of each of its citizens? If not, they may be giving greater weight to 
representations arising from problematic lobbying which undermines 
‘objectivity’. Second, is the information arising from broader public deliberations 
being favoured over information resulting from lobbyists competing in their self-
interest? If not, officials may be giving greater weight to ideas that have gained 
prominence from problematic lobbying. Third, do decision-makers have access 
to the widest possible variety of information? If they do not, their ability to make 
decisions on their merits may be weakened which also undermines objectivity. 
Where any of the questions are answered in the negative, the decision-maker may 
have been diverted from their purpose of acting in the public interest, or their 
ability to act in the public interest may have been weakened because ‘objectivity’ 
has been undermined. 
The questions in Chapters 4 and 5 were developed separately, but the 
questions are interchangeable because there is a crossover between corruption 
and equality concerns. Finally, with regard to public trust in the institutions being 
undermined, this is simply established by integrity or objectivity being 
undermined, and the resulting diversion. That is because the existence of those 
principles is couched in the need to uphold the public trust. The case studies 
below help to illustrate when and how the public trust might be undermined. 
Bringing together these various elements, Figure 1 below outlines the institutional 
diversion framework. Part 3 of the framework is developed in Chapter 7. 
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Figure 1: Parts 1 and 2 of the Institutional Diversion Framework Summarised 
 
In Part 1 of the framework, a concern is identified by establishing the elements 
of individual corruption, institutional corruption or political equality. The concern 
is then tested in Part 2 using the criteria of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’ to determine 
whether there is an institutional diversion. 
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2. Applying the Institutional Diversion Framework  
In this section, concerns about lobbying in the UK are applied to the diversion 
framework. This builds upon Rowbottom’s book which applies political equality 
concepts to numerous lobbying issues. This chapter undertakes that effort within 
the structure of the diversion framework which offers a consistent and coherent 
approach for analysing the issues. To achieve this, the sections below analyse 
media investigations and books (which have done much to reveal scandals in the 
previous two decades in the UK), case law, and the influence of lobbying on the 
passage of two laws. The framework is evaluated for its effectiveness in 
identifying the problems with lobbying and testing for a diversion. 
2.1 Media Investigations and Institutional Diversion 
This section considers examples pertaining to the elements of individual 
corruption, institutional corruption and political equality. Whilst examples are 
drawn from several sources, Cave and Rowell’s investigations in their book offer 
the most detailed consideration of the activities of lobbyists in the UK and will 
thus provide the basis for much of the information analysed.5 No claims are made 
about the culpability of individuals or groups in this thesis. This section merely 
restates what is published elsewhere, analyses that information and applies it to 
the institutional diversion framework to evaluate its effectiveness. 
2.1.1 Individual Corruption Case Studies 
(a) Cash for Access 
In 2013, two former Foreign Secretaries, Jack Straw and Malcolm Rifkind, were 
secretly filmed by investigative journalists in a ‘cash for access’ scandal.6 Straw 
had informed the journalists that he operated ‘under the radar’ to influence and 
change EU rules on behalf of a firm which paid him £60,000 per year.7 He stated 
that ‘normally, if I’m doing a speech or something, it’s £5,000 a day, that’s what 
                                                          
5 Cave and Rowell (n 2). 
6 Rowena Mason, ‘Sir Malcolm Rifkind and Jack Straw Cleared of Cash-for-Access Misconduct’ 
(The Guardian, 17 September 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/sep/17/sir-
malcolm-rifkind-and-jack-straw-cleared-of-cash-for-access-misconduct> accessed 23 Feb 2017. 
7 ibid. 
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I charge’.8 It was subsequently revealed that Straw would be employed by a 
company that had secured a £75m government contract after he lobbied a 
minister on its behalf for a number of years.9 Specifically, he lobbied the Cabinet 
Office minister, Francis Maude, on behalf of Senator International which offered 
him an executive position for after he had left office.10 The Chairman of Senator 
International stated that ‘we’re doing loads of work but occasionally Jack is, tries 
to move things forward’.11 Straw told undercover reporters: 
I happen to have helped them over the last four years anyway. I mean, 
without taking a penny from that […] But as a result of getting the name 
out - it’s a private firm - they’ve said would I be interested ultimately in 
going on the board.12 
Rifkind claimed that he could offer useful access to every British ambassador in 
the world and stated that he was self-employed despite receiving a salary as an 
MP.13 Both were found not to have broken the rules (as they stood) because they 
were seeking employment for after they had left Parliament.14 Further, both 
strongly defended their own conduct on the basis that their actions were ‘entirely 
appropriate’ and ‘in accordance with parliamentary rules’.15  
The rules were subsequently changed so that former MPs are now banned 
from working as paid lobbyists for six months after stepping down.16 Further, 
members of the Parliamentary Standards Committee that cleared both former 
ministers expressed serious misgivings about the Code of Conduct being too 
weak. One member of the Committee noted how ‘we have got a problem with 
                                                          
8 ibid. 
9 laire Newell, Lyndsey Telford and Luke Heighton, ‘Jack Straw to Take Job for Firm he 
Lobbied for in Commons’ (The Telegraph, 23 Feb 2015) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/investigations/11430777/Jack-Straw-to-take-job-for-firm-
he-lobbied-for-in-Commons.html> accessed 23 Feb 2017. 
10 ibid. 
11 ibid. 
12 ibid. 
13 Mason (n 6). 
14 ibid. 
15 Newell, Telford and Heighton (n 9). 
16 Lyndsey Telford and others, ‘Ex-MPs Banned From Lobbying After 'Cash for Access' 
Scandal’ (The Telegraph, 30 September 2015) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/11902758/Ex-MPs-banned-from-lobbying-after-
cash-for-access-scandal.html> accessed 23 Feb 2017. 
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the rules’ which involves MPs being judge and jury of fellow decision-makers.17 
They noted how for this specific scandal: 
There was no proper discussion over the conduct of Straw and Rifkind 
by the committee […] Mr Barron simply held up the report during a 
meeting and asked for approval for it to be passed. The other members 
sat in silence and he took this as approval.18 
The member of the Committee went on to note that: 
The problem is that the rules are not tight enough. There is a cultural 
problem as well. Rifkind and Straw’s complaint was that they were stung 
by Channel Four – not that it would be wrong to work for a Chinese PR 
company. The truth is you can work for as many Chinese PR companies 
as you like and be a member of Parliament. Before this Parliament is up 
it would be proper to have a look at them again.19 
In another case in 2011, a scandal arose in the Cameron Government concerning 
the Defence Secretary Dr Liam Fox. His close friend and lobbyist, Adam 
Werritty, was given access to Fox’s department, attending many meetings, and 
accompanied him on many foreign visits despite having no official role in 
Government.20 It was determined that Fox had breached the Ministerial Code 
having allowed the distinction between his personal interests and Government 
activities to become blurred.21 A minister must declare potential conflicts between 
their personal and professional lives. Fox subsequently resigned stating that ‘I 
have also repeatedly said that the national interest must always come before 
personal interest’.22 
                                                          
17 Peter Dominiczak and others, ‘MPs Who ‘Cleared’ Jack Straw and Sir Malcolm Rifkind Reveal 
‘Misgivings’’ (The Telegraph, 17 September 2015) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/investigations/mps-who-cleared-jack-straw-and-sir-
malcolm-rifkind-reveal-misgiv/> accessed 23 Feb 2017. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid. 
20 ‘As it happened: Liam Fox Resigns’ (BBC News, Undated) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-15313986> accessed 23 Feb 2017. 
21 ‘Liam Fox Quits as Defence Secretary’ (BBC News, 14 October 2011) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15300751> accessed 23 Feb 2017. 
22 ibid. 
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(b) Cab for Hire 
The ‘cab for hire’ scandal followed an undercover investigation in which three 
former Labour Cabinet Ministers offered to help lobbying firms in return for 
money. The former Transport Secretary, Stephen Byers, stated that he was like a 
‘cab for hire’ and would work for £5,000 per day.23 Former Health Secretary, 
Patricia Hewitt claimed that she helped an advisory group, who paid her £3,000 
per day, obtain a key seat in Government.24 Former Defence Secretary, Geoff 
Hoon, noted how we wanted to make money by making use of his contacts.25 
The three former ministers were suspended from the Labour Party, and an 
investigation by the Standards and Privileges Committee found Byers and Hoon 
to have been in serious breach of parliamentary rules.26 
(c) Cash for Amendments 
In 2009, three Labour peers offered to make amendments to bills for undercover 
reporters (posing as lobbyists) in exchange for up to £120,000.27 It was found that 
two peers, Lord Truscott and Lord Taylor, had breached the Lords Code of 
Conduct for failing to ‘act on their personal honour’.28 They became the first 
members of the Lords to be suspended since 1642.29 The then leader of the Lords, 
Lady Royall said ‘we are at a dark moment for democracy. The trust that people 
place in Parliament and parliamentarians has sunk like a stone. People’s disgust at 
Parliament is palpable’.30 Indeed, there were calls for the police to investigate the 
matter for breach of corruption laws.31 
 
                                                          
23 ‘History of political lobbying scandals’ (BBC News, 3 June 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22754297> accessed 20 June 2014. 
24 ibid. 
25 ibid. 
26 ibid. 
27 ibid. 
28 ibid. 
29 ibid. 
30 Andrew Sparrow, ‘Lords Votes to Suspend Peers Over ‘Cash-for-Amendments’ Scandal’ (The 
Guardian, 20 May 2009) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/may/20/peers-
suspended-cash-for-amendments> accessed 23 Feb 2017. 
31 ‘Police Must Look Into Lords ‘Cash for Amendments’ Claims, say Lib Dems’ (The Guardian, 
25 Jan 2009) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/jan/25/peers-inquiry-cash-
legislation> accessed 23 Feb 2017. 
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(d) Applying Institutional Diversion 
Examples of outright corruption are rare. Most office-holders abide by the rules 
and violations of corruptions laws are highly unlikely to arise. The three examples 
above, however, highlight concerns about individual corruption under Part 1 of 
the framework. All decision-makers involved were supposedly seeking a personal 
or private financial gain (sometimes through the promise of future employment). 
These were not instances of institutional corruption because a political benefit 
was not involved. The payments were not donations to a political party.  
In some cases, such as for Straw and Rifkind, no breaches of the rules were 
found. In Straw’s case, he was seeking a benefit of employment once leaving 
office which was not, at that time, in breach of any rules. However, it is 
questionable why the Bribery Act 2010 would not be engaged. There was an 
offer/promise of a financial or other advantage (employment). Representing a 
private interest in public office might constitute improper performance of a 
relevant function. Straw would argue that no breaches of the Code of Conduct 
were found and thus there was no improper performance. However, the BA 2010 
stipulates that there is improper performance where a person does not act in good 
faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust. Straw is clearly in a 
position of trust. Even if that argument fails with regard to Straw, surely it 
succeeds in the cases of the Peers who were suspended after serious breaches of 
the Code of Conduct were found. There was clearly improper performance, and 
there was financial gain involved. The same goes for the ‘cab for hire’ scandal. 
Nevertheless, even if the BA 2010 was not breached, the rules within Parliament 
were which is why members were suspended. As such, one of the elements, at 
least, of individual corruption is satisfied. 
The next stage is to test whether integrity is undermined under Part 2. 
Integrity means that holders of public office should not place themselves under 
any financial or other obligation to lobbyists that might influence them in the 
performance of their official duties. Three questions can be asked to determine 
whether officials have placed themselves under an obligation that might influence 
them in the performance of their duties. First, does the lobbying conduct breach 
or potentially breach any law? It is argued that BA 2010 has been breached in 
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some of the scenarios above. If that argument is not accepted, question two 
succeeds regardless. Second, does the concern contravene code of conduct or 
other rules on financial gain? Investigations clearly found that those rules had 
been contravened in the scenarios above which answers the question in the 
affirmative. Third, is the independence of the institution or individual 
compromised? The independence of the individuals has clearly been 
compromised because they are acting in the interests of the lobbyists because of 
promises of personal financial gain or future employment. Thus, officials have 
placed themselves under an obligation to outside individuals that have influenced 
them in the performance of their official duties. Integrity is undermined which 
means that those officials have been diverted from their purpose of acting in the 
public interest. 
Further, whilst institutional corruption is not engaged, elements of political 
equality are (institutional corruption might be engaged if the evidence showed a 
pattern of behaviour). For Part 1 of the framework, the examples highlight how 
wealthy and influential people can gain an unequal opportunity to influence the 
political system by paying money to officials (unequal arms). The sub-elements of 
equality are also engaged. First, by offering employment and financial advantages 
to officials, lobbyists are exerting control over the decision-making process 
because they can direct officials to act for them. The economy of attention is also 
engaged because those office-holders are directing their attention to those who 
are offering them personal benefits. Equality of participation is relevant since 
participation in the political system is limited to those with vast resources who 
can ‘hire’ officials. The elements of political equality are, therefore, engaged.  
For Part 2, both ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’ are undermined because of these 
political inequalities. For integrity, question three is engaged on whether the 
independence of the individual or institution is compromised. Clearly, the control 
of the decision-making process undermines the independence of the decision-
makers. For ‘objectivity’, the officials did not show equal respect and concern for 
the preferences of each citizen and did not engage in broad deliberations about 
the issues (Question 1). Instead, they offered themselves to act in accordance with 
the wishes of their paymasters. They gave greater weight to representations that 
gained prominence because of lobbying that was underpinned by corruption and 
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political inequalities. The ability of those officials to make decision objectively is 
undermined alongside integrity. Thus, officials have been diverted from their 
purpose of acting in the public interest which will undermine public trust.  
In this regard, whilst the concerns in these scenarios might initially appear to be 
mainly about individual corruption, the framework offers a more holistic 
consideration of the issues by highlighting political equality concerns. Two issues 
arise in terms of identifying regulatory solutions. First, there are questions in the 
Straw case about the effectiveness of parliamentary rules. Politicians should not 
be able to act for private interests offering future employment because conflicts 
of interest clearly arise. It is not only the rules but the investigative process which 
is of concern, with members approving a report without proper discussion. A 
cultural problem is thus highlighted with annoyance directed externally towards 
investigative journalists rather than members seeking private gain. Second, the 
reluctance for proper police investigations into conduct that potentially engage 
the BA 2010 seems problematic. Further, a lack of transparency surrounding 
lobbying presents a hurdle to proper scrutiny where the Act might be engaged. 
2.1.2 Institutional Corruption Case Studies 
(a) Dependence and Donor Clubs 
The main political parties in the UK have donor clubs. The Conservative Party 
has a donor system consisting of eight tiers. For £50 per month an individual can 
join Club2020 to help ‘defeat the rise of socialism’; the Fastrack Club for £300 
per year to meet and network with others during receptions and events hosted by 
key figures in politics; Team 2000 for £2,000 per year to support the Party’s 
policies, attending speeches of Party leaders and attending discussion groups; the 
Business & Entrepreneurs Forum for £3,000 per year to meet monthly with 
politicians and support free-market policies; the Front Bench Club for £5,000 per 
year to meet and debate with MPs at a series of lunches and receptions; the 
Renaissance Forum for £10,000 per year to enjoy dinners and debate with 
eminent speakers in business and politics; the Treasurers’ Group for £25,000 per 
year to join senior figures from the Party at dinners, lunches, drinks receptions 
and other events; and the Leader’s Group for £50,000 per year to join the Prime 
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Minister and other senior figures at post-PMQ lunches, drinks receptions and 
other events.32 
The Labour Party also runs donor clubs (although with a less elaborate 
setup). Individuals can join the Thousand Club in one of three tiers. The lowest 
tier entails invites to bi-annual receptions, networking opportunities and other 
events for £1,200 per year; the Vice President’s Tier for £2,500 per year involves 
invitations to receptions and regular communications with the President of the 
Club; and the President’s Tier for £5,000 per year involves invitations to 
receptions of the President and lunch at the annual conference.33 
(b) Sponsoring Events and Fundraising  
Lobbyists can also influence parties by sponsoring events. In his book on 
lobbying, UK lobbyist Lionel Zetter offers strategies for donating to political 
parties. He encourages ‘low-key’ approaches such as sponsoring a frontbencher’s 
private office, taking tables at party fund-raisers (which has the added benefit of 
entertaining clients whilst currying favour with politicians), sponsoring a party 
policy launch and sponsoring a leaflet or handbook. Additionally, political party 
conferences offer an ‘excellent opportunity’ for lobbyists to channel their own or 
their clients’ money to political parties. He explains that: 
It is possible to sponsor fringe meetings and receptions, or to advertise in 
the conference centre. Again, there are usually gala dinners or corporate 
dinners involving the party leader and other senior figures. It is possible 
to either sponsor the whole event or just take a table.34 
The tactics highlighted by Zetter are used by lobbyists at political party events. At 
a Conservative Party summer party in 2011, Russia’s former deputy finance 
minister won an auction (having paid £160,000) to play tennis with David 
                                                          
32 Conservatives, ‘Donor Clubs’ (Conservative Party, 2017) 
<https://www.conservatives.com/donate/Donor-Clubs> accessed 20 Feb 2017. 
33 The Labour Party, ‘Join the Thousand Club’ (Labour Party, Undated) 
<http://www.labour.org.uk/w/join-thousand-club> accessed 20 Feb 2017. 
34 Lionel Zetter, Lobbying: The Art of Political Persuasion (2nd edn, Kindle edn, Harriman House 
Ltd 2011) section 1.4. 
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Cameron and Boris Johnson.35 The auction took place at the Hurlingham Club in 
London where 50 tables were sponsored and organised by an investment firm 
called Shore Capital for £12,000 per table.36 The entire Conservative Party 
Cabinet was present at the event which was attended by 73 financiers, 47 retail 
and property executives and 19 professional lobbyists.37 The event was criticised 
by the former chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life for 
providing an opportunity for direct and secret access to high ranking politicians.38 
The same fundraiser also highlighted potential conflicts arising from 
foreign donations. It was revealed that a firm acting for the Government of 
Bahrain headed one of the prominent tables and hosted the then Defence 
Secretary Philip Hammond. Other guests at the table included the CEO of the 
Arab-British Chamber of Commerce whose aim is to foster trade between the 
UK and Bahrain, and the Chair of the UK-Bahrain All-Party Parliamentary 
Group, Conor Burns MP.39 James Henderson, the chief executive of Bell 
Pottinger attending the Conservative Party summer party event stated that ‘we do 
not go there to lobby ministers in any form […] Apart from shaking a hand I 
don’t believe I have ever spoken to a minister at any of these events’.40 The chief 
executive noted how his colleague was also attending ‘in a private capacity as the 
personal guest of her host. She didn’t raise any issues on behalf of Bell Pottinger 
or her clients’.41 The Labour Party has also hosted similar events with dinners 
                                                          
35 Melanie Newman, Nick Mathiason and Tom Warren, ‘Exclusive: Russian Banker Pays 
£160,000 to Play Tennis with David Cameron and Boris Johnson’ (The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism, 3 July 2014) <https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2014-07-
03/exclusive-russian-banker-pays-160-000-to-play-tennis-with-david-cameron-and-boris-
johnson> accessed 22 Feb 2017. 
36 Nick Mathiason and Tom Warren, ‘Howard Shore and Andrew Law Among City Bosses out 
in Force at Tory Fundraiser’ (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2 July 2014) 
<https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2014-07-02/howard-shore-and-andrew-law-
among-city-bosses-out-in-force-at-tory-fundraiser> accessed 22 Feb 2017. 
37 Newman, Mathiason and Warren, ‘Exclusive: Russian Banker’ (n 35). 
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39 Nick Mathiason, ‘Cameron Forced to Explain Defence Secretary’s Encounter with Bahrain 
Lobbyist at Fundraising Party’ (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2 July 2014) 
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defence-secretarys-encounter-with-bahrain-lobbyist-at-fundraising-party> accessed 22 Feb 2017. 
40 Nick Mathiason, Melanie Newman and Tom Warren, ‘Access all Ministers: Billionaires and 
Lobbyists at Lavish Party with David Cameron’ (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 1 July 2014) 
<https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2014-07-01/access-all-ministers-billionaires-
and-lobbyists-at-lavish-party-with-david-cameron> accessed 22 Feb 2017. 
41 ibid. 
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being attended by lobbyists and other industry experts who could have direct 
access to shadow ministers.42 
The reach of lobbyists also appears to extend to many entertainment 
events. An analysis of the Register of Special Advisers’ Gifts and Hospitality by 
the BIS in 2011 revealed that Rupert Murdoch’s companies and representatives 
hosted 23% of all entertainment events registered (26 of 111 for the period 
analysed).43 The then Prime Minister’s director of communications, Andy 
Coulson, attended lunches with representatives of the news empire on five 
occasions and attended an awards dinner hosted by the Sun (belonging to 
Murdoch).44 At the time, the Government was considering whether to allow 
NewsCorp’s proposed takeover of BSkyB in a £10bn deal which would have 
significantly increased the size of Murdoch’s business.45 Such events led to 
questions about the efficacy of disclosure rules surrounding meetings with 
ministers because official face-to-face meetings had to be declared, but 
fundraisers did not fall within the scope of disclosure rules.46 
(c) Support and Secondments 
Lobbyists provide support in other ways. For example, support is given by the 
‘big four’ accountancy firms to Government and Parliament. In a three-year 
period from 2009 to 2012, it was revealed that Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG 
and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) had given donations of staff costs worth 
£1.36m and offered consultancy work worth £500,000 to the Conservative Party, 
                                                          
42 ibid. 
43 Alice Ross and Nick Mathiason, ‘NI Hosted Nearly a Quarter of Hospitality Enjoyed by 
Cameron’s Inner Circle’ (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 23 July 2011) 
<https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2011-07-23/ni-hosted-nearly-a-quarter-of-
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44 ibid. 
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Hammond and Jeremy Hunt’ (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 1 July 2014) 
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Labour and the Liberal Democrats.47 They also seconded fifteen staff members 
to the Treasury in a one year period.48  
In 2014, the Labour Party front bench accepted over £600,000 of research 
help from PwC.49 There were concerns that PwC were using their position for 
personal gain; although this was denied by the Labour Party.50 This led to an 
investigation by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee which 
found ‘worrying’ cases of individuals from PwC who provided advice on 
legislation, then going ‘back to their firms and [advising] their clients on how they 
can use those laws to reduce the amount of tax they pay’.51 PwC themselves 
confirm that they provide advice to lawmakers in their own interests. They state 
that ‘in the interests of the firm and its clients… we may, subject to the agreement of 
the Executive Board, provide limited non-cash assistance to those parties in areas 
where we have appropriate expertise’.52 
Such arrangements have also led to concerns about the financial benefits 
that can be attained by those companies. For example, a company half-owned by 
Deloitte won contracts worth £774m.53 Whilst the process of granting the 
contracts was not of concern, the secondees loaned by the firms might have 
provided an insider advantage by ‘knowing when contracts are coming up and 
even getting themselves on the tender list. Undoubtedly having insider 
information is beneficial. That is why the big four second staff’.54 
 
                                                          
47 Maeve McClenaghan, ‘How ‘Big Four’ Get Inside Track by Loaning Staff to Government’ 
(The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 10 July 2012) 
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(d) Applying Institutional Diversion 
Under Part 1 of the framework, the examples above do not highlight instances of 
individual corruption because the benefits accrued are political. It is political 
parties that are receiving donations or the institutions that are gaining support. 
Thus, the concerns are about institutional corruption. 
In all the examples, a political benefit is being received which satisfies the 
first element of institutional corruption. Whether it is donor clubs raising money 
for political parties, fundraising events or staff support, a benefit is attained. 
Second, there may be a systematic service being given in return. This is difficult 
to prove without more transparency, but questions do arise. In the case of donor 
clubs at least, there is clearly a systematic service being given in return for the 
donation because donors can attend several events and they derive other 
membership benefits. In the case of events being sponsored or staff being 
seconded, much would depend on whether anything is offered in return and, if 
so, whether the service is systematic. The secondment of staff by the ‘big four’ 
accountancy firms suggests that they are receiving access or another service which 
provides insider knowledge. That insider knowledge might be considered a 
systematic service because it is ongoing whilst the staff are present in Parliament. 
For those donating at events, sponsoring events or hosting tables, it would 
depend on whether a systematic service is being returned. If it is, then the second 
element of the institutional corruption test is satisfied.  
For the third element, the examples highlight exchanges that are improper 
for (a) improper dependency reasons and (b) other improprieties. On the former, 
it is clearly the case that political parties depend on donations to survive. The 
Government and Parliament also appear to be dependent on help from outside 
firms offering ‘free’ staff in the form of secondees or other help. Rowbottom 
explains the concern about such dependencies in the following passage: 
If a politician depends on a particular donor for substantial funds, there 
is a danger that the official will be influenced by the views or interests of 
that donor (especially if he wishes to receive donations in the future), even 
if the donation has come with no strings attached […] the presence of the 
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donation can taint the politician’s decision-making and present a conflict 
of interest.55 
The theory of reciprocity explains this. It is human nature to ‘return a favour’ to 
someone who has offered help.56 A sense of obligation underlines the returning 
of a favour by the recipient of the original favour.57 Reciprocity is more likely to 
develop in the lobbying context because gifts may be exchanged, donations given 
or free help offered.  
Thus, identifying a dependency can offer a richer account of an institutional 
problem that exists. However, for both (a) and (b) above, the elements of 
individual corruption (already rejected above) or political equality must be 
established for finding impropriety. In that regard, the elements of political 
equality are engaged. There is competition between lobbyists who use their 
financial arms advantages to donate to parties, sponsor events and second staff. 
Their financial strength generates opportunities for influence that most could not 
afford. The sub-elements of the ‘controlling the decision-making process’, the 
‘economy of attention’ and the ‘equality of participation’ help to identify 
underlying problems. There are questions about the control that accountancy 
firms are exerting over policy internally by virtue of the dependency on their 
expertise. Further, politicians are more likely to give their attention to those 
offering support, and participation in the political process is precluded by one’s 
ability to offer something advantageous to office-holders. Thus, the exchanges 
noted above are improper for these reasons of equality. 
For Part 2 of the framework, the criterion of ‘objectivity’ can be used to 
test whether the institutional corruption identified causes a diversion. For 
question 1, officials are not showing equal respect and concern for the preferences 
of each citizen because they are offering advantages to those who donate to them. 
They could be giving greater weight to their representations. For question 2, 
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information arising from extensive public deliberations may not be favoured over 
influences arising from lobbyists competing in their self-interests. For example, it 
is logical that the opposition front bench will be more likely to heed the ‘advice’ 
of the accountancy firms offering them £600,000 of research assistance than 
others. For these reasons, it is also questionable whether officials have access to 
the widest possible variety of information (Question 3). Thus, objectivity is likely 
undermined in these scenarios because it is doubtful whether office-holders are 
assessing ideas on their merits and giving equal weight to representations when 
such a strong dependency exists.  
Furthermore, ‘integrity’ is also potentially undermined. Namely, the third 
question for integrity: is the independence of the institution or individual 
compromised? Independence is compromised not only because a dependency 
exists, but also because firms are providing help to the Government who needs 
to regulate them. The independence of the institution is, therefore, compromised 
for those two reasons. Thus, both the criteria are potentially undermined which 
means that a diversion from acting in the public interest has arisen. That diversion 
causes trust in the institutions to be undermined. If access and influence can be 
purchased (which it can) then citizens will not trust that the political system is 
working for them. 
Regarding regulation, the issues highlight how reforms might be needed to 
the system of donations to avoid dependencies and political equality barriers 
created by the political system. A lack of transparency surrounding secondments 
and the hosting of events makes it difficult to draw definitive links, and so greater 
transparency would help to draw firmer conclusions. Conflicts of interest 
highlight the potential reforms needed regarding who can operate within the 
political system and what information they have access to. Thus, the examples 
highlight an array of issues stemming from concerns about institutional 
corruption which flow into issues about political equality. The framework offers 
a clear and logical path to deciphering those issues in a holistic manner that is not 
offered elsewhere.  
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2.1.3 Political Equality Case Studies 
The examples below highlight the pervasive and infiltrative nature of lobbyists in 
the political system. They illustrate in more detail the much more complex sub-
elements of political equality; the marketplace of ideas, the control of the 
decision-making process and the economy of attention. 
(a) The Marketplace of Ideas 
(i) Tobacco: Third Parties and Shutters 
In 2009, the Government amended the Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act 
2002 and other regulations58 to ban the display of cigarettes at the point of 
purchase. Shutters were required to hide cigarette displays and are now a 
prominent feature in supermarkets in the UK. When a customer requests to buy 
cigarettes, a member of staff must slide a shutter to reveal the cigarettes before 
closing the shutters once the transaction is complete. The purpose of the law is 
to limit the exposure that children have to cigarettes. Evidence suggested that 
similar laws in other countries resulted in a reduction in smoking amongst young 
people.59 
The lobbying effort by the tobacco industry to oppose the introduction of 
such a law in the UK reveals the extent to which the marketplace of ideas can be 
controlled by lobbyists. Cave and Rowell explain that ‘an immense lobbying effort 
to fight the shutters’ was launched by the industry which was fronted by ‘people 
other than tobacco firms’.60 Those people consisted of shopkeepers whom large 
tobacco firms sought to control to give the public impression of ‘the friendly face 
of their local corner shop struggling against excessive government regulation’.61 
In other words, the aim was for the tobacco firms to put their words ‘in 
someone else’s mouth’.62 Rose explains the rationale for this approach is to give 
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the appearance of credibility to an argument by giving the argument the 
appearance of independence.63 Where an idea does not appear motivated by a 
self-interest or the desire to protect profit (particularly in the context of sensitive 
issues such as smoking and public health) it may have a greater likelihood of 
success.64 ‘It is about separating the message from the self-interested source’ 
explain Cave and Rowell.65 The tobacco industry have influenced officials through 
third parties for decades by funding think-tanks, retailers, scientists, academics 
and journalists. Such third parties enjoy more credibility than corporations who 
appear to have an agenda. The use of third parties can be a ‘deeply deceptive 
tactic’ because seemingly independent third parties may, in reality, be formed, 
trained and financed by lobbyists. At the same time, ‘strenuous’ efforts are made 
to conceal all traces of lobbyists’ influence and to ‘selectively and quietly’ disclose 
financial information.66 
With regard to the law on cigarette shutters, tobacco firms allegedly devised 
a plan internally, called ‘Project Clarity’ to ‘try and derail, or failing that, delay the 
new law’.67 Two lobbying firms were instructed called Gardant Communications 
(later rebranded to Meade Hall & Associates) and iNHouse Communications. 
The firms used shopkeepers to front the lobbying campaign and thus be in the 
public eye as opposed to the lobbying firms. The firms also prepared legal 
challenges against the Government. Once filed, the lawsuits would be supported 
by larger lobbying organisations such as the British Retail Consortium and the 
Confederation of British Industry. The plan was also for newsagent 
representatives to approach MPs seeking votes in the upcoming 2010 general 
election. Regional rallies would be sponsored for prospective MPs where the 
candidates would be asked to sign a pledge to oppose the ban on tobacco displays. 
They argued that a ban should be opposed because it would lead to more 
smuggling and thereby more crime and lower tax revenues. To support that 
argument, the lobbyists recruited former police and customs officers to convey 
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the message. The pledge would later be used to influence the candidates should 
they have subsequently been elected to Parliament.68 
Following this lobbying effort, and days before the general election, the 
then shadow Health Minister of the Conservative Party informed the newsagents’ 
lobby group that he was concerned about the legality of the proposed ban and 
that, if elected, the Conservatives would reconsider the proposals.69 According to 
the authors, the comments ‘caused great excitement’ amongst the lobbyists who 
called it ‘hugely important [and] directly attributable to the grassroots efforts’.70 
Conservative Party policy had been influenced which was evidenced by the ban 
being delayed for two years for small shops, and six years for newsagents, once 
the Conservatives were elected.71 
Having succeeded in delaying the ban, the lobbyists then sought to achieve 
a more permanent retreat from the law. An action plan supposedly belonging to 
the lobbyists72 indicated that they planned to seek the support of 100 MPs to 
pressure the Government. The lobbyists communicated their arguments through 
another third party, the Leicestershire Asian Business Association (LABA). This 
was achieved by sending mail to LABA members encouraging them to contact 
and influence MPs.73 The lobbyists reframed the issue as being a concern about 
business rather than health. Cave and Rowell note that the lobbyists: 
Combined a media campaign designed to alarm, with third party lobbying, 
including a determined ‘grassroots’ effort, aimed at demonstrating 
widespread opposition.74 
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To exert control of third parties to front lobbying campaigns, the authors explain 
that lobbyists: 
Seek to exploit a dormant constituency who may share their stance, 
spurring these allies into action and through funding giving them 
prominence with politicians and the media. Or, if allies are hard to come 
by, lobbyists will create them from nothing, hiring people and forming 
groups.75 
(ii) Tobacco: Manipulative Tactics and Plain Packaging 
These tactics extended to another issue of concern to the tobacco industry: plain 
packaging on cigarettes. There was a Government proposal to remove branding 
from cigarette packets and replace them with graphic health warnings because 
branding is a key factor in enticing young consumers to smoke. In response, 
tobacco lobbyists conveyed their stance through third parties such as 
shopkeepers, a body representing rural shops (financially supported by tobacco 
firms) and an organisation representing Scottish wholesalers.76 A lobbying firm, 
Luther Pendragon, was hired with the tactic of approaching local authorities, 
council representatives and trading standards officers throughout the country.77 
The trading standards officers were urged by the lobbyists to write to their local 
MP with the suggestion of delaying the proposals on plain packaging.78 The 
authors highlight that ‘tobacco was getting council officers to lobby for it’.79 
Former police officers were also employed whose names allegedly appeared 
in media articles warning that the smuggling of tobacco would become worse if 
plain packaging were introduced. Further, in submissions to the Government on 
the issue, tobacco companies cited former police offers as expert witnesses who 
opposed the packaging. Those former officers were, however, members of a 
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group funded by tobacco companies.80 The following extract highlights the 
pervasive lengths to which lobbying firms controlled the messaging: 
A small army of specialists were brought in to supplement these and other 
third party messengers such as business associations, anti-counterfeiting 
groups, researchers, and think tanks, like the Institute of Economic 
Affairs and the Taxpayers’ Alliance. The PR company Finsbury helped 
PMI [the tobacco lobby] on key campaign decisions; the law firm DLA 
Piper was tasked with working up national stories, exclusives, op-eds and 
‘thought-provoking pieces’; the advertising company Pepper Media 
targeted its audience with regional stories about illicit trade. The specialist 
broadcast PR company Markettiers4dc was also roped in as consultants 
on the campaign. Also laid out was the broadcast and national and 
regional print media to target. Papers like the Financial Times, Daily Mail 
and Telegraph were in. The Guardian and the Independent were out.81 
The aim was to bring about a collective effort to promote the message that the 
smuggling of tobacco would increase substantially, to doubt the evidence 
surrounding the benefits of plain packaging and to threaten ‘legal implications’ of 
introducing plain packaging laws. Importantly, plain packing had been introduced 
in Australia and one of the core arguments was to encourage the Government to 
adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach as regards the success of plain packaging in 
Australia before introducing such a law in the UK. 
Much planning went into the lobbying effort with the lobbyists creating an 
‘influencers’ map detailing those in favour and against plain packaging. The map 
included politicians, think-tanks, businesses and government departments. Their 
plans also revealed the lengths to which they would go to influence a Government 
public consultation on the proposals. The lobbyists claimed to have the capacity 
to generate 18,000 responses to the consultation arising from smokers’ groups 
they recruited, industry, retail groups, think-tanks and trade unions. British 
American Tobacco also influenced the consultation process with a target of 
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200,000–300,000 individual submissions through websites. Indeed, a website was 
created by lobbyists that had the appearance of being a ‘consumer website’. 82  
A report by the Telegraph highlighted how an open letter was delivered to 
the Health Secretary by 51 MPs opposing plain packaging. Of those MPs, ‘six 
have each accepted tickets and lunch at the Royal Chelsea Flower Show worth 
more than £1,100 from Japan Tobacco International (JIT), which owns the Silk 
Cut, Mayfair and Benson & Hedges Brands’.83 They noted how an MP had 
‘accepted two tickets to the opera festival Glyndebourne from the company last 
spring, valued at £1,132’.84 In the open letter signed by the MPs, it was argued 
that there was ‘no reliable evidence that plain packaging will have any public 
health benefit’ and that plain packaging would encourage tobacco smuggling.85 
The Telegraph claimed that JIT had spent more than £23,000 ‘courting MPs in 
the last eighteen months’.86 
A political science study demonstrated that over a three-year period which 
included the Government’s consultation on plain packaging:  
88% of research and 78% of public communications opposing plain 
packaging were carried out by organisations with financial links to 
tobacco companies. And public retailer campaigns funded by tobacco 
companies to mobilise opposition to plain packaging generated 95% of 
the more than 420,000 negative postcard and petition submissions to the 
consultation.87 
Some of the tactics used also appeared to be dishonest and manipulative when 
lobbyists argued that half a million people were opposed to plain packaging. In 
support of this number, they cited petitions, online forms, postcards or written 
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submissions to the Department of Health.88 However, the authenticity of those 
sources was called into question. Cave and Rowell describe that in 2012 a civil 
servant: 
Was leaving London’s busy Waterloo Station when he saw two men 
wearing Hands Off Our Packs campaign T-shirts. This was the campaign 
run by the tobacco front group Forest. The official watched as one of the 
Hands Off Our Packs canvassers filled in a number of responses to a 
petition against the measure, forging one signature after another. The civil 
servant challenged him. The man refused to say what he was doing.89 
A letter by that civil servant from the Department of Health sent to the campaign 
group Forest was revealed by a Freedom of Information request. In the letter, the 
civil servant noted that: 
I observed your representatives for a short period, during which I saw 
one of them writing frantically on the pad he was holding in full view of 
the public. I approached him, and saw that he was writing names and 
addresses on his pad, then signing the pad next to the names in different 
ways. During the short time I watched him, he filled completely a whole 
sheet […] On the assumption that the signed petitions will be sent to DH 
[Department of Health] as part of your organisation’s response to the 
consultation, I am alerting you to the possibility that forged names may 
have been included in your petition.90 
In another letter to Forest, the civil servant wrote: 
Today, I received correspondence from Head of the Department of 
Epidemiology and Public Health at the University of Nottingham, and 
the Chair of the Royal College of Physicians’ Tobacco Advisory Group 
regarding your organisation’s petition on tobacco packaging […]  
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[correspondence from the said person]  
In a meeting with the undergraduate medical students here at the University 
of Nottingham on Monday, one student informed me that he had been 
approached by two of his friends who I understand to be other students to sign 
the ‘Hands off our Packs’ petition. He stated that his friends had to acquire 
a certain number of signatures otherwise they would not get paid. He went on 
to say that he had signed the petition giving a false name because he felt sorry 
for his friends. Obviously this is of huge concern on a number of fronts. 
In three emails, members of the public contacted the Department of Health to 
complain about the tactics used by Forest. They complained that members of the 
‘help protect our pack’ campaign approached people to sign the petition leaving 
them under the impression that they would receive free gifts. The campaign was 
also accused of approaching drunk people to sign the petition in clubs and bars 
and for providing false information about the Government’s proposals, leaving 
people under the impression that the Government was seeking an outright ban 
on cigarettes.91 
The lobbying efforts on plain packaging appeared to be successful. The 
Government’s legislative plan for 2013 did not include plain packaging. At the 
time, a tobacco industry lobbyist blogged that it was time ‘to get the party 
started’.92 Two months later, the Government announced that it would ‘wait and 
see’ whether plain packaging was effective in Australia. The authors note how 
that delaying tactic was a ‘central message employed by the tobacco lobbyists’.93 
In an interview, the then Prime Minister stated that there was not enough 
evidence to prove that plain packaging was effective at cutting smoking amongst 
young people and that there was too much legal uncertainty—both central 
arguments employed by tobacco lobbyists. Reflecting on the lobbying effort, 
Hatchard states that: 
Arguments that come from tobacco companies and their research spill 
into public spaces. Once there, they can influence the public and political 
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mood on life-saving tobacco control policies and create a misleading 
impression of diverse and widespread opposition. This is known in the 
world of political science as “conflict expansion”. And the potential 
effects are significant. When widespread, these “third party” activities can 
work to delay and even prevent policies: it took four years to get from 
consultation to implementation in the UK.94 
(iii) Think-Tanks  
A consistent thread in the examples analysed is the influence of think-tanks in the 
UK on the political process. Establishing a direct link between their influence and 
policy outputs is almost impossible because the processes involved are complex 
and multifaceted.95 Further, a lack of transparency makes a clear relationship 
difficult to ascertain.96 The furthest political science studies can go is to establish 
a ‘congruence between ideas and the content of policy decisions’ although that in 
itself does not establish impact.97 Nevertheless, there is a ‘strong suggestion’ that 
think-tanks have enjoyed a significant role in disseminating and legitimising 
particular policy proposals.98 Furthermore, it is undeniable that think-tanks exist 
to lobby because their purpose is to influence policy.  
It is, for that reason, that UK lobbyist Zetter offers a ‘top tip’ of indirectly 
donating to political parties by sponsoring think-tanks or their reports. He 
explains that ‘by sponsoring a report by one of these think tanks, it is possible to 
have a positive influence on the thinking of political parties and politicians 
without having to register a donation’.99 It is not only research outputs of think-
tanks that can influence but also their financial ability to sponsor events. They 
achieve this by ‘hosting conferences and seminars, submitting proposals to 
relevant civil servants and ministers, writing articles in newspapers, and publishing 
books and pamphlets’.100 For those that do reveal their financial details, much 
appears to be given from the financial industry. 
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An investigation by the BIS in 2012 showed that in a one year period, the 
UK’s top 18 think-tanks had received £1.3m from the financial sector raising 
questions about their independence.101 Some working for think-tanks have 
acknowledged these risks. For example, Sam Read from the New Economics 
Foundation think-tank stated that: 
Theoretically a wealthy individual who doesn’t like a government policy 
could give millions of pounds to a thinktank to promote their agenda […] 
As well as utilising the thinktank’s professed close links to politicians, they 
can help to create a debate in the media where they will give the 
impression that certain policies are backed by independent experts.102 
Some think-tanks have stated that donors ‘do not have massive influence but they 
do offer suggestions on areas of focus’.103 Thus, think-tanks appear to be, in some 
cases, influenced by those with significant financial resources. 
Two influential think-tanks are the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) 
founded in 1955 and the Adam Smith Institute (ASI) founded in 1977. Both 
favour neo-liberal free-market ideals and undertake research promoting policies 
in that area. Their influence has been extensive with claims that the Thatcher 
Governments implemented 200 of 624 policy proposals listed in a 1985 ASI 
file.104 Together, the ASI and IEA have used subtly different approaches to 
influencing policy. The IEA has broadly presented ‘the intellectual case for long-
term market-orientated policies and values, whereas the ASI has focussed rather 
more on the short-term or practical means of actually implementing such 
policies’.105 Indeed, for the IEA, it has ‘sought to change the climate in which 
government thinking was taking place’ and that it influenced ‘those who help to 
frame the context in which policy-making takes place’.106 
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A more modern think-tank called Policy Exchange was formed in 2002. Its 
purpose was to challenge Labour to help the Conservatives. Former Prime 
Minister David Cameron claimed that ‘without Policy Exchange, there would be 
no Conservative revolution’.107 Whilst Dorey notes that the statement was ‘almost 
certainly hyperbole’, the links between the Conservative Party and Policy 
Exchange are strong.108 Michael Gove (former minister and candidate for the 
Conservative Party leadership) sat as its former Chair. Further, before the 
Conservatives winning the general election in 2010, it was claimed that Policy 
Exchange was a ‘hothouse for many of its likely personnel, and the deviser of 
much of what the Conservatives are likely to do in Office’.109 Subsequently, the 
Conservative Party adopted many of its policies under Cameron.110  
Another think-tank, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), is 
claimed ‘to have played a major role in the 1992 establishment, by the Labour 
leadership, of the (Borrie) Commission on Social Justice, which in turn, provided 
the basis for such New Labour policies as the New Deal’.111 The extent of the 
IPPR’s influence on the Labour Party was considered to be so significant that it 
was referred to as ‘New Labour’s civil service’.112 A different think-tank, Demos, 
was concerned less with proposing policies but in shaping the framework in 
which policies were developed which has echoes with the dynamic between the 
IEA and ASI.113 There are also direct links between think-tanks and 
Governments. Following the Labour Party’s election victory in 1997, the then 
Prime Minister Tony Blair appointed the co-founder of Demos to the Cabinet 
Office to coordinate the implementation of policies.114 This direct link appears to 
be a pattern. There have been 24 individuals who had memberships or held posts 
within influential think-tanks, who were subsequently appointed to government 
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positions as special advisers, ministers and as the head of 10 Downing Street 
Policy Unit.115  
(iv) Applying Institutional Diversion 
The examples above highlight concerns about political equality under Part 1 of 
the framework. The two core elements of political equality are engaged because 
those with significant financial resources gain an unequal opportunity to influence 
office-holders. In the context of this section, they use those resources to access 
the marketplace of ideas, control it and use their advantage to ensure their voice 
is heard loudest (sub-elements of political equality).  
The control is deep and pervasive, infiltrating all corners of the marketplace 
which then forms the basis of influence over the decision-making process. The 
examples of the tobacco industry highlight how industry hires professional 
lobbyists. The lobbyists make detailed plans and concerted efforts to fight 
potential Government policies that could undermine their profits. A significant 
part of that plan is to ‘recruit’ third parties to convey their messages which gives 
them the appearance of being independent and credible. Instead of the push 
against tobacco regulations being fronted by tobacco firms, the struggling corner 
shop is presented which conceals the true source of the idea.  
At the same time, the lobbyists seek to influence from all directions. Think-
tanks, academics and journalists are recruited. A consistent, broad and loud 
message appears from many sectors of the marketplace which is supportive of 
the tobacco lobby. PR companies, law firms and the mainstream media shape that 
message. Petitions by grassroots campaigns funded by the industry are used to 
influence. The tactics used for obtaining signatures are sometimes deceptive or 
fraudulent. Public consultations are flooded by hundreds of thousands of 
responses by the tobacco industry, dwarfing and drowning out the voice of 
others. Fake consumer websites are created. The vast majority of research and 
public communications arises from the lobbying efforts of the tobacco lobby. 
Only wealthy lobbyists can access the marketplace in such a manner, control it 
and generate such a loud voice. 
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Further, the sub-element of ‘controlling the decision-making process’ is 
engaged. Once the target of delaying a law was achieved, the lobbyists went 
further, attempting to remove the idea from the agenda entirely. At times, public 
officials were used to achieve this aim. Potential future MPs were lobbied and 
encouraged to sign pledges. Former police officers funded by the industry would 
publicly support the objectives of the industry. Open letters were signed by 
dozens of MPs (some of whom received hospitality from the industry) opposing 
tobacco regulations. On the example of think-tanks, the analysis shows how 
control can infiltrate directly into Government. Many think-tanks do not reveal 
their funding sources and have their research outputs influenced. They either seek 
to influence policies directly or to shape the framework in which policies are 
developed. This reflects the depth of control which lobbyists try to attain. They 
not only control various ‘sectors’ which perpetuate their narrative, but they also 
strive to shape and control the decision-making process itself. Ultimately, 
members of think-tanks have taken up key positions in Government and 
Parliament.  
It may be entirely legitimate for lobbyists to seek to control the marketplace 
of ideas and pursue a certain narrative. However, most people simply cannot 
afford to compete for control and influence. Most cannot afford to hire expensive 
professional lobbying firms, law firms, recruit the media, pay for academic 
research, influence the output of think-tanks and ultimately infiltrate Government 
and Parliament.  
Under Part 2 of the framework, integrity and objectivity are potentially 
undermined. For objectivity, officials are undermined in their ability to show 
equal respect and concern for the preferences of citizens if the information they 
derive is unknowingly and heavily influenced by lobbyists (Question 1). That 
ability could also be undermined if the decision-maker was once a member for a 
think-tank that pursues a narrow agenda funded from secret sources. When the 
marketplace of ideas is controlled in this way, to the extent that public 
consultations are flooded with questionable inputs, the objectives of broad public 
deliberations are undermined (Question 2). Instead of having access to a wide 
variety of information, narrow evidence is presented from a controlled 
marketplace. In these circumstances, the decision-making environment is not 
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offering balanced information which undermines decision-making based on 
merits. It may become very difficult for officials not to give greater weight to the 
influence of lobbyists because the information before them is almost entirely 
dominated by those interests (Question 3). Objectivity is, therefore, undermined. 
Integrity is also potentially undermined because of a lack of independence 
(Question 3 on Integrity); especially where key decision-makers have held 
positions on think-tanks or have strong ties to them. 
Where integrity and objectivity are undermined, officials are diverted from 
their purpose of acting in the public interest or their ability to do so is weakened. 
Plans are delayed or shelved, and the public trust in the institutions is undermined. 
In this regard, it can be seen how the institutional diversion framework identifies 
the lobbying concerns and tests whether a diversion has occurred in a rich and 
detailed manner. On regulation, Hatchard argues for greater transparency: 
In order to help countries guard against tobacco industry interference, 
awareness can be raised of the effects of their activities on public and 
political debates. And steps could be taken to make their relationships 
with tobacco companies clearer. A compulsory register of tobacco 
companies’ memberships, political activities and associated spending 
would be a strong first move.116 
(b) Controlling Decision-makers and the Political Process 
(i) All Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs)  
Much concern has been expressed about all-party parliamentary groups (APPGs) 
which are a particularly useful vehicle for lobbyists to influence and potentially 
control the decision-making process itself. APPGs are cross-party groups with 
expertise in specialist areas. They are recognised but minimally regulated. Over 
550 exist and have received millions of pounds in external funding.117 A practice 
has developed in which lobbyists provide support in money or in kind to assist 
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with the work of the groups.118 This has led to an inquiry by the Registrar of 
Consultant Lobbyists in the UK about whether APPGs are being used to bypass 
the provisions of the TLA 2014.119 There are also concerns about the access that 
lobbyists have to APPGs with some acting as secretaries for them.120  
For example, the All-Party British-Maldives Parliamentary Group Chair 
David Amess MP had attended the Maldives on at least nine occasions.121 One 
trip in February 2016 was an all-expenses-paid trip funded by the Maldives.122 On 
that trip, Amess, who visited with another two members of the APPG, stated that 
he applauded the former President for bringing democracy to the Maldives.123 
That praise was given at a time when the Maldives was being criticised 
internationally for its human rights record.124 The three members argued that their 
trip ‘does not indicate in any way that we are in their pocket’.125 Another APPG, 
the China APPG, raised over £160,000 from firms and Chinese state-funded 
bodies who flew a ‘succession of MPs to Beijing and beyond’.126 The APPG on 
Unconventional Oil and Gas has received donations of over £50,000 and has 
been accused of being a front for the shale gas industry because it was almost 
entirely funded by it.127 
This has led one lobbyist in his book, Zetter, to argue that APPGs are 
‘thinly veiled fronts for commercial organisations’.128 He notes how lobbyists can 
engage with APPGs by sponsoring them, providing the secretariat, arranging 
speakers, arranging site visits and suggesting topics for APPG reports.129 The 
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APPGs receive little support and no funding from Parliament and are thus 
‘grateful’ for outside help.130 Whilst there have been greater initiatives for more 
transparency surrounding APPGs, the push for transparency has gone too far. A 
600-page register is published every few weeks which makes the sheer volume of 
information difficult to decipher.131 
(ii) Peers, Ministers and Regulators 
In 2010, a private-sector membership body and industry advocacy group 
promoting the financial services industry, TheCityUK, was formed.132 TheCityUK 
offers its paying members (sponsors) access to policymakers. The sponsors are 
guaranteed a position on the advisory council and access to senior domestic and 
international influencers and decision-makers.133 In 2012, a report revealed that 
five members of the House of Lords, regulators (members from the Financial 
Services Authority) and senior civil servants sat on the advisory board and other 
committees of TheCityUK.134 Having supported a trade deal between the UK and 
India, TheCityUK released the following extract in its 2011 annual report: 
We are fortunate to have HM Treasury and UK Trade & Investment as 
partners of the [India] group, and the regular briefings from the 
government departments and key players from the British High 
Commission in India ensure the group is on the leading edge of the vital 
information […] That access also allows us to give feedback 
to government in relation to the problem areas–protectionist legislation, 
and significant restrictions on market access, investment, and equality 
of treatment with domestic suppliers.135 
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That access contrasted with the Trades Union Congress (TUC) who had to rely 
on leaks for detailed information on negotiations which took place in secret.136 
This led to arguments about inequality: 
Industry is allowed to be fully engaged in the negotiations while other 
stakeholders like consumers or civil society organisations are not allowed 
to know anything. The secrecy means the consequences of certain 
positions are not being examined or discussed before they are agreed.137 
The direct links between the Government and TheCityUK were also questioned. 
Lord Brittan, who was appointed by the Cameron Government as a trade adviser, 
produced a white paper advocating an increase in overseas skilled workers 
entering the UK.138 At the same time, he attended two meetings of the advisory 
council of TheCityUK (whom he was involved with since its inception) which 
aggressively lobbied on an EU-India Free Trade Agreement which would allow 
more skilled workers from India into the country.139 Some have claimed that bank 
representatives were not merely talking with officials but setting the agenda: 
‘representatives from banks were giving civil servants their orders […] The 
master-servant relationship was obvious’.140 
The reach of lobbyists also extends to the regulatory process itself. A BIS 
investigation in 2012 revealed how the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which 
regulates the financial services industry in the UK, was coordinating lobbying 
strategies with industry.141 The FSA agreed on a coordinated effort to influence 
UK regulatory reforms by opposing plans a for a new super-watchdog, discussed 
blocking new transparency rules, and discussed the best time for the financial 
services industry to lobby on regulatory rules.142 
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(iii) Applying Institutional Diversion 
Whilst this section has explored political equality sub-elements, the examples also 
raise show how those elements can identify institutional corruption concerns in 
Part 1 of the framework. In the case of APPGs, a benefit is being given to them 
in the form of donations or staff. Whether a systematic service is being given in 
return would require more information to determine, but it appears that there are 
significant benefits for lobbyists. Until 2013, many were granted unrestricted 
access to Parliament itself with passes being given to them. Today, many lobbyists 
have direct access to the APPGs, sitting as secretaries or in other roles. It is also 
not far-fetched to hypothesise that lobbyists are seeking some form of benefit by 
funding APPGs.  
If a service is being given or if some benefit is being derived in return for 
those donations or help, then an exchange has taken place. That exchange could 
be underpinned by an improper dependency on those donations or help given. 
Indeed, APPGs are very dependent on outside donations since there is little or 
no financial support offered internally. Whether the dependency is improper can 
be proven by establishing the elements of political equality. Specifically, lobbyists 
exert control over the political process by offering assistance to APPGs. It is the 
donors who fund foreign visits, staff and costs of the APPGs. In this regard, they 
are exerting control at the very heart of Parliament. Lobbyists are controlling the 
environment and may be influencing the outputs of APPGs (whether the 
members of APPGs are consciously aware of it or not). Underlying that concern 
about control are the two core principles of the equality of the opportunity to 
influence and the equality of arms. Only those with the resources to donate to 
APPGs can hope to gain the opportunity to influence them, and there may be 
competition between various lobbyists seeking to gain the opportunity to 
influence by exerting control over the APPGs.  
Institutional corruption aside, political equality concerns are also identified 
in isolation. In the case of TheCityUK, members of the Lords, civil servants and 
regulators sat on their advisory board. Thus, key decision-makers became part of 
the lobbying entity itself, and there were accusations that lobbyists set the agenda 
that office-holders were merely expected to follow. In this regard, they exerted 
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control over officials. Independence is also clearly a concern because those 
officials are part of the advisory board for lobbyists they are meant to regulate. 
At the same time, other lobbyists such as the TUC are omitted entirely from that 
process, relying on leaks for information. A related issue is the economy of 
attention. The Government (in the examples highlighted) clearly did not want to 
engage the TUC to the same extent as TheCityUK. That might be for ideological 
reasons, the significant control exerted by TheCityUK or both.  
Under Part 2 of the framework, both integrity and objectivity are potentially 
undermined. Integrity is undermined because independence is compromised 
(Question 3). For objectivity, it is unlikely, for example, that APPGs funded by 
the Maldives are going to engage in broad public deliberations with human rights 
groups and show equal respect and concern for citizen preferences (Questions 1 
and 2). In the case of TheCityUK, the views of others such as the TUC were not 
given equal respect or concern (Question 1). Further, broad public deliberations 
are clearly not being favoured where officials are sitting on the board and helping 
that entity (Question 2). By excluding others from the process, citizens and 
officials do not have access to the widest possible variety of information 
(Question 3). Consequently, office-holders may be giving greater weight to the 
ideas of those lobbyists and their ability to assess ideas on their inherent 
worthiness might be weakened. Thus, office-holders may be diverted from their 
purpose of acting the public interest, or their ability to do so may be weakened 
which undermines public trust. 
(c) Economy of Attention 
(i) Sham Consultations 
There are times when Government consultations are a façade. In 2005, the 
Labour Government under the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, launched a 
consultation on nuclear power. It was premised on the need for debate on the 
future of nuclear energy. However, the process was called a ‘charade’ because a 
decision had already been made two months earlier to develop a new generation 
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of nuclear facilities.143 There are two relevant issues. The first concerns the 
process being a charade and the second concerns the tactics of the nuclear lobby. 
On the former, the House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee criticised 
the process, noting that: 
It is vital that the Government’s energy policy is based on full 
consideration of the evidence and has broad political and public support 
[…] However, the Government’s Energy Review risks being seen as little 
more than a rubber-stamping exercise for a decision the Prime Minister 
took some time ago.144 
The consultation process was subject to a judicial review challenge by Greenpeace 
on the basis that there ‘was a legitimate expectation that there would be “the 
fullest public consultation” before such a final decision on the future role of 
nuclear energy was decided’.145 The High Court was scathing in its assessment of 
the consultation process holding that it was unlawful, upholding the application 
for judicial review.146 Mr Justice Sullivan held, amongst other things, that the 
consultation exercise was ‘very seriously flawed’ having gone ‘clearly and radically 
wrong’, that it was ‘manifestly inadequate’ and ‘seriously misleading’.147 A second 
consultation was conducted by the Government of Gordon Brown two years 
later. It promised that the views of the public would help to shape the policy on 
nuclear power. A website was created, and citizens were encouraged to contribute 
their opinions which would be listened to.148 However, that consultation was also 
revealed to be a ‘farce’ after Brown ‘let the cat out of the bag when he told MPs 
that the government had made the decision to continue with nuclear power 
halfway through the consultation’.149 
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On the nuclear lobby tactics, it was noted how the decision was a ‘huge 
victory for the nuclear industry, which has been employing a sophisticated 
multimillion pound public relations campaign to win its case’.150 Involved in the 
process was a special adviser, Geoffrey Norris, who had been a long-term 
advocate of nuclear power and Sir David King, a scientific adviser who had been 
in favour of nuclear power for many years.151 Regarding the lobbying strategy, a 
government-owned nuclear company, British Nuclear Fuel (BNFL) hired public 
relations companies to help shape arguments that nuclear power was climate 
friendly.152 They attempted to deliver this message through third parties such as 
‘independent’ scientists because ‘the public would be suspicious if we started 
ramming pro-nuclear messages down their throats’ noted a public affairs director 
of BNFL.153 BNFL targeted independent researchers, academics, 
parliamentarians, the media and trade unions because, as they put it, the 
‘Government does put store by what independent bodies/ experts have to say’.154 
BNFL offered financial support to members from a number of trade unions and 
administrative support facilities to campaign groups.155 
(ii) Special Advisers 
Whilst the focus of the institutional diversion framework is on the influence 
directed towards MPs, peers and ministers, it is also concerned with the decision-
making environment that influences those decision-makers. Special advisers form 
a key part of that environment and are a big target for lobbyists. They are 
sometimes ‘core participants in policy thinking [who] will often have a greater 
influence on the Secretary of State’s eventual decision than the junior ministers in 
the department’.156 Likewise, some special advisers have ‘had more personal 
influence on government policy decisions than the relevant departmental 
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secretaries of state’.157 In undertaking their role, they will be concerned whether 
proposals are in line with the overall policy position of the Government.158 
In developing and deciphering policy, they will maintain ‘significant 
external contacts, notably with the political parties, think-tanks and other 
stakeholders in the work of the Department. They will be a channel for new ideas 
and proposals’.159 In doing so, they will ‘keep an eye open for new policy thinking 
whether being promoted by think tanks, the Opposition, interest groups or 
emerging media lobbies’.160 Some have argued that there are ‘no real concerns’ 
with this process.161 A ‘benign’ reality persists whereby special advisers are helpful 
to lobbyists because they can spot political issues quickly, and be an effective way 
of raising quickly the profile of a matter in Government (making sure it is 
understood at a senior level).162 However, it is also recognised in the same research 
that special advisers provide direct access to ministers and, at the same time, block 
access to them. 
Extracts from interviews with public officials who have worked with special 
advisers reveal that some ministers had large teams of advisers making it 
‘incredibly difficult to deal’ with them because it was ‘very difficult for officials to 
get into the room for meetings’.163 One adviser to the then Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown, Shriti Vadera, restricted officials’ access to Brown because ‘she 
just had the view that her was Brown’s view, so it did not need to be tested’.164 
Whilst the research found that such instances were the exception and not the rule, 
special advisers are relevant to the economy of attention in a significant way 
because they can filter whose influence ultimately reaches key decision-makers. 
(iii) Applying Institutional Diversion  
The examples above highlight sub-elements of ‘equality of arms’ and ‘opportunity 
to influence’ under Part 1 of the framework. The specific concern is that 
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politicians give greater attention to some rather than others. At times, the 
restriction of their attention is cynical as can be seen with the examples of sham 
consultations where decision-makers gave the appearance of giving meaningful 
attention to all citizens through a deliberative process. However, a decision had 
already been made, ensuring the process was a façade. With regard to special 
advisers, they form a central part of the decision-making environment in 
Government. It was noted that they will keep an eye open for policy ideas from 
think-tanks, interest groups and media lobbies. This suggests that they give greater 
attention to lobbyists or those controlled by them. It also suggests that to gain 
the attention of special advisers, one needs to have significant resources or 
influence and must compete with other lobbyists to gain attention. This means 
that lobbyists are ‘often debilitated by the sheer range of groups and interests 
involved’.165 They cannot compete unless they have enough resources. Having 
direct access to, or control over, special advisers increases the opportunities for 
influence.  
Further, special advisers may consciously filter out which information 
reaches ministers, believing either that some information is more valuable than 
other information in terms of the Government’s goals, or attributing their own 
views to those of the Government. Conflicts of interest also arise in the economy 
of attention examples. Politicians who have a stake in the companies that are 
seeking to lobby them may give greater attention to the lobbying of those 
companies. They may have greater sympathy for their cause, they could have 
personal relationships with the relevant stakeholders and may derive a personal 
benefit. 
Under Part 2 of the framework, the criterion of objectivity is most likely 
undermined. Officials are clearly not showing equal respect and concern for the 
preferences of citizens (Question 1) where sham consultations are given or where 
staff filter out which information reaches key decision-makers. For question 2, 
information is also clearly not arising from broad public deliberations because, in 
the examples above, those consultations were proven to be a façade. For question 
3, officials do not have access to the widest possible variety of information where 
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their staff prevent information reaching them. For these reasons, office-holders 
could be giving greater weight to ideas which gained prominence from 
problematic lobbying. Their ability to assess ideas on their merits is weakened. 
Thus, objectivity is undermined which causes a diversion from acting in the public 
interest, weakening public trust.  
2.1.4 Summary 
The case studies analysed highlight the pervasive nature of lobbying which 
infiltrates much of society. Most of the concerns above were structured to help 
explain the usefulness of the sub-elements of political equality identified in 
Chapter 5. These case studies have not previously been tied to a coherent and 
comprehensive framework which identifies the underlying concerns in a 
structured manner and tests whether there is a diversion. 
2.2 Case Law and Institutional Diversion 
The poor understanding of lobbying issues and the need for a framework can be 
seen in the case below. The relevant background facts are summarised and the 
lobbying issues are highlighted. The problems with the court’s approach is 
examined, and the diversion framework is applied. 
2.2.1 Broadview: ‘Impossible to Conclude’ 
The case of Broadview Energy Developments Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government166 concerned an MP lobbying a Minister. Whilst this thesis is not 
concerned with lobbying between decision-makers in office, nor of the correct 
procedures used in the administrative law context, the case helps to highlight a 
general lack of understanding about how lobbying works and thus, potentially, 
the ability of the courts to reach fully informed conclusions. Had the outcome of 
this case been applied to a scenario involving the lobbying of a minister from an 
outside party, serious concerns would have arisen. 
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The facts were that Broadview (a company) sought to develop a new wind 
farm near the villages of Helmdon and Greatworth. Constructing the wind farm 
required permission from the Council which was refused. Broadview appealed 
that decision and the appeal was recovered by the Secretary of State (Minister) 
because the matter involved renewable energy development. The Minister refused 
planning permission to Broadview on the grounds that the wind farm would 
undermine the desirability of the area. Broadview sought to quash the decision 
on the grounds that a local MP, Andrea Leadsom, had extensively lobbied the 
Minister to refuse planning permission which breached the law and several 
guidance rules. 
The judges held that there was no breach because the Minister did not 
consider any new evidence by virtue of the lobbying. The audi alteram partem 
principle was applied which requires decision-makers to consider all sides of the 
argument in planning application decisions. A minister making a planning 
decision must make clear to any person giving oral representations that he cannot 
listen to them. Leadsom had lobbied the Minister in the tea room in Parliament 
but the Minister did not state at the beginning of those conversations that they 
should not continue which was a breach of the rules. 
However, Lord Justice Longmore found it ‘impossible to conclude that the 
tea room conversation played any part in his decision-making process’ and that 
the Minister being receptive to the lobbying was ‘at the most, a technical breach 
which cannot have made any difference to the ultimate decision’.167 Since there 
was a time gap of one year between the direct face-to-face lobbying and the 
decision, Longmore found it impossible to conclude that such lobbying could 
affect the final decision. Whilst the lobbying amounted to a technical breach of 
the decision-making process, the time difference between the breach and the 
decision meant that there were no grounds for quashing the Minister’s decision. 
Further, Lord Justice McCombe stated that ‘had the chronology been otherwise, 
and if the conversation had been more closely proximate in time to the decision 
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taken, then it seems to me that the lawfulness of the decision might well have 
been in peril’.168 
Additionally, the court had discounted a number of correspondences 
between Leadsom and the Minister. Eleven oral and written communications 
were highlighted which showed that Leadsom had lobbied the Minister for over 
one year.169 These were not considered by the court because they did not contain 
any new information to what was already known to the Minister and thus did not 
engage the relevant planning application laws and rules.170 
2.2.2 Applying Institutional Diversion 
It is important to note that the outcome of the case was not problematic. 
Leadsom was representing her constituents throughout and the Minister refused 
to grant planning permission because the wind farm would undermine the 
desirability of the area for constituents. However, what is of concern was the 
judges’ understanding of lobbying which could have led to unjust results in a 
different scenario.  
Longmore and McCombe found that the lobbying technically amounted to 
breach of the rules pertaining to granting planning permission. Nevertheless, their 
conclusion was that it was ‘impossible’ for lobbying occurring one year prior to a 
decision to affect that decision. Only lobbying nearer to the time of a decision 
could potentially affect the decision and thus put the decision-making process in 
peril. Those conclusions are highly questionable when one considers the many 
case studies highlighted above pertaining to the elements of individual corruption, 
institutional corruption and political equality under Part 1 of the framework. They 
reveal that much lobbying is undertaken over a period of months or years and 
lobbyists are successful when using a variety of methods to influence decision-
makers. Those methods are both direct and indirect, and collectively, they exist 
to gradually and systematically influence outputs.  
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The judges’ conclusion that lobbying one year prior to a decision being 
made can have no effect is therefore doubtful. It is even more doubtful in this 
case when one considers that there were many other instances of lobbying both 
orally and in writing over a period of one year. The courts disregarded those 
communications because they did not reveal any new information. Thus, they did 
not engage the rules and laws on the need for the Minister to disclose 
communications that do not reveal new information. Nevertheless, it is submitted 
that the courts erred in not considering the potential impact of those 
communications alongside the tea room lobbying that they sought to focus on in 
isolation. That is because, taken together, the tea room lobbying and the other 
communications could have gradually and systematically influenced the final 
decision. That is how lobbying works and Part 1 of the framework would have 
revealed that to the judges. 
Part 2 of the diversion framework is not engaged in this case because 
Leadsom’s actions did not amount to individual corruption nor institutional 
corruption. Whilst political equality might technically be engaged because, as an 
MP, Leadsom had an unequal opportunity to influence that Broadview was not 
offered as an outsider, the framework does not cover decision-makers lobbying 
each other; particularly where decision-makers are acting on behalf of 
constituents. However, had the scenario been different so that Broadview was 
lobbying the minister in their self-interest and had special access to the Minister—
lobbying in the tea room in Parliament and lobbying through numerous 
correspondence—the diversion framework would have been engaged in its 
entirety. In such a scenario, Broadview would have an unequal opportunity to 
influence that others do not by virtue of their special access raising questions 
about the objectivity of the decision-maker. 
Therefore, this case reveals how some judges may have little understanding 
of how lobbying works in practice which could undermine their ability to reach 
fully informed conclusions. Part 1 of the diversion framework can highlight the 
pervasive nature of lobbying where such knowledge is lacking. This is important 
because one could envisage cases where private interests (and not just office-
holders) are influencing decisions which would fully engage the framework. It 
would be very concerning, for example, if judges concluded that lobbying by 
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nuclear lobbyists attempting to influence the building of a new nuclear power 
plant should be disregarded because it occurred one year prior to a decision being 
made. 
2.3 Legislation and Institutional Diversion 
This final section analyses the impact of lobbying on legislation by reference to 
two case studies; the Water Act 2014 and the Mesothelioma Act 2014. The 
examples demonstrate that the framework is useful for identifying how lobbying 
involves, in many cases, a battle between self-interested entities which pertains to 
the equality of arms. 
2.3.1 The Water Act 2014 
The purpose of the Act was to create an insurance fund for premises at high risk 
of flooding which several groups had an interest in. Namely, the Association of 
British Insurers (ABI) which represents the insurance industry, the British 
Property Federation (BPF) which represents property owners, the British 
Insurance Broker’s Association (BIBA) which represents brokers, and the World 
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) which is concerned with conservation issues. Each 
group lobbied public officials in pursuance of their cause in relation to the Act. 
The ABI, as the provider of the fund, lobbied the Government on the rules 
surrounding the fund. This led to both parties agreeing to a Memorandum of 
Understanding in June 2013 on the creation of the fund called Flood Re. The 
purpose of the fund was to allow for the provision of affordably priced insurance 
under the Water Act 2014.171 It was agreed between the ABI and the Government 
that business premises would be excluded from the fund because businesses 
would not have difficulty in obtaining insurance at normal prices, so would not 
need the protection of Flood Re.172 Other groups such as the BPF argued that the 
fund would also not cover properties in large blocks, private rented homes, 
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properties in council tax band H and determined that premiums for small 
businesses would increase because of the exclusion of business premises.173 
Lobbying by this and other groups such as BIBA led to Band H homes in Wales 
being included in the flood protection scheme.174 In addition to Flood Re, the 
WWF and other conservation groups were successful in lobbying for 
environmental safeguards to be included in the Water Act 2014 such as reducing 
water company abstraction on rare chalk streams.175 
Thus, several groups participated in the decision-making process. The ABI, 
BPF, BIBA and the WWF argued their cases, represented their member views 
and influenced change. Sometimes this change was for causes which would be 
considered as universally good such as the WWF’s successful lobbying bringing 
about positive change for the environment. The groups provided a medium 
through which people with similar concerns could discuss their problems, and a 
concentrated voice to lobby decision-makers. However, the example also 
highlights how more powerful lobbyists can have more influence on decision-
making resulting in decision-makers being less responsive to other groups. 
Indeed, the Government most strongly agreed with the views of the ABI which 
represents 90% of the UK insurance market.176 The Government was willing to 
change its stance once other groups such as BIBA and BPF had lobbied their case 
more loudly. However, the rules were only changed months later following much 
lobbying which suggests that the Government was not responsive enough to 
those other groups during the creation of the Act. Smaller, less well-resourced 
and less powerful groups had to work harder and longer to have their voice heard. 
 
                                                          
173 Judith Ugwumadu, ‘British Property Federation reiterates Flood Re concerns’ (The Actuary, 29 
September 2014) <http://www.theactuary.com/news/2014/09/british-property-federation-
reiterates-flood-re-concerns/> accessed 13 January 2015; Richard Dyson, ‘Government flood 
insurance scheme ‘failing’’ (The Telegraph, 27 June 2014) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/insurance/10930445/Government-
flood-insurance-scheme-failing.html> accessed 13 Jan 2015. 
174 BIBA, ‘BIBA Welcomes Flood Re Announcement and Inclusion of Band H Properties’ 
(British Insurance Brokers' Association, 18 December 2014) 
<http://www.biba.org.uk/MediaCenterContentDetails.aspx?ContentID=3773> accessed 13 
January 2015; Dyson (n 173). 
175 WWF, ‘Recent Successes’ (World Wide Fund for Nature 2014) 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Fund_for_Nature> accessed 13 Jan 2015. 
176 Association of British Insurers, ‘About the ABI’ (ABI, January 2015) 
<https://www.abi.org.uk/About> accessed 13 January 2015. 
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2.3.2 The Mesothelioma Act 2014 
The purpose of the Act was to introduce a payment scheme to compensate 
sufferers of mesothelioma (a type of cancer) following exposure to asbestos. The 
interested groups were the sufferers of mesothelioma, their employers and the 
insurance industry. A grassroots lobbying campaign was undertaken by the 
Independent on Sunday newspaper for the creation of a fund for victims.177 
Sufferers had also lobbied decision-makers for years on the issue of receiving 
compensation. Insurers lobbied the Government as they were concerned about 
the cost of the compensation scheme. Grassroots lobbying was paramount to 
raising awareness of injustices suffered by those with cancer. It was also critical 
for negotiating a compensation package for sufferers. Lobbying was also effective 
from the perspective of insurers who could provide technical expertise on the 
provision of insurance for sufferers. The Government was thus able to decipher 
the views of the main interested parties and act accordingly.  
However, the Justice Select Committee found that a Government review 
of mesothelioma claims was not prepared in an even-handed manner.178 The 
report followed accusations by a Partner at a law firm and others that the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) had unduly influenced the Government’s 
proposals.179 The Committee found that the undue influence was caused by an 
informal agreement between the Government and the ABI which was not 
disclosed to other interested parties. The Committee expressed ‘concern that the 
Government has not been transparent or open about the fact that its policy on 
mesothelioma has been shaped by an agreement […] with insurers’.180  
2.3.3 Applying Institutional Diversion 
The case studies provide an illustration of how various groups seek to influence 
the formation of legislation. Equality concerns are highlighted in Part 1 of the 
                                                          
177 Emily Dugan, ‘Exclusive: Victims Blame Insurers for ‘Insulting’ Asbestos Payouts’ (The 
Independent, 5 May 2013) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/exclusive-
victims-blame-insurers-for-insulting-asbestos-payouts-8604128.html> accessed 17 January 2015. 
178 House of Commons Justice Committee, Mesothelioma Claims (third report) (HC 305, 2014-15) 4. 
179 Leigh Day, ‘Lawyer condemns Government proposals for Meso claims’ (Leigh Day, 2 
October 2013) <http://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2013/October-2013/Lawyer-condemns-
Government-proposals-for-Meso-clai> accessed 17 January 2015. 
180 Justice Committee (n 178) 3. 
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framework. For the Water Act 2014, the Government sided with the more 
powerful insurance lobby. It amended rules following a concerted lobbying effort 
from other groups, but those groups were required to put in a much greater 
lobbying effort than the insurance lobby to achieve their aim. This highlights the 
arms advantage that some lobbyists have over others. For the Mesothelioma Act 
2014, the Government made a secret informal agreement with insurers following 
a concerted effort which shaped policy. Thus, some lobbyists had a greater 
opportunity to influence others because they were able to make agreements 
secretly.  
Under Part 2 of the framework, these scenarios highlight how integrity may 
be undermined because of the Government’s independence being compromised 
by the agreement (Question 3). They also show how ‘objectivity’ can be 
undermined where the process is dominated by a battle between self-interested 
entities where the strongest group wins. Equal respect and concern is not being 
shown for the preferences of all citizens (Question 1), and greater weight is being 
given to the representations of some lobbyists over others (Question 2). These 
factors might lead to a diversion from acting in the public interest and public trust 
being undermined.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to apply and evaluate the usefulness of the 
institutional diversion framework for an analysis of lobbying concerns in the UK. 
At the outset, several questions regarding the institutional diversion were asked.  
First, does the framework help in identifying the lobbying concerns 
(whether they are in isolation or whether they cross over)? Yes: numerous 
examples of lobbying were given, and they were categorised into broad concerns 
about individual corruption, institutional corruption and political equality. Within 
those broad umbrellas, the analysis revealed deeper underlying issues highlighted 
by the sub-elements of political equality. The crossover between issues was 
illustrated well in the examples of institutional corruption where an ‘improper 
exchange’ was established by identifying the elements of political equality. 
Second, are the integrity and objectivity tests useful for identifying why those 
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concerns are problematic and for establishing a diversion? Yes, the questions help 
to establish clearly whether those criteria have been undermined by the identified 
problem thereby causing a diversion.  
Third, does the concept of an ‘institutional diversion’ help to conceptualise 
the problems clearly? It is argued that it does. Officials are not acting in the public 
interest, or their ability to do so is weakened where integrity and objectivity are 
undermined by the issues identified. This is a clear conception of the problem. 
Fourth, does that assist with identifying potential issues which require regulation? 
From the identification of the issues in Part 1, it could be seen how issues 
requiring potential reform were flagged in the analysis that followed. Fifth, is the 
framework a better tool for analysing lobbying concerns than the current 
approach in academic literature? In the case of Broadview, it was seen how the 
court poorly understood how lobbying works and could have understood the 
main issues using the framework. Further, from the examples that were 
considered, numerous issues were raised. Other literature does not offer a 
framework for identifying those concerns in a rational, clear and structured way. 
Thus, it is submitted that the diversion framework is a better tool than what 
currently exists elsewhere. Sixth, are there any drawbacks to the framework? All 
the examples analysed fell within the scope of the issues envisaged by the 
framework. Thus, it is submitted that the concept of an ‘institutional diversion’ 
works to achieve its aim of helping to offer a better conceptualisation of the 
problems with lobbying than currently exists in other literature that does not 
provide an overarching and holistic framework. The next chapter develops Part 
3 of the framework called ‘Solve’. 
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7 
Guiding Lobbying Reform: An Analysis of the 
TLA 2014 and Interview with the Registrar 
____________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
The previous chapters developed and applied Parts 1 and 2 of the diversion 
framework. This chapter creates guidelines for the development of regulatory 
solutions under Part 3 of the framework called ‘Solve’. These guidelines arise 
from an interview conducted for this thesis with the Registrar of Consultant 
Lobbyists whose post was created by the TLA 2014. 
It is evident from the previous chapters that lobbying is regulated in various 
ways such as under the BA 2010, codes of conduct, resolutions and the TLA 
2014. There is scope for a detailed evaluation of lobbying regulations, but such a 
study is far beyond the scope of this chapter. Therefore, the analysis here is 
limited to the TLA 2014. Attempts have already been made to repeal the TLA 
2014 but have failed. Indeed, the Lobbying (Transparency) Bill 2016/17 was 
intended to replace it but that attempt was unsuccessful because the Bill was so 
broad and unworkable in practice. The TLA 2014 has received much criticism 
and is likely to be targeted either for amendment or repeal again. Therefore, any 
further attempts at reform should be steered by guidelines that take into account 
the practical and political realities of statute being enacted by Parliament on this 
issue.  
This chapter is divided into three parts. First, it examines what the TLA 
2014 regulates and whether it addresses the concerns it was meant to address. It 
is argued that the TLA 2014 does not deal with those concerns and that regulatory 
solutions ought to be developed more carefully moving forward. Second, the 
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interview with the UK’s Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists is analysed.1 The 
challenges facing the Registrar in her role are identified which is important for 
determining how regulation should be developed to resolve the issues highlighted 
by the diversion framework. Third, ten guidelines are synthesised from the 
interview for Part 3 of the framework called ‘Solve’ that help to shape solutions 
moving forward. 
1. What the TLA 2014 Regulates 
The TLA 2014 requires certain lobbyists to register on a publicly available register. 
Namely, those working professionally as ‘consultant lobbyists’ who ‘in the course 
of a business and in return for payment […] makes communications […] on 
behalf of another person or persons’.2 A person is prohibited from carrying on 
the business of consultant lobbying unless they are registered on the Register of 
Consultant Lobbyists.3 The Act covers oral and written communications made ‘in 
return for payment’.4 Communications must be ‘made personally’ to a minister5 
or others in the Cabinet.6 
The register itself is a searchable online database. There are minor 
differences regarding what information companies, partnerships and individuals 
must provide, but they are all essentially required to provide a name and business 
address.7 The Act does not impose a code of conduct but requires that registrants 
state whether they comply with one.8 Registrants must state the name of the client 
on whose behalf they lobby every quarter.9 The duty of keeping and publishing 
                                                          
1 It is argued that the conclusions drawn from one individual are sufficient for an analysis of the 
relevant issues for two reasons. First, this chapter focusses on the challenges of regulation in the 
UK context and the Registrar is the first person to ever undertake this role in the UK. All the 
lessons are new and can only reliably be garnered from her first-hand experiences. Second, 
Scotland is in the process of creating a lobbying register. The forthcoming Scottish Registrar 
(Billy McLaren) has indicated his support for the regulatory approach of the UK’s registrar. See, 
National Assembly for Wales, ‘Inquiry into Lobbying: Evidence Session 2 - Video’ (Standards of 
Conduct Committee, 4 April 2017) <http://www.senedd.tv/Meeting/Archive/8c3bf014-8158-
4430-8411-871382dd74df?autostart=True> accessed 10 June 2017. 
2 Section 2(1) TLA 2014. 
3 ibid section 1(1). 
4 ibid section 2(3). 
5 ibid Sch 1, Part 2. 
6 ibid Sch 1, Part 3. 
7 ibid sections 4(2)(a), (b) & (c). 
8 ibid section 4(2)(g). 
9 ibid section 4(3) & 5(1). 
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the register falls on the Registrar10 who is currently Alison White.11 She monitors 
compliance with the Act12 and can serve a notice requiring a person to supply 
information whether the person is registered or not.13 An offence is committed 
where a person carries on the business of consultant lobbying whilst being 
unregistered,14 or if the details on the register are inaccurate or incomplete and 
the person has failed when required to submit an information return.15 There are 
both criminal and civil penalties available to the Registrar.16 The lobbying register 
went live in 2015 on the website of the Office of the Registrar of Consultant 
Lobbyists and appears as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 ibid section 4(1). 
11 UK Government, ‘Alison White’ (Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists, 2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/people/alison-white> accessed 15 April 2015. 
12 TLA 2014, section 8. 
13 ibid section 9 & 9(2). 
14 ibid section 12. 
15 ibid section 12(1). 
16 ibid section 12(7) & 16. 
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Figure 1: The UK Register of Consultant Lobbyists.17 
 
The register is simple, providing a search box, a list of consultant lobbyists by 
name and a link to further details. Figure 2 below provides a comparison of the 
different types of registration provided. 
                                                          
17 Office of the Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists, ‘Register of Consultant Lobbyists’ (ORCL, 
2017) <https://registerofconsultantlobbyists.force.com/CLR_Search> accessed 3 April 2017. 
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Figure 2: Entries on the Register of Consultant Lobbyists.18  
 
 
                                                          
18 ibid. 
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The details required from the different entities are largely the same. Namely, the 
name, the date registered, address, telephone number, website, a list of clients and 
a statement regarding whether they are signed up to a code of conduct. The 
biggest differences in content are usually the addresses and phone numbers of 
individuals compared with businesses. Further, some registrants will have 
voluntarily signed up to a code of conduct whereas others will not have done so 
(circled in red above).  
1.1 Whether the TLA 2014 Addresses Lobbying Concerns 
This issue is considered in two parts. First, and most narrowly, the goals of the 
TLA 2014 and the policy underlying its creation (identified in Chapter 2) are 
revisited to determine whether the register achieves what the law set out to do. 
Second, and more broadly, there is consideration of the concerns highlighted by 
the diversion framework on individual corruption, institutional corruption and 
political equality to explore whether the register addresses those concerns. This 
section is supplemented with extracts from the interview with the Registrar 
(although the main analysis of that interview is undertaken in section 2 below). It 
is argued that the TLA 2014 does not address most of the concerns that led to its 
creation nor those identified by the diversion framework. 
1.1.1 The Policy Objectives Underlying the TLA 2014 
The policy underlying the TLA 2014 is that:  
It is not always transparent whose interests are being represented when 
consultant lobbyists meet with ministers and senior officials. This 
information asymmetry may lead to suboptimal policy making.19  
Further, according to the then Government, the problem with a lack of 
transparency is that it can fuel a perception of undue influence.20 It stated that 
‘there is public concern that some lobbying activity is opaque, allowing some to 
                                                          
19 Cabinet Office, A Statutory Registry of Lobbyists (as part of the Transparency Lobbying, Non-Party 
Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill) (Impact Assessment, 9 July 2013) 3. 
20 ibid. 
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exert a hidden, sometimes inappropriate, influence on Government’.21 
Additionally, it noted how it would ‘continue to be vulnerable to asymmetric 
information unless this is prevented by statute, perpetuating this lack of 
transparency [where lobbyists] do not declare their clients up front’.22 Below, the 
register is analysed to determine whether it covers each issue in turn. 
(a) It is not always transparent whose interests are being represented when 
consultant lobbyists meet with ministers and senior officials. 
The register offers more transparency than before because there was previously 
no such register. It provides a list of consultant lobbyists who lobby ministers in 
certain situations and a list of the lobbyist’s clients. However, that is too narrow 
for several reasons. First, the requirements under section 2(3) TLA 2014 are easily 
circumvented. This defines ‘communications’ as those which are made personally to 
a Minister of the Crown or permanent secretary.  
The term ‘made personally’ is a glaring loophole. Where communications 
are not ‘made personally’, consultant lobbyists will not have to sign the register. 
They could simply ask someone else to communicate on their behalf. In this 
regard, the following extract from the interview with the Registrar is illuminating: 
If an organisation was to draft a letter and the letter says: ‘Dear Minister. 
Just to let you know about this particular piece of proposed legislation. 
We don't think it’s a very good idea for X, Y, Z reasons. We'd like to have 
a meeting with you. Signed X’. Now the letter is written by the consultant 
lobbyist, but it is signed by their client, so the letter is not registerable. If 
it was signed by the lobbyist, it would be. However, in most cases, it is 
signed by the client, so it is not registerable. A common misunderstanding 
at the outset was ‘we drafted the letter. Therefore, it's registerable’. No, it 
is not. The letter might be written by you but it has actually been signed 
by your client, so the letter itself is not registerable. But my next question 
is how did that letter go to the minister? Did it go to the minister’s private 
email address? Answer, ‘yes it did’. What did the email say? Did it just say: 
                                                          
21 ibid 1. 
22 ibid. 
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‘Dear Minister, please find attached a letter. Yours sincerely, consultant 
lobbyist’. If so, that is not registerable. If the email says: ‘Dear Minister, 
please find attached my letter from our client X Corporate which lays out 
a number of issues to do with this particular Government policy to which 
we would like you to have a meeting’—registerable.23 
Thus, consultant lobbyists can simply bypass the need to register by asking their 
client to sign a letter. Further, even if lobbyists want to err on the side of caution 
by seeking to register, that does not lead to more transparency. The Registrar 
explains that: 
Lots of people say to me: ‘Well I think I better err on the side of caution; 
better to over declare rather than under declare’. However, it means the 
register is not correct. They are doing things that the legislation doesn’t 
require them to do. It is my job to make sure they do what the legislation 
requires them to do.24 
As a result, the narrow definition of ‘communications’ leads to a loophole being 
created. Even where lobbyists want to register, that does not lead to more 
transparency because that is not what the legislation requires. 
The second term highlighted under section 2(3) TLA 2014 above: ‘Minister 
of the Crown or permanent secretary’ highlights how most office-holders are not 
covered. Indeed, one omission which led to considerable criticism from MPs was 
that of special advisers who are often lobbied.25 Such omissions create loopholes 
because lobbyists can simply lobby office-holders who are not covered. 
Consequently, for the first part of the policy, the register does not achieve its aims 
regarding transparency and information asymmetry because only a very a narrow 
range of communications are registrable and can easily be circumvented. 
(b) A lack of transparency can fuel a perception that undue influence has 
taken place. 
                                                          
23 Appendix 1, 9. 
24 Appendix 1, 3. 
25 HC Deb 9 September 2013, Vol 567 Col 742; HL Deb 22 October 2013 Vol 748, Col 896. 
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This raises questions about the nature of the transparency mechanism itself. A 
lobbying register may or may not tackle the perception of undue influence. It 
might do when it provides adequate information. However, too much 
information (such as on the APPG registers) would make it impossible for most 
individuals to find the time to analyse it all. Too little information might raise even 
more suspicions of undue influence with people drawing incorrect conclusions. 
The right balance is hard to determine, but the lobbying register in its current 
state is clearly inadequate for tackling perceptions of undue influence. It provides 
a name and address of the lobbyist as well as their clients, but other critical 
information is omitted such as whom the lobbyist met, when they met, what was 
discussed, what the lobbyist sought to influence, the interests of the lobbyist’s 
clients and so on. A further point is that the Ministerial Diaries exist to provide 
information about lobbying that cannot be found in the register. The 
Government publishes a quarterly register regarding whom ministers met, what 
was discussed, details of gifts received and overseas travel. A sample of this is 
given in Figure 3 below: 
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Figure 3: David Cameron’s Meetings from 1st April to 30th June 2014.26 
 
Whilst the information is useful, it is a poor complement to the lobbying register. 
The details in the diaries cannot be cross-checked with those in the register 
because specific dates are not given in either. Also, the diaries are inconsistent. 
Some entries provide details of the meetings, and some do not. Therefore, even 
when considered together, the register and diaries offer little information that can 
be used to tackle the perception of undue influence. 
                                                          
26 Cabinet Office, ‘Cabinet Office: Ministerial Gifts, Hospitality, Travel and Meetings, April to 
June 2014’ (UK Government, 13 March 2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cabinet-office-ministerial-gifts-hospitality-
travel-and-meetings-april-to-june-2014> accessed 23 April 2015. 
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(c) There is public concern that some lobbying activity is opaque, allowing 
some to exert a hidden, sometimes inappropriate, influence on 
Government. 
Whilst this concern crosses over with points (a) and (b) above, several separate 
matters arise. First, the concern mentions the need to reveal ‘lobbying activity’, 
yet the register does not disclose the details of lobbying activities; only that some 
lobbying activity has taken place. Second, whether influence was ‘inappropriate’ 
will not be revealed by the register in its current state as, again, no details of the 
lobbying are given. Third, the register covers less than 20% of lobbyists overall 
(consultant lobbyists) and, in any case, only covers less than 1% of consultant 
lobbyist activities because they rarely meet Ministers or Permanent Secretaries.27 
Therefore, the register does little to bring transparency to the activities of 
consultant lobbyists, never mind others such as in-house lobbyists. During the 
Bill stages, the Government claimed that it is clear whose interests in-house 
lobbyists represent. For example, it is clear whose interests HSBC represent when 
they lobby.28 However, it is not merely the identity of the lobbyist that is relevant 
but also the subject matter of the lobbying; HSBC could have a huge range of 
interests. This inadequacy is underlined by information contained in the 
European Union Lobbying Transparency Register in Figure 4 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 PRCA, ‘PRCA Lobbying Bill Briefing – Report stage’ (PRCA, 2013) 
<http://www.prca.org.uk/assets/files/PRCA%20Lobbying%20Bill%20Briefing%20-
%20Report%20stage.pdf> accessed 24 April 2015. 
28 HC Deb 3 September 2013, Vol 567, Cols 178 & 179. 
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Figure 4: Lobbyists Headquartered in the UK and Registered on the European 
Transparency Register.29 
 
Figure 4 shows lobbyists that have their head offices in the UK, registered from 
2009 to 2015. They are divided into different categories such as in-house 
lobbyists, consultant lobbyists, law firms and so on. It is quite an indictment of 
the TLA 2014 when one can search the details of lobbying by UK-based 
consultant and in-house lobbyists in the EU (with specific details regarding their 
                                                          
29 Europa EU, ‘Search the Register (For UK Lobbyists)’ (Transparency Register, 23 April 2015) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/reportControllerPager.do?fteP
ersOperator=EQUAL&acreditedPersStart=&regEndYear=&countries=230&regStartDate=&_
countries=on&_countries=1&_hasActivityExpertGroups=on&_interests=on&_hasActivityInd
ustryForums=on&_=on&_actionFields=on&financialCostStart=&ftePersEnd=&regEndMont
h=&financialTurnoverEnd=&regEndDate=&_hasActivityInterGroups=on&membersOperator
=EQUAL&regStartDay=&_hasActivityHighLevelGroups=on&financialTurnoverOperator=E
QUAL&financialTurnoverStart=&_hasActivityConsultCommittees=on&_hasBelgiumOffice=o
n&ftePersStart=&regStartMonth=&regEndDay=&membersEnd=&_categories=on&acredited
PersOperator=EQUAL&financialCostOperator=EQUAL&financialCostEnd=&regStartYear=
&membersStart=&_inAllEuCountries=on&euFunding=Not_applicable&acreditedPersEnd=&
d-7390322-p=1> accessed 23 April 2015.  
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lobbying activities) but cannot search the details of lobbying by UK based 
lobbyists in the UK.  
Overall, the UK Government’s policy underlying the TLA 2014 was to 
tackle a lack of transparency surrounding lobbying activities because poor 
transparency can fuel perceptions of undue influence. However, the register is 
inadequate for solving these problems. ‘Communications’ are defined too 
narrowly, only consultant lobbyists are covered, most office-holders are not 
covered, and minimal information is provided on the register which will do little 
to alleviate the highlighted concerns. 
1.1.2 Institutional Diversion Concerns and the TLA 2014 
The register also does little to deal with the concerns highlighted by the 
institutional diversion framework. Since it reveals nothing about the influences 
involved, whom the lobbyists met and what was discussed, it is impossible to 
identify whether individual corruption has arisen or whether political equality is 
an issue. A registered lobbyist will have communicated directly with a minister, 
but questions remain about whether the lobbyist has greater opportunities for 
influence than others or whether others are afforded the same opportunity to 
communicate with the minister. Further, institutional corruption concerns cannot 
be analysed. The subject matter of the lobbying is unknown as are any reciprocal 
benefits moving from a minister to the lobbyist. Since the name of the official is 
not revealed, a basic analysis of whether a service is returned (one of the elements 
of institutional corruption) cannot be ascertained. Little in the register helps to 
determine whether integrity and objectivity have been undermined causing a 
diversion from the public interest.  
One aspect of the register, however, is helpful. In Figure 2 above, entries 
on the register are shown which highlight whether a registrant subscribes to a 
code of conduct. That is helpful because it highlights different codes that 
lobbyists subscribe to. The requirements under those codes are inconsistent, and 
the definitions are different to those of the House of Commons, House of Lords 
and Ministerial code. For example, in Figure 2, PwC subscribe to the Chartered 
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Accountants in England and Wales’ (ICAEW) Code of Ethics.30 In that code, 
‘integrity’ means ‘to be straightforward and honest in all professional and business 
relationships’ and ‘objectivity’ means ‘to not allow bias, conflict of interest or 
undue influence of others to override professional or business judgments’.31 
APCO subscribe to the APPC Code of Conduct which states that: 
Save for entertainment and token business mementoes, political 
practitioners must not offer or give, or cause a client to offer or give, any 
financial or other incentive to any member or representative of an 
institution of government, whether elected, appointed or co-opted, that 
could be construed in any way as a bribe or solicitation of favour. Political 
practitioners must not accept any financial or other incentive, from 
whatever source, that could be construed in any way as a bribe or 
solicitation of favour.32 
This demonstrates some alignment with the principle of ‘integrity’ arising from 
the codes and legislation applying to office-holders. However, there are 
inconsistencies between the rules that lobbyists adhere to and how closely those 
rules align with those applying to office-holders. In this regard, the register is 
helpful for highlighting those inconsistencies and, therefore, suggests possible 
future areas for research and reform. At the same time, however, it highlights how 
the register is simply not designed to deal with the conduct issues highlighted by 
the diversion framework. 
2. Regulatory Challenges: An Interview with the Registrar 
The Appendix in this thesis contains an interview conducted with the Registrar 
of Consultant Lobbyists, Alison White, whose post was created by the TLA 2014. 
The purpose of this section is to identify the regulatory challenges faced by the 
Registrar which are unique to the administrative and political system in the UK 
by analysing that interview. From that analysis, guidelines are synthesised and 
incorporated into Part 3 of the diversion framework. The framework would be 
                                                          
30 ICAEW, Chartered Accountants in England and Wales’ Code of Ethics. (ICAEW, 2017). 
31 ibid, Fundamental Principles, rule 100.5. 
32 Association of Professional Political Consultants, ‘APPC Code of Conduct’ (APPC) 
<https://www.appc.org.uk/code-of-conduct/appc-code-of-conduct/> accessed 3 April 2017. 
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more helpful if it not only helps with identifying and testing the concerns with 
lobbying but also offers guidelines for the development of regulatory solutions 
that can realistically be achieved (ie, be enacted in legislation by Parliament). 
2.1 The Objectives of the Registrar 
To achieve what the legislation requires her to do, the Registrar outlines five 
objectives for her role. They are to: 
(a) Administer an accessible, up-to-date and accurate Register of 
Consultant Lobbyists; 
(b) Ensure that all those who are required to register do so, by making 
potential registrants aware of their obligations under the Act; 
(c) Provide clear and accessible guidance on the requirements for 
registration and compliance; 
(d) Monitor and enforce compliance with the Act’s legal requirements; 
and 
(e) Operate the Register and the Office in a way that demonstrates 
good governance through delivery of my statutory obligations in a 
cost effective and accountable manner.33 
The objectives are analysed to decipher how the Registrar achieves them and 
whether any obstacles arise in achieving them. Other relevant issues arising from 
the interview are also examined. 
2.2 Achieving the Objectives and Challenges 
2.2.1 Objectives A, B and C 
The register has been criticised for covering only consultant lobbyists. 
Nevertheless, the Registrar has registered others who might not have been 
expected to fall within its remit because their activities are covered under the Act 
including ‘lawyers, management consultants, accountants and think-tanks’.34 As 
such, a challenge for the Registrar has been ensuring that people register who 
                                                          
33 Alison J White, ORCL Business Plan 2016-2017 (Office of the Registrar of Consultant 
Lobbyists, 2016) 5. 
34 Appendix 1, 2. 
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‘would not at all think of themselves as being traditional lobbyists’.35 A registrar 
cannot ‘make the assumption that they will have read [the] guidance or that they 
will even know about the register’.36 She notes that needing to register ‘will 
probably be the last thing on your mind when you are setting up an organisation 
and trying to find clients’.37 Thus, it is incumbent upon the Registrar to 
communicate effectively with potential registrants and educate them about their 
responsibilities.  
Both have been a ‘big challenge since the beginning’.38 She notes that many 
misunderstood and misinterpreted their obligations despite the guidance 
produced and the education given.39 Consequently, she has devoted her time ‘very 
largely’ on education and communication by creating ‘good guidance and a good 
interpretation in usable language; accessible language that the layperson could 
understand’.40 Once that information is communicated, it is imperative to ‘keep it 
fresh in people’s minds otherwise, they forget’.41 This is achieved through 
newsletters, meetings and an annual stakeholder conference.42 Further, there is 
the added difficulty that those to whom information is communicated may not 
be in their post in the future, or that when companies file their quarterly return, 
different people undertake that role—people who have not had their obligations 
under the Act communicated to them.43 
Additionally, in achieving these objectives, the Registrar highlights the 
importance of being accessible and being someone who can be relied upon. Being 
accessible enables people to ‘conform better’ because they can avoid making 
mistakes by simply asking.44 Being reliable fosters a culture of trust. Lobbyists will 
be more likely to ask questions about their obligations if they can ensure their 
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confidentiality is protected.45 That trust is developed over time as relationships 
are built: 
I have spoken to lots of organisations on the phone, and I have addressed 
all sorts of meetings, sometimes meetings of partners of individual firms. 
I address the compliance officers of the lobbying trade bodies. I have 
spoken at all sorts of different events. I go to meetings of the APPC 
(Association of Professional Political Consultants) and the PRCA (Public 
Relations and Communications Association) and other bodies. We have 
an annual stakeholder event as well.46 
The Registrar also highlights some of the investigatory challenges that arise. For 
example, at the time of the interview, she was conducting an investigation into 
APPGs (analysed in Chapter 6). Her investigation was to determine whether 
lobbyists involved with APPGs were undertaking registrable activities and should, 
therefore, have been registered: 
I went through the whole list and looked to see who was providing their 
support services and then looked to see whether they were registered. I 
came up with a combination of providers of services on my register and 
declaring clients; on my register and not declaring clients; and not on my 
register […] For the ones that are not on my register, you have to 
communicate with them through publicly available channels. In some 
cases, some of them do not have websites. To find their contact details, I 
use publicly available sources of information, internet searches, 
Companies House, etc.47 
In general, most people are helpful where information is requested, however 
‘some of them need to be shown why it is important to be cooperative; sometimes 
I have to be firm. Sometimes they think that perhaps I will just go away, but I do 
not’.48 
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2.2.2 Objective D 
As noted above, there are civil and criminal penalties available to the Registrar. 
At the time of the interview, a civil penalty of about £2,000 had been imposed on 
one organisation, and other smaller penalties of a few hundred pounds were 
imposed for the late payment of fees.49 It is important that penalties act as a 
deterrent for those not taking their obligations seriously: ‘I am quite sure that they 
will for those organisations that [had the penalty imposed upon them] I hope that 
other organisations will look at that and be similarly weary’.50 She also states that 
‘the potential threat of failing to comply with any legislation, including this one, 
would be a ‘very serious issue’ for organisations regarding their ethical 
obligations.51 In terms of enforcing compliance, there have not been any 
difficulties so far, with fines being accepted and paid.52 
In terms of monitoring, she has conducted investigations into those 
advertising public affairs services by meeting with the relevant people to 
determine whether they should be registered. One obstacle to her undertaking 
her compliance function has arisen from the under-resourcing of her office. Her 
office is small with officials being seconded from the Cabinet Office. However, 
whilst the Registrar has had to do more than she would have ‘preferred to’, she 
has been able to ‘cover the gaps’ so that there would not be a hiatus in undertaking 
the necessary tasks.53 She also reveals that under-resourcing has been ‘an unhappy 
series of accidents more than anything else’, and that she is ‘experiencing the same 
kind of difficulties that they are experiencing [in Government and the Civil 
Service] with recruitment and retention of staff and so on. I am just on the 
receiving end of the same difficulties’.54  
Thus, whilst the Registrar has managed despite these issues, her experience 
highlights the potential challenges that can arise further in the administrative 
chain. Her circumstances illustrate that assisting the lobbying Registrar appears 
not to be a priority for the Government. It is a small office and staff are seconded 
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to it. Consequently, if there are recruitment difficulties, the Registrar’s needs may 
not be prioritised, and much will be left to the Registrar herself to do. One person 
may not be able to fulfil the objectives effectively if they are overstretched. 
An additional matter is the cost of conformance for organisations. It costs 
an organisation about £1,000 per year to register. Separate issues arise from this 
for small and large organisations. For small organisations, that cost can be high; 
inhibiting their ability to operate. To overcome this hurdle, the Registrar has 
allowed organisations to pay their fees in instalments.55 For larger organisations, 
the bigger cost of conformance is not the registration fee but the compliance 
process: 
If you are a big organisation with lots of partners, you have to have 
processes in place which capture all the activities that your partners are 
doing with ministers, in order that you as compliance officer can make 
sure that they are registered. That means that you have to put in place 
appropriate processes to make sure your organisation complies across the 
board. If you are a ‘one man band’, there is only you to worry about. If 
you have got 50 partners, or if you are PwC you could have a hundred or 
a thousand partners, and all of them have to comply and all your other 
staff as well. […] that can be expensive.56 
This cost of compliance is exacerbated by the regulatory scheme that is 
developing in the UK and the Republic of Ireland. There is now the TLA 2014, 
the Republic of Ireland’s Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015, Scotland’s Lobbying 
Act 2016 and Wales are considering lobbying legislation.57 The Registrar notes 
that ‘organisations that are UK-wide or international, will potentially have to 
confirm to a number of different regimes all of which require separate compliance 
procedures’.58 She states that ‘it is incumbent on the regulators to try to work 
together as best they can to alleviate the compliance burden on registrants because 
I can see that being, in due course, a very difficult situation for organisations. 
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However, there is not anything in the legislation that requires any of us to do 
that’.59 
2.2.3 Objective E 
The Registrar proposes a budget at the start of the year which is approved by the 
Minister for Constitutional Reform. She must work within that budget, adhering 
to the responsibilities of the Accounting Officer in the Civil Service. She notes 
how her needs are ‘quite modest’: 
I have written all my guidance myself. I have sought some legal advice 
from the Government legal department. We have a small office. I use the 
Institute of Directors to meet people. I am not what you describe as a 
large spending profligate department. I am a small, modest Registrar for 
a small piece of legislation, and my needs are suitably modest. I do not 
need an expensive office in order to be able to administer what needs to 
be administered.60 
Overall, the ongoing costs of the register (now that it has been set up) are about 
a quarter of a million pounds per year.61 One practical challenge, however, that 
does arise is in the administration of collecting fees for the register. Registrants 
pay their fees in different ways, whether by Bacs transfer, cheque or credit card. 
Providing those payment facilities is challenging: ‘we end up on the receiving end 
of having to deal with putting practical systems in place and making sure they 
work’.62 There is no centralised payment system meaning the Registrar must work 
across different systems to ensure that fees reach the Cabinet Office’s bank 
account; a time-consuming process: 
My officials have to become experts in dealing with some of the 
practicalities of handling money because that is what we are required to 
do. We have to collect cash, that is our responsibility, so we have to we 
have to find methodologies to enable us to collect cash.63 
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2.2.4 Other Issues 
(a) The Costs of a Broader Regulatory Regime 
The costs of regulation will increase if the TLA 2014 is broadened. Most (if not 
all) legislation in other jurisdictions covers both consultant and in-house 
lobbyists. If UK legislation were to cover in-house lobbyists, a pertinent question 
becomes whether the current regulatory structure can be easily and cost-
effectively adapted. The Registrar notes that ‘the more information that is 
required to be collected, the more staff, the more IT [information technology] 
and the more of everything else will be required’.64 She states that: 
In order to be able to make sure that the register is correct, the team is 
fully engaged. […] At the end of the quarter when the returns come in, 
that is a very very busy period at the end of the year when we have to 
collect the annual registration fee. If more information is required […] 
there would have to be a complete rethink about how the register works. 
I am not saying that we would have to start again, but certainly, the 
technical solution, the guidance and the general approach will all have to 
be reviewed and revised.65 
Linked to this is the cost of educating potential registrants about the new 
requirements which may take time. This entire process would also take longer if 
the current office is replaced in its entirety.66 
(B) Covering the Costs of a Broader Regulatory Regime 
An additional issue is how the costs of broader regulation would be covered. 
Whilst the scheme of funding is a political decision and not for the Registrar to 
answer, she highlights how the UK Government ‘has decided that industry would 
cover the cost’ by registrants paying annual fees.67 In Scotland, the Government 
‘is doing it at the taxpayers’ expense’.68 The reluctance of the UK Government to 
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adopt a taxpayer funded register correlates strongly with the recalcitrance of 
political parties towards publicly funded regulatory schemes. It is, therefore, 
unsurprising that such a view extends to lobbying regulation.  
(C) Regulating Conduct 
A final issue is the challenge of creating a code of conduct for registrants. This 
would be an essential method of ensuring that the criteria of integrity and 
objectivity are upheld. For this, it is envisaged that the starting point for 
determining reform would be to look to the processes implemented by the self-
regulating lobbying bodies in the UK such as the APPC which implement codes 
of conduct. If the Registrar had similar powers, she notes that there would have 
to be a separate enforcement process involving an investigation and a hearing.69 
2.2.5 Summary 
One can identify the problems with lobbying and suggest solutions to them, but 
that analysis is frivolous unless it is informed by the practical and political 
constraints that exist which determine whether such reform ideas are achievable. 
Taking into account the details of the interview, the next section develops 
guidelines that can help to guide future reform analyses. 
3. Guidelines for Future Reform Analyses 
The TLA 2014 does not deal with the concerns that justified its creation nor those 
highlighted by the diversion framework. New or amended legislation would be 
required to deal with those concerns, and there were attempts to do so between 
2016 to 2017 when Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe sponsored the Lobbying 
Transparency Bill 2016/17. That Bill was ultimately unsuccessful although it did 
pass the House of Lords. The purpose of this section is not to analyse what form 
a reformed system might take since that is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, 
guidelines are synthesised from the interview above for Part 3 of the diversion 
framework. Having identified a diversion in Parts 1 and 2, solutions should be 
devised that take into account the guidelines. 
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3.1 Guidelines for Developing Solutions 
First, the Registrar must undertake a continuous campaign of investigation and 
education to ensure compliance. Many do not understand their obligations even 
when they are explained, and people change roles resulting in the need to educate 
new staff. Second, an accessible registrar will enable registrants to fulfil their 
obligations properly. It is important to develop relationships over time, build trust 
and foster an environment in which registrants feel confident asking the Registrar 
about their obligations. Third, whilst most lobbyists are helpful in providing 
information, at times they do not, and it can be hard to find information, 
particularly when it is not publicly available. Regulators must be firm with those 
who do not take their obligations seriously. Fourth, civil and criminal sanctions 
can act as a deterrent for those who do not fulfil their obligations. They are a 
valuable tool for the Registrar to ensure that legislation is taken seriously. 
Fifth, a regulator should be properly resourced. Whilst the Registrar has 
coped, one could envisage a regulator becoming overstretched and unable to fulfil 
their statutory obligations. The size of a potential regulator should take into 
account any recruitment difficulties in the Civil Service and the Government. 
Sixth, different regulators within the UK must work together to ensure that the 
cost of conforming to the different regimes does not become overly complex, 
burdensome and bureaucratic for larger organisations. 
Seventh, at present, it is a political reality in the UK that extensive 
regulation will not be enacted. For the regulation of standards in British public 
life, successive governments for almost three decades have pursued a mantra of 
light-touch regulation which looks set to continue.70 Indeed, the TLA 2014 is a 
reflection of that; as is the abolition of the Standards Board in 2012 which heavily 
regulated standards in local government under the Local Government Act 2000.71 
Ewing, Rowbottom and Tham advise that ‘perhaps the best we can do is to 
recognise that change can best take place incrementally, dictated by the 
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organisational and institutional structures of the system in which they are to 
operate. There is no magic bullet’.72 Therefore, any reformed lobbying regulation 
will likely continue to operate on the payments of those in the industry rather 
than the taxpayer. Solutions should be designed to keep that limitation in mind 
as well as the issues of staff resources and the costs of conformance. Eighth, as a 
corollary of that, the UK regulator must also factor into their schedule the amount 
of time it takes to put in place the practical systems for receiving payments and 
ensuring they work. There is no centralised payment system which means that it 
takes time to process payments. 
3.2 Institutional Diversion Developed: Part 3 
From the evaluation above, ten abbreviated guidelines called ‘obligations’ and 
‘restrictions’ challenges are synthesised and added below to Part 3 of the diversion 
framework called ‘Solve’: 
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Figure 5: Developing Part 3 of the Institutional Diversion Framework 
 
3.3 The Lobbying (Transparency) Bill [HL] 2016/17 
The Bill was intended to create a new lobbying register and a registrar with much 
broader powers than under the TLA 2014. The purpose of this section is not to 
analyse the Bill in depth; although, there is scope to do so in future studies. 
Instead, this section highlights reasons that contributed to the failure of the Bill 
taking into account the guidelines above.73 
First, the Bill was far too broad and complex in its definition of a public 
official. Under Section 2(5), not only were office-holders in Government and 
Parliament covered but all executive agencies, non-ministerial governmental 
departments, non-departmental public bodies and regulatory bodies. Currently, 
there are 376 agencies and public bodies which would require a behemoth sized 
                                                          
73 Further, space does not permit a more detailed evaluation of the guidelines in this thesis 
although, again, it is envisaged that future studies could undertake that evaluation. 
Part 3 
SOLVE 
(A) Obligations Challenges 
 
Need to: 
1. Continuously investigate and 
educate. 
2. Be accessible to potential 
registrants.  
3. Be firm with those not 
complying. 
4. Use criminal and civil 
sanctions to act as a deterrent. 
5. Factor in the time it would 
take to set up and administer 
payments across different 
payment systems. 
  
(B) Restrictions Challenges 
  
1. Regulation cannot be too 
broad and complex. 
2. Regulation must be at least 
partly industry funded. 
3. Size of regulator should take 
into account Civil Service 
recruitment difficulties. 
4. Ensure that conformance 
costs across UK regulatory 
regimes do not become too 
high. 
5. Must encourage collaboration 
between regulators.  
  
Devise solutions taking into account the  
following obligations and restrictions: 
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regulator.74 Considering the recruitment difficulties in the Civil Service, the 
adversity towards anything other than light-touch regulation in British public life 
and the desire to pay as little as possible, the Bill was destined to fail from the 
beginning. 
Second, in its initial incarnation, before amendments were made, the Bill 
omitted entirely civil penalties and stipulated for a reduced criminal penalty under 
Section 9.75 The Bill thus did not provide for sufficient deterrents for those who 
might fail to comply. These omissions were in addition to many others that were 
subsequently added, and whilst they were added, it meant that the Bill was simply 
not adequate at the outset and, therefore, an easy target for criticism which 
contributed to its failure. 
Third, in terms of funding the proposed regulatory regime, the original 
incarnation of the Bill under Section 1(5) stated only that the Secretary of State 
would fund the regime and provide staff and premises. It is telling that the 
amended version of the Bill added Section 22 which allowed the registrar to 
impose charges on registrants. This highlights how there is no appetite for a 
taxpayer funded regime in the UK; the original Bill overlooked that entirely.  
Thus, it can be seen from this very brief analysis how the guidelines 
developed in Part 3 are essential for shaping workable solutions. The Bill missed, 
entirely, fundamental political realities which ensured it would fail. 
Conclusion 
The diversion framework helps to identify specific concerns with lobbying in the 
UK and test whether a diversion has occurred. From those concerns, one can 
begin to identify issues for reform. However, it is not enough merely to state that 
something ought to be reformed and develop a solution accordingly. That process 
must be shaped by specific guidelines which can help to avoid solutions that are 
simply destined to fail in the UK context because of political or practical realities. 
Thus, in this chapter, guidelines were developed from an interview conducted 
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with the UK’s lobbying Registrar which are intended to help shape regulatory 
solutions that are more likely to succeed.  
The TLA 2014 has been roundly criticised for not dealing with the issues 
that justified its creation. It also does not address concerns highlighted by the 
institutional diversion framework. For those reasons, there have already been 
attempts to repeal the TLA 2014 and replace it with the Lobbying (Transparency) 
Bill in 2016. However, that attempt illustrates why guidelines are needed. The Bill 
failed to consider fundamental practical and political realities about regulation in 
British public life. Consequently, it was destined to fail and accordingly did so. 
Solutions would be more likely to succeed if the guidelines in Part 3 of the 
diversion framework are considered and adhered to.  
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8 
Conclusion 
____________________________________________________ 
In this thesis, it has been argued that the problems with the lobbying of Parliament 
and Government in the UK need to be identified more clearly so that targeted 
regulatory solutions can be determined. Currently, lawmakers, organisations and 
academics have struggled to propose clear pathways to achieving that objective 
due to a failure to agree on certain fundamental issues: the nature and scope of 
the central problems associated with lobbying, the relationship between them, and 
how they are relevant to the model of democratic government in the UK. The 
result is that discussions about reform and proposed solutions are poorly 
informed, not fully considered and sometimes misguided. 
To solve this problem, a framework has been created called ‘institutional 
diversion’ which was developed, tested and evaluated. The framework has three 
purposes. First, it identifies the underlying lobbying issue that is of concern. 
Second, it tests whether that problem has caused the institution, or officials within 
it, to divert from their purpose of acting in the public interest. Third, it offers 
guidelines that help to guide regulatory solutions that are likely to be enacted in 
the UK. 
The aim is for the framework to be helpful to anyone seeking to identify 
and understand lobbying concerns and those who are looking to develop 
solutions to those concerns such as academics, judges, policy-makers and 
lawmakers. It is also intended that the framework acts as a starting point for future 
research into lobbying in the UK by offering a foundation from which issues can 
be explored. The following sections review the research undertaken, explain how 
it relates to previous studies, analyse the limitations of the framework, consider 
its implications, possible future uses and developments of it.  
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1. Research Review 
1.1 Summary 
The institutional diversion framework has been developed in three parts which 
are outlined in Figure 1 below. Part 1 is called ‘Identify’ which means to identify 
the concern in question whether that is individual corruption, institutional 
corruption or political equality. Part 2 is called ‘Test’ and offers tests in the form 
of questions that help to determine whether ‘integrity’ or ‘objectivity’ have been 
undermined thereby causing a diversion from the purpose of ‘acting in the public 
interest’. It is not necessary for both criteria to be undermined for there to be a 
diversion: a diversion can occur either because integrity has been undermined or 
because objectivity has been undermined. Part 3 is called ‘Solve’ and offers 
guidelines which help to shape solutions to reform that are practical and workable. 
These are suggested guidelines, it may not be necessary to follow them all in every 
case but what applies to the scenario in question. The framework is outlined in 
Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: The Institutional Diversion Framework Concluded 
 
                 Is Integrity Undermined?                OR                 Is Objectivity Undermined? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…the office-holder may have been diverted from their purpose of acting in the public interest, or their 
ability to act in the public interest may have been weakened. 
Part 1.  
IDENTIFY 
(b) Institutional Corruption 
Elements: 
1. Benefit to official; and 
2. Systematic service in return to 
lobbyist; and 
3. An improper exchange 
(improper dependence or other 
impropriety)  
Identify the concern using elements of (a) or (b) or (c) in Part 1 
Test whether the identified  
concern causes a diversion  
 
Apply the elements of individual  
corruption and/or political equality  
to establish ‘impropriety’  
Part 2.  
TEST 
Test if the concern undermines either ‘Integrity’ or ‘Objectivity’ thereby causing a diversion 
1. Is the office-holder showing equal respect and 
concern for the preferences of each citizen? OR 
2. Is information arising from broad public 
deliberations being favoured over information 
arising from lobbyists competing in their self-
interests? OR 
3. Do citizens and office-holders have access to 
the widest possible variety of information? 
 
If any question is answered in the negative 
objectivity may be undermined meaning that… 
(c) Political Equality 
Elements: 
1. Equality of Arms; or 
2. Equality of the 
Opportunity to Influence 
  
Sub-Elements 
Consider the six sub-
elements 
1. Does the lobbying conduct breach or 
potentially breach any law? OR 
2. Does the concern contravene, or potentially 
contravene, code of conduct or other rules on 
financial gain? OR 
3. Is the independence of the institution or 
individual compromised? 
 
If any question is answered in the affirmative 
integrity may be undermined meaning that… 
Part 3 
SOLVE 
 
Take into account the following obligations and restrictions when designing solutions: 
  
(B) Restrictions Challenges 
1. Regulation cannot be too broad and 
complex. 
2. Regulation must be at least partly 
industry funded. 
3. Size of regulator should take into 
account Civil Service recruitment 
difficulties. 
4. Ensure that conformance costs across 
UK regulatory regimes do not become 
too high. 
5. Must encourage collaboration between 
regulators.  
  
(A) Obligations 
Need to: 
1. Continuously investigate and educate. 
2. Be accessible to potential registrants.  
3. Be firm with those not complying. 
4. Use criminal and civil sanctions to act 
as a deterrent. 
5. Factor in the time it would take to set 
up and administer payments across 
different payment systems. 
  
Test whether the identified  
concern causes a diversion  
  
Devise solutions to the problem 
  
(a) Individual 
Corruption Elements: 
1. Bribery; or 
2. Impermissible 
donations; or 
3. Lobbying whilst 
unregistered; or 
4. Conflicts of interest  
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1.2 Hypotheses and Aims 
Four main hypotheses were made at the outset which are evaluated here. First, 
‘institutional diversion’ will help to identify the concerns with lobbying with 
greater precision than currently exists elsewhere through a clear structure, and will 
offer a rich account of the underlying concerns. Second, the framework will offer 
clear tests to determine when a diversion has occurred. Third, it will act as a 
starting point for normative enquiries into reform by highlighting issues of 
concern that require changing. Fourth, it will help to guide the development of 
solutions that are workable within the UK political and administrative context. 
For the first hypothesis, Part 1 of the framework was divided into three 
concerns about lobbying: individual corruption, institutional corruption and 
political equality. To identify those concerns, clear elements and sub-elements 
were developed. By following those elements in Chapter 6, a detailed and rich 
account of the underlying concerns was provided in a more structured, coherent, 
consistent and holistic manner than has been offered elsewhere. Thus, the 
framework succeeds in identifying the concerns with greater precision than exists 
elsewhere and offers a rich account of those concerns. 
The second hypothesis pertains to Part 2 of the framework. It was first 
necessary to identify a clear purpose of Parliament and Government. The analysis 
in Chapter 3 was both analytical and normative. It is clear the MPs and peers are 
required to act in the public interest, but that is not a requirement of the ministers. 
It was, therefore, argued, that ministers should act in the public interest in the 
context of problematic lobbying. To test for a diversion from the public interest, 
two criteria were developed called ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’. Integrity means that 
‘holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial or other 
obligation to lobbyists that might influence them in the performance of their 
official duties’.1 Objectivity means that officials should assess ideas on their merits 
or inherent worthiness in the sense that they should not give greater weight to 
ideas that have gained prominence because of lobbying underpinned by 
corruption or political inequality. Both definitions arose from the rules that MPs, 
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peers and ministers subscribe to. In Chapters 4 and 5, questions were developed 
to test when those criteria are undermined thereby causing a diversion from acting 
in the public interest. The questions proved effective in Chapter 6 when applied 
to examples of lobbying. The answers offered a rich explanation of why the 
concern identified in Part 1 of the framework undermined the relevant criteria in 
Part 2 thereby causing a diversion. Thus, the second hypothesis is satisfied.  
Third, at the end of several case studies analysed in Chapter 6, issues for 
potential reform were highlighted by the application of Parts 1 and 2 of the 
diversion framework. In that regard, this hypothesis is satisfied because the 
framework helped to highlight the pertinent reform issues following a dissection 
of each case study. However, whether the issues highlighted were the most 
important can only be determined in future research analysing potential regulatory 
solutions in detail. It could be that the framework requires refining to highlight 
more relevant reform issues. 
For the fourth hypothesis, it was illustrated in Chapter 7 why the TLA 2014 
is problematic and highlighted why its proposed replacement, the Lobbying 
(Transparency) Bill 2016/17 was destined to fail because it did not account for 
the political and practical restrictions operating in the UK political climate. Those 
restrictions were synthesised from an interview with the UK’s lobbying Registrar, 
Alison White, conducted specifically for this thesis. From that interview, ten 
guidelines were developed, and it was shown how the Bill simply did not adhere 
to them. Their creation will, therefore, help to shape solutions that are more likely 
to succeed moving forward. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is satisfied. 
In addition to the hypotheses noted above, the aim of the framework more 
generally is to help anyone seeking to identify and understand lobbying concerns 
and those who are looking to develop solutions to those concerns such as 
academics, judges, policy-makers and lawmakers. In that sense, the framework is 
helpful because it offers clear, structured, coherent and consistent tests to analyse 
lobbying concerns. The literature that currently exists does not offer a framework 
to analyse these issues holistically nor offer guidance within one logical 
framework. It is submitted that institutional diversion does so; at the very least, 
to an extent greater than what exists elsewhere.  
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It is also intended that the framework acts as a starting point for future 
research into lobbying in the UK by offering a foundation from which issues can 
be explored. Lobbying is a complex issue, and it would be helpful for anyone 
researching lobbying to refer to the framework. They could identify what topic 
they are examining and how it fits into the bigger picture. A researcher or judge 
could avoid many of the pitfalls that others have fallen into—exploring matters 
in isolation, using terminology inconsistently and incoherently, and devising 
solutions that are misguided. 
Finally, it is hypothesised that the framework could be adapted to studies 
of lobbying in other jurisdictions. The problems with lobbying should be the same 
in any country (ie, individual corruption, institutional corruption and political 
equality; albeit, to different degrees). Even if there is a unique problem elsewhere, 
one could simply amend Part 1 of the framework to account for those concerns. 
Part 2 should also be adaptable by changing the criteria and questions applicable 
to certain jurisdictions. The purpose of ‘acting in the public interest’ could be 
changed to a purpose specific to whichever jurisdiction is being considered by an 
analysis of the constitution in each jurisdiction. The guidelines in Part 3 could be 
developed by reference to the specific political and administrative challenges in 
the jurisdiction examined. Thus, adapting the framework could be helpful to 
analyses beyond the UK. 
2. Relationship with Previous Research and Contribution 
This research builds upon the literature on political corruption, political equality, 
lobbying, campaign finance/election law and legislative ethics, as well as learning 
from the experiences of those in practice. Most importantly, Ewing, Rowbottom, 
Lessig, Thompson, Ringhand and Alison White.  
For the structure of the diversion framework, Thompson’s work on 
institutional corruption (and Lessig’s development of it through dependence 
corruption) has provided the main foundation. The origin of institutional 
diversion is firmly rooted in those theories with a broadly similar definition 
applying. Further, the work of Ringhand on political equality in the British 
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election law context was pivotal to the structure of political equality elements 
within the framework as well as the tests for the criterion of ‘objectivity’.  
For the theory underlying the diversion framework, the work of Ewing and 
Rowbottom (amongst others) has been essential. They highlight many important 
factors such as the need to account for corruption and political equality issues, 
which political equality concepts are relevant to lobbying, how political corruption 
should be defined, the shortcomings in the field, the need for standards, the 
relevance of the ‘public interest’ and what may undermine it, and a myriad of 
regulatory issues relevant to the UK context amongst many other factors. This 
framework constitutes an attempt to account for those issues, to complement 
their work and to offer new conceptions of the issues, within a new and coherent 
structure. 
For the regulatory guidelines in the diversion framework, the first-hand 
experience of the UK lobbying Registrar, Alison White, was fundamental to 
understanding the practical and political challenges to reform in the UK. That 
insight will be pivotal to future analyses of reforming the Statutory Register of 
Consultant Lobbyists created by the TLA 2014. 
Regarding contributions to the field of lobbying, several observations can 
be made about this research. First, in Chapter 3, this research offers a unique 
attempt to decipher a measurable purpose of decision-makers working within 
Parliament and the Government by developing the literature on political 
corruption. The ‘public interest’ and ‘norms of office’ approaches are combined, 
and both are defined through an examination of the model of democratic 
government in the UK. To test when the ‘public interest’ has been undermined, 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, identify and define the criteria of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’. 
These criteria are applied in a similar way by Thompson in his institutional 
corruption framework, but they are developed in this thesis with meanings 
specific to the UK context through an analysis of corruption and political equality 
literature. This approach follows Rowbottom’s recommendation that political 
equality literature should be used to define the standards from which office-holder 
deviate. This approach also merges the work of both Thompson and Ringhand 
but also represents a bespoke development of those criteria for ‘institutional 
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diversion’ in the UK. Whilst such a determination is very challenging and the 
outcome open to criticism (see below on limitations), it nevertheless provides a 
unique attempt at testing problematic lobbying conduct influencing decision-
makers by reference to a defined purpose.  
Second, the work undertaken in Chapter 4 represents a unique attempt to 
harmonise the theories of both Thompson and Lessig within a reformulated 
theory of institutional corruption. In the US, there has been significant debate 
amongst academics about whether Lessig’s theory, in particular, is a political 
equality theory rather than a corruption theory. This research suggests a path 
forward and, in doing so, develops a less contingent test for institutional 
corruption which is developed for deciphering concerns with lobbying in the UK.  
Third, Chapter 5 builds upon Ringhand’s research on political equality by 
adapting her findings (rooted in British campaign finance literature) in a new 
direction to the analysis of lobbying in the UK. Her concepts and principles 
(called ‘elements’ in this thesis) are redefined, restructured and reformulated in 
places. They are developed with significant depth to account for the complex 
lobbying processes via the exploration of derivative sub-elements. All of this is 
achieved in a new structure consisting of two core elements and six sub-elements. 
At the same time, this complements Rowbottom’s research which highlights 
similar principles (although, more principles are covered in this thesis and are 
given a specific structure for examining lobbying concerns). 
Fourth, Chapter 6 offers a unique fusion of the theoretical and the practical. 
Whilst Rowbottom applies theories to lobbying concerns in his book; this thesis 
applies an overarching framework consistently to specific case studies about 
lobbying explored by journalists and others. Aside from Rowbottom’s work, 
other literature has mainly focussed on lobbying from one aspect or the other. 
Therefore, this thesis complements Rowbottom’s work by also applying 
theoretical concepts to practical concerns. Further, the framework offers a clear 
and holistic explanation of what the concerns are with lobbying and why. 
Fifth, Chapter 7 establishes unique guidelines for future lobbying reform in 
the UK taking into account the challenges specific to the UK context following 
an interview with the UK lobbying Registrar. The regulatory regime in the UK is 
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new, and the guidelines offer a starting point for the development of literature in 
this area. 
Overall, the institutional diversion framework is built upon the shoulders 
of giants but also offers major contributions to the analysis of lobbying in the UK 
and, it is argued, abroad (should it be adapted). Other literature does not bring 
together the various concerns with lobbying under one framework, offering a 
holistic in-depth evaluation of those concerns fusing both the academic and the 
practical, a test to decipher when those concerns are problematic and why, and 
guidelines for developing solutions to those problems based on an interview with 
the UK’s lobbying Registrar. That is not to say that there are not limitations to 
the framework. 
3. Limitations of Research 
There are four main limitations of this research. First, it is acknowledged that the 
greatest debate about the framework will arise from discussions on the ‘purpose’ 
of those working within Parliament and the Government. It is submitted that 
‘acting in the public interest’ is a fairly uncontroversial overarching gauge as 
expressed in Chapter 3. Most decision-makers would agree that they seek to do 
so and should do so. Further, the criterion of ‘integrity’ used to test a diversion 
from that purpose is also uncontroversial because its requirements arise explicitly 
from statute and other rules on improper financial gain. However, debate will 
likely arise on the criterion of ‘objectivity’.  
In this thesis, ‘objectivity’ means that officials should assess ideas on their 
merits or inherent worthiness in the sense that they should not give greater weight 
to ideas that have gained prominence because of lobbying underpinned by 
corruption or political inequality. It is acknowledged that this is a normative 
articulation that is open to debate in places. Some will take the view that 
politicians do not need to make decisions objectively within the scope of the 
meaning attributed to it in this research—particularly with regard to lobbying that 
is labelled as ‘problematic’ because of a political inequality that some would not 
find concerning. If the opposition to that criterion is vociferous, then it is 
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acknowledged that it may need to be amended, removed or substituted for a 
different criterion.  
However, it is submitted that, unless one is advocating for an unequal 
society, the argument that decisions should not be skewed by inequalities in 
money or power influencing the decision-making environment, are strong. 
Further, the threat of lobbying skewing objective decision-making is explicitly and 
implicitly recognised in various sources such as in codes of conduct for MPs and 
peers. Those sources are strongly underpinned by regulatory developments in the 
UK over the past three decades—initiated by successive governments—that have 
arisen in response to lobbying scandals where it has been recognised that lobbying 
can cause such an undesirable skew. Underlying all the above is the very real 
concern by decision-makers about public trust being undermined because of 
lobbying for reasons pertaining to the undermining of objective decision-making. 
That is why lobbying is afforded substantial space in the codes of conduct and 
elsewhere. For these reasons, it is submitted that the ‘objectivity’ criterion as 
defined in this thesis is justified.  
Second, it is acknowledged that determining a diversion from a purpose in 
practice would require significant evidence; not just media reports that ‘join the 
dots’. That limits the usefulness of the framework because its ability to identify a 
problem is constrained by the levels of information transparency in the political 
system. Nevertheless, the framework can point towards areas that require more 
transparency and, in any case, offers more than other literature to lawmakers and 
policymakers for identifying areas for reform, and to judges seeking to understand 
the issues. 
Third, the framework is open to criticism by academics in the US for the 
manner in which it has attempted to harmonise institutional and dependence 
corruption theories by Thompson and Lessig. It is envisaged that some would 
prefer that Lessig’s analysis is omitted entirely. Others might argue that in making 
institutional corruption ‘less contingent’, this research has oversimplified 
Thompson’s excellent work. However, it is submitted, first, that the concept of a 
‘dependency’ is highly relevant to lobbying and it would diminish the analysis to 
omit it. Second, retaining both theories as defined by Thompson and Lessig 
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would make the institutional diversion framework needlessly complex in what is 
already quite a rich framework. Third, nothing in this framework oversimplifies 
Thompson’s approach. Key concepts and principles not only remain but are 
added to; the greatest change is in the formulation of those concepts and how 
they are structured. This approach is intended to ensure that the framework is 
relevant to the UK context. 
Fourth, the guidelines developed in Part 3 of the framework might only be 
useful in the context of lobbying regulation that creates a lobbying register rather 
than other types of regulation. They were developed from an interview with the 
lobbying Registrar in the UK and should be understood in that context which 
might limit the usefulness of Part 3. However, it is submitted that some of the 
guidelines are applicable regardless of the type of regulation such as the political 
desire for light-touch regulation in British public life, or the demand for external 
funding of such regulations. For other guidelines, much will depend on the 
specific analysis in the future; although, nothing precludes them from being 
adapted for those studies. 
4. Implications of Research 
This research identifies concerns about lobbying in the UK. First, it suggests that 
there are significant problems concerning lobbying pertaining to institutional 
corruption, political equality, and, to a lesser extent, individual corruption. Most 
concerning are the case studies in Chapter 6 which detail the pervasive power of 
professional lobbyists with regard to their control of decision-makers and the 
control of the marketplace of ideas—significant and hidden issues that will be 
tremendously complex to regulate.  
Second, the research highlights deep concerns about the ability and success 
of the TLA 2014 in dealing with the concerns that justified its creations as well as 
those highlighted by the diversion framework. The Registrar is working very 
effectively, but the limits on her power and scope of the law raise questions about 
what the law achieves.  
Third, the Lobbying (Transparency) Bill 2016/17 demonstrates that—
despite the best efforts of very intelligent people—basic political realities can be 
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overlooked in favour of worthy altruistic goals; meaning that solutions are 
destined to fail. The need for guidelines such as those developed in Chapter 7 is 
imperative for there to be any opportunity for successful reform in the future. 
5. Future Research and Practical Applications  
A number of studies can potentially arise from this research moving forward both 
internationally and domestically. Internationally, it is envisaged that the 
framework could be adapted to studies of lobbying in other jurisdictions. 
Country-specific analyses could be undertaken with the elements in Parts 1, 2 and 
3 being added, removed or substituted. Those analyses could reveal much about 
the problems in those jurisdictions, the purpose of their political institutions and 
what regulations might succeed there. Since lobbying is a relatively new field for 
investigation in most jurisdictions, the framework could offer a starting point for 
investigations in those jurisdictions. 
In the UK, the institutional diversion framework itself could be tested and 
applied to more case studies with specific solutions being devised from those case 
studies, taking into consideration the guidelines developed. It could be expanded 
far beyond MPs, peers and ministers to consider local government officials, civil 
servants, executive agencies and regulators. The issue of office-holders lobbying 
one another or lobbying by the Monarch could also be encapsulated in future 
work. Further, Part 3 of the framework could be developed in much greater detail 
with thorough studies conducted into the regulation of lobbying in the UK. They 
could explore the potential for collaboration between different regulators in the 
UK to lower the costs of compliance for organisations, how lobbying regulation 
might be reformed, whether a code of conduct for lobbyists should be introduced 
and how that would be overseen and enforced. Research might consider how 
future lobbying legislation should be drafted, the shortcomings of the TLA 2014, 
a detailed study of the Lobbying (Transparency) Bill and why it failed, and what 
lessons can be learnt from other regulators in the UK as well as lessons learnt 
from lobbying regulators in other jurisdictions.  
Further studies could be undertaken on the ‘purpose’ of decision-makers 
in Parliament and Government, with interviews being conducted with politicians 
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to determine their views on the requirements of ‘acting in the public interest’, and 
the criteria of ‘integrity’ and ‘objectivity’. An analysis of reforming political party 
funding could also fall within the scope of the framework since donations can be 
used to influence the political process. Ultimately, this is a tremendously rich area 
for potential future research, and these studies could begin to build a detailed 
body of literature on lobbying in the UK that is, so far, lacking.  
Conclusion 
In his book on party funding in the UK, Ewing notes that the only thing clear 
about potential regulatory solutions moving forward ‘is the fog ahead’.2 For 
lobbying, the array of issues has created a disorienting smog over what the 
concerns are. In that regard, the ‘institutional diversion’ framework offers a 
starting point and a path forward to analysing the critical issue of lobbying. It 
offers a coherent and rational structure for identifying what the difficulties are, 
test when they cause office-holders to divert from their purpose of acting in the 
public interest and guide solutions to those problems. Ultimately, it is hoped that 
the framework is a step in the right direction; that it can encourage deep and 
holistic analyses of the issues which generate solutions with the aim of upholding 
public trust in the political system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 K.D. Ewing, The Cost of Democracy: Party Funding in Modern British Politics (Hart Publishing 2007) 
225. 
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Background 
This interview was conducted to discuss the practical challenges faced by the 
Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists in the United Kingdom. In particular, the 
Registrar has set out five objectives relating to her role. They are to: 
(a) Administer an accessible, up-to-date and accurate Register of 
Consultant Lobbyists; 
(b) Ensure that all those who are required to register do so, by making 
potential registrants aware of their obligations under the Act; 
(c) Provide clear and accessible guidance on the requirements for 
registration and compliance; 
(d) Monitor and enforce compliance with the Act’s legal requirements; 
and 
(e) Operate the Register and the Office in a way that demonstrates good 
governance through delivery of my statutory obligations in a cost 
effective and accountable manner.1 
The challenges of achieving those objectives were primarily explored although 
other relevant issues arose from those discussions. 
Interview 
S – What challenges do you face in administering the register to make 
it accessible and keep it up-to-date?  
W – My statutory accountability is to make sure that all of those organisations or 
individuals that should be registered in accordance with the legislation actually do 
so. Because of the nature of the legislation, that doesn’t only apply to public affairs 
consultants, what you might describe as traditional lobbyists. There are a number 
of organisations which would not at all think of themselves as being traditional 
lobbyists that are required to register. That includes lawyers, management 
consultants, accountants and think-tanks. All of the above appear is some way on 
the register.  
                                                          
1 Alison J White, ORCL Business Plan 2016-2017 (Office of the Registrar of Consultant 
Lobbyists, 2016) 5. 
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It is my responsibility to make sure that—whatever the nature of the 
organisation—if they are required by the nature of the services that they provide 
for their clients to register, then they need to do so. I cannot just make the 
assumption that they will have read my guidance or that they will even know 
about the register. Particularly, if you are a small ‘one-man-band’ kind of 
organisation, you might not even know about it. It will probably be the last thing 
on your mind when you are setting up an organisation and trying to find clients; 
to worry about whether or not you should be on the register.  
Thus, communication and education have been a big challenge since the 
beginning. One of the initial challenges which those objectives refer to is making 
sure that everybody understands what it is that the legislation is actually saying. 
And here we are, coming up to two years after the register was launched, there 
are still a lot of organisations that misunderstand—even in the context of my 
guidance and all of the educational activities that I have been doing over the 
course of the last eighteen months or so—still lots of organisations that do not 
understand and misinterpret their obligations. They might be on the register, but 
they are still not fulfilling the requirements properly. Lots of people say to me 
‘well I’d like to err on the side of caution’. As a result, they over declare rather 
than stand in danger of getting it wrong. Trying to make sure that organisations 
do it correctly so that they are on the register and they do what they are required 
to do correctly, is an ongoing challenge. 
S – Is it a problem if they over declare? 
W – It just means that the register is not correct. It is my responsibility to make 
sure that it is correct in accordance with the legislation because you can get 
registrants making a client declaration which is incorrect. For example, they 
communicate with the minister’s private office rather than with a minister, or they 
communicate with somebody who was not a minister or Permanent Secretary, 
but they make a declaration anyway because they think it is the right thing to do—
lots of people say to me: ‘Well I think I better err on the side of caution; better to 
over declare rather than under declare’. However, it means the register is not 
correct. They are doing things that the legislation doesn’t require them to do. It 
is my job to make sure they do what the legislation requires them to do. 
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S – Are there consequences for you if they do not do what the 
legislation requires them to do?  
W – Well, the more important problem is that what should be on the register is 
what the legislation dictates should be on the register. If there are things on the 
register that should not be there then the user, the citizen, could be misinformed. 
The citizen has a right to expect that what is on the register will be in accordance 
with what the legislation says and if it is not, the citizen could potentially be 
misinformed and draw the wrong conclusions. Therefore, it is an important part 
of my role. What those objectives are saying is that there has to be a register and 
that the contents of the register must be strictly in accordance with what the 
legislation requires of it.  
S – In this regard, it is communication and education that are the 
main challenges? 
W – Yes and my focus has been very largely on those. Making sure, first of all, 
there is good guidance and a good interpretation in useable language; accessible 
language that the layperson could understand. The sort of person that would be 
likely to be completing a quarterly return. I have to communicate with them in 
understandable terminology. Once that is in place you have got to keep it fresh 
in people’s minds because otherwise, they forget. You cannot make the 
assumption that just because somebody has done something, the objective is 
achieved. Somebody might leave their post, or the guidance might just get 
forgotten about because there are other priorities (things like Christmas and New 
Year or the time of the quarterly returns). People just forget, and if one person 
does it one-quarter, somebody else does it the next quarter; they do not 
necessarily do it the same.  
S – How do you keep the guidance fresh in their minds? 
W – We have to stay on their back. We communicate regularly. We have a 
newsletter, I have lots of meetings, I talk to lots of groups. We have an annual 
stakeholder conference. Within the context of fairly modest means, we try to keep 
things as fresh in stakeholder and registrant minds as possible. There has to be 
good guidance and an ongoing program. But then over and above, monitoring 
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and enforcing compliance whereby enforcing compliance is the nuclear option if 
you like.  
This is the set of tools that the Registrar has available in the event that 
organisations do not comply. If they do not comply, I can enforce compliance. I 
have a range of civil and criminal penalties. I have not used any criminal penalties, 
and I hope I will not have to but I have used a small number of civil penalties and 
that has tended to be in two circumstances. The first one is where there was an 
attempt to avoid registering when an organisation should have done so. For 
example, conducting consultant lobbying without being registered and not being 
transparent about that. Secondly, those organisations that continue to conduct 
consultant lobbying without paying their annual registration fee. You cannot be 
on the register without paying your annual registration fee, and if you are not on 
the register you cannot undertake consultant lobbying (as defined in the Act). You 
must be on the register before you conduct any relevant communications.  
S – What penalties were imposed and do you think they work well as 
a deterrent? 
W – There has only been one, and I think they had a civil penalty of £2,000. The 
others were quite modest. I think we charged £300 for the three organisations 
that paid their fees very late. In terms of acting as a deterrent, I am quite sure that 
they will for those organisations that had to pay them. I hope. It remains to be 
seen. I hope that other organisations will look at that and be similarly weary, but 
I think the bigger deterrent is the threat of a civil penalty because for organisations 
that hold themselves out to be highly ethical—lawyers for example—they have a 
very strong code of legal ethics. If you are found to be in breach of statute, that 
would be a very serious issue for your law firm. Thus, I think the potential threat 
of failing to comply with any legislation, including this one, would be a very 
serious issue and it would be that I think, that would be the bigger factor.  
S – Do you have any difficulties with enforcing compliance? 
W – No. None of my civil penalties have been challenged; they have all been 
accepted and paid. Clearly, the experience is quite limited. I think it is quite likely 
that in due course there will be a legal challenge and there is a tribunal which we 
set up which is there, ready, to be able to hear any appeals in the event that that 
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was required. That is part of the legislation that there should be an appeals process 
in the event that there was a civil penalty notice issued which somebody wanted 
to appeal against, they would be able to do so through the tribunal.  
S – Do you think you have enough powers to carry out your 
monitoring task effectively?  
W – I have not found any difficulty in being able to carry out those programs of 
activity that I felt were required. For example, this year (2016), I have carried out 
a major investigation into law firms that were advertising public affairs services 
on their websites. I looked at all of those and met with firms to check whether or 
not they needed to be registered. I have done all that work myself as part of my 
statutory duty. I have got a small office, but I do not think that in the event that 
my office is fully resourced there should be a problem. This summer, it was not 
fully resourced which is why I have done a lot of things myself that perhaps in 
the future I would hope my office would be able to do. My officials are seconded 
from the Cabinet Office. There have been some difficulties and challenges with 
that this year. I hope things are now settled down. That has been the only 
challenge. 
S – You mean in terms of under-resourcing? 
W – Under-resourcing, yes. I think that has been an unhappy series of accidents 
more than anything else. It is just one of those things if you like. It has been a 
challenge, but it has not precluded me from doing what it was that I said I would 
do in my business plan and, in fact, I think I have probably done at least as much 
as what I said in my business plan; probably more. There has been the odd case 
that I have discovered where organisations should be registered and have not 
been but, generally speaking, there has only been the odd one, where potentially, 
there should have been a registration. In most cases, we have been able to arrive 
at an appropriate conclusion in the public interest. 
S – When there have been problems of not having enough resources, 
was that swiftly resolved once you raised the flag?  
W – The difficulty is that my officials are seconded. I am experiencing the same 
kind of difficulties that they are experiencing with recruitment and retention of 
staff and so on. I am just on the receiving end of the same difficulties. Basically, 
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I have covered the gaps, so it has not resulted in a hiatus. I have just worked more 
perhaps than I would have preferred to. 
S – How do you undertake your task in a cost-effective manner that 
demonstrates value for money?  
W – The way that the system works is that I propose a budget at the start of the 
year for the expenditure that I think is needed in order to be able to carry out my 
statutory duties. That goes to the relevant minister who is the Minister for 
Constitutional Reform. Then he approves the budget, and that is the financial 
envelope within which I work. That works quite well; there has not been any 
difficulty with that, although, my needs are quite modest. I think, for example, I 
have written all my guidance myself. I have sought some legal advice from the 
Government legal department. We have a small office. I use the Institute of 
Directors to meet people. I am not what you describe as a large spending 
profligate department. I am a small, modest Registrar for a small piece of 
legislation, and my needs are suitably modest. I do not need an expensive office 
in order to be able to administer what needs to be administered. Last year there 
was a small underspend, this year there will probably be a small underspend. I 
need to be on the right side of the budget red line. 
S – What would happen if you were to go over the budget red line? 
W – I cannot. In the Civil Service, there is something called an accounting officer. 
They have a set of responsibilities which are laid down by the Treasury which you 
are expected to adhere to. In the event that there was a legal test case, I would 
approach the Cabinet Office for the necessary funds to secure the required legal 
resources to be able to take that case forward but that has not happened yet. It 
may very well happen. I had that discussion with ministers. It may very well 
happen in the future. In the event that it does, the Cabinet Office has said that it 
would underwrite the bill because it would be important in terms of the testing 
of the legislation.  
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S – Are there any specific obstacles that affect your day-to-day 
operations of running the register?  
W – I would not describe in that way. Part of the challenge of any legislation is 
helping people to understand it, and the sort of issue that I outlined to you about 
people erring on the side of caution, making client declarations that they do not 
need to make because that is not required by the legislation. What I have done is 
taken legislation and turned it into what I hope is accessible guidance. You can 
read the guidance and that ought to give you sufficient information to be able to, 
first of all, register, and then to make your declarations in an informed way. But 
human beings are human beings. There will always be misunderstandings and so 
on. Part of my role is to listen to those misunderstandings and if necessary update 
my guidance, and I have done that. I issued some initial registration guidance 
ahead of the opening of the register, and we updated it in the course of the last 
year. 
S – You find out things as you go along that you had not initially 
contemplated? 
W – Yes. I have been able to—based on experience—provide more rich guidance. 
The guidance is better guidance now. I have not changed anything, but I have 
enriched it to make it more understandable. I think the best example is one I have 
already given you which is trying to help people to understand in what 
circumstances a client declaration needs to be made. There is quite a lot of scope 
in any legislation, and this is no exception for misunderstandings. People read 
something, they read my guidance, the Act and they say: ‘we think it means this’.  
For example, if an organisation was to draft a letter and the letter says: ‘Dear 
Minister. Just to let you know about this particular piece of proposed legislation. 
We don't think it’s a very good idea for X, Y, Z reasons. We'd like to have a 
meeting with you. Signed X’. Now the letter is written by the consultant lobbyist, 
but it is signed by their client, so the letter is not registerable. If it was signed by 
the lobbyist, it would be. However, in most cases, it is signed by the client, so it 
is not registerable. A common misunderstanding at the outset was ‘we drafted the 
letter. Therefore, it's registerable’. No, it is not. The letter might be written by you 
but it has actually been signed by your client, so the letter itself is not registerable. 
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But my next question is how did that letter go to the minister? Did it go to the 
minister’s private email address? Answer, ‘yes it did’. What did the email say? Did 
it just say: ‘Dear Minister, please find attached a letter. Yours sincerely, consultant 
lobbyist’. If so, that is not registerable. If the email says: ‘Dear Minister, please 
find attached my letter from our client X Corporate which lays out a number of 
issues to do with this particular Government policy to which we would like you 
to have a meeting’—registerable.  
Basically, it is not my role to say what is a loophole or what is right or wrong or 
what should be different. It is my role to take the legislation as it is and interpret 
it and then make sure that organisations conform to it and so you can see for just 
that brief explanation, there is lots of scope for this interpretation. Not because 
people are setting out to get around it: actually, most people want to do the right 
thing, but sometimes it is quite easy to misinterpret it or misunderstand it or get 
confused by it. This is why I have made myself very accessible in order to make 
sure that organisations are able to understand what it is, and if they do not 
understand, I would much rather they came and talked to me about it. I have had 
bags of small meetings. Lots of people will send me a letter and ask ‘is this 
registerable?’ or send me an email describing a meeting that took place and say ‘Is 
this registerable?’.  
S – Are they concerned about the confidentiality of the information 
they are sending you? 
W – Not with me because I think probably I have built a reputation, hopefully, 
of being somebody that can be relied on. I do not talk about individual registrant 
issues to anybody else (apart from the office of course).  
S – You are building that rapport with them to be more accessible, 
and you are known for being accessible so that they feel like they can 
talk to you?  
W – Yes, I have set out to make myself accessible rather than remote because I 
found that enables people to be able to conform better. If they feel they can 
approach me about anything they are confused about, it is much better that they 
are encouraged to do that rather than me standing and saying ‘that is a far too 
small issue for me to be engaged with’. I would rather they came and asked 
Appendix – Interview  
10 
because if they are not sure, they will probably make a mistake. It is better for 
them not to make a mistake.  
S – How have you reached out to them to show that you are 
accessible? 
W – Well, it is over a period of time. I have worked with individual organisations, 
and through that behaviour, they have learnt that they can come and talk to me. 
I have spoken to lots of organisations on the phone, and I have addressed all sorts 
of meetings, sometimes meetings of partners of individual firms. I address the 
compliance officers of the lobbying trade bodies. I have spoken at all sorts of 
different events. I go to meetings of the APPC (Association of Professional 
Political Consultants) and the PRCA (Public Relations and Communications 
Association) and other bodies. We have an annual stakeholder event as well. 
I will also mention something of interest which is not in the question. One of the 
big issues of any legislation is the cost of conformance. If you are going to be on 
the register the whole year, it will cost you a thousand pounds. For some smaller 
organisations, that is a big issue because if you do not generate very much in the 
way of cashflow; paying to join the register is a big issue. This was an issue which 
engaged ministers during the time the legislation was going onto the statute book. 
If organisations, particularly small organisations, cannot afford to join the register, 
then potentially the organisations that they provide services for, would not be 
able to receive those services thus endangering democracy. One of the things that 
I have done as Registrar is to implement an instalment paying plan to help those 
who cannot afford to write a cheque for a thousand pounds as a lump sum. That 
is one cost of conformance.  
The bigger cost of conformance, however, in my view is the processes that an 
organisation needs to put in place in order to make sure they can capture all the 
necessary information to enable them to comply. If you are a big organisation 
with lots of partners, you have to have processes in place which capture all the 
activities that your partners are doing with ministers, in order that you as 
compliance officer can make sure that they are registered. That means that you 
have to put in place appropriate processes to make sure your organisation 
complies across the board. If you are a ‘one man band’, there is only you to worry 
about. If you have got 50 partners, or if you are PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers) 
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you could have a hundred or a thousand partners, and all of them have to comply 
and all your other staff as well. Therefore, you have to have appropriate 
procedures in place which enable that compliance to be not only in place but also 
evidenced, and that can be expensive. Additionally, now for these big 
organisations not only is there the UK register, but the Government of Scotland 
is putting in place lobbying legislation. I have been asked to respond to a 
consultation that the Welsh Government is doing about potential lobbying 
legislation, and there is already lobbying legislation in the Republic of Ireland. 
Organisations that are UK-wide or international will potentially have to conform 
to a number of different regimes all of which will require a separate compliance 
procedures.  
I am meeting the lobbying Registrar of Scotland in January (2017) so that he and 
I can discuss together whether or not there is anything that we can do between 
us that will help to reduce the cost of compliance for registrants. I do not know 
what those might be yet because I have not had the discussion. I am very aware 
that the cost of compliance can be very intrusive or difficult for organisations 
(particularly large ones) than just paying the annual fee.  
S – How can you help them with their costs of compliance? 
W – The difficulty is that there is no requirement for me or on certain regimes to 
do so. The regime in Ireland is entirely different than the UK regime, and the 
Scottish Bill appears to require different things too. The more complexity there 
is (and the Irish regime is a very complex thing: it looks to me that the Scottish 
regime is complex in a different way) the more information that you wish to 
collect, the more difficulties for the cost of compliance.  
S – If legislation were to cover not only consultant lobbyists but also 
in-house lobbyists, how might this affect costs? 
W – I do not know how much extra it would cost. Now that the register is set up, 
the ongoing running costs are just over a quarter million pounds a year. In order 
for me to do what is set out in that list of objectives, it costs about a quarter of a 
million pounds a year. The more information that is required to be collected, the 
more staff, the more IT and the more of everything else will be required. The 
more you want to collect and publish the higher the cost. I cannot tell you how 
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many extra fields would result in another member of staff. I know we have got 
about one hundred thirty registrants, a fairly small number. In order to be able to 
make sure that the register is correct, the team is fully engaged. The team does 
not sit around twiddling its thumbs. They recognise that their top priority is 
keeping the register correct and up to date and at the end of the quarter when the 
returns come in, that is a very very busy period at the end of the year when we 
have to collect the annual registration fee. If more information is required such 
as that proposed by the private member’s bill (the Lobbying Transparency Bill 
2016/17) in the House of Lords (introduction of a Code of Conduct and 
requiring in-house lobbyists to register), there would have to be a complete 
rethink about how the register works. I am not saying that we would have to start 
again, but certainly, the technical solution, the guidance and the general approach 
will all have to be reviewed and revised. 
S – Even your objectives? These five? 
W – I think the core would be the same, but I could not say that those objectives 
would still be relevant in a context of new legislation. They would have to be 
reviewed in that context. The technical solutions would have to be reviewed; 
although the technical solution we have got is expandable. If it was just a question 
of adding extra fields, we could add extra fields relatively cost effectively. But we 
know enough from experience, that quite often, if you start asking people to do 
things they have never done before, that will require quite a long process to get 
them up to speed with the changes, particularly now that they are used to doing 
it in a certain way. If they were required to do it in a different way it would 
probably take some time to get them up to speed to make sure that happened 
without error. 
S – Could you imagine any of the existing problems being 
exacerbated by broader legislation? 
W – Well I think what would happen is that there would have to be a new process 
of education. I do not know whether it would be possible to say we just need to 
do a bit of updating to the guidance, and we need to add a few extra fields, or 
whether we would have to say this guidance is now irrelevant. Whether we have 
to start again so that everybody has to tear up everything they have done and start 
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doing something different, I do not know the answer to that. The other thing is 
that they might not want me to do it. If they dispensed with the current legislation 
introduced new legislation they might not want me to do what was required. 
S – Is it the case that anything new is going to be hard to begin with, 
but if you have got the right sort of person who is being accessible, 
over time those problems will go away? 
W – Yes. I have found that works well, but nobody handed me a guidebook and 
said you need to do this. I did not get any guidance from anybody. They just let 
me get on with it. When I became Registrar, I inherited a couple of civil servants, 
one of whom had been in their post for a few weeks and one who joined the same 
day as me. I just read the legislation and took it from there. 
S – Do you think that lack of guidance is a problem?  
W – It was not for me. I had to attend a pre-appointment scrutiny hearing. I was 
examined on my capabilities to be able to set something up from scratch. You do 
not get much more scratch than here is an Act of Parliament and go. So, I would 
like to think that I have had some modest success in doing what I was required 
to do.  
S – If there was a code of conduct, would that change your role 
significantly? 
W – Yes, the Act does not say very much. All it says is that one of the things the 
registrants are required to do is to declare whether or not they subscribe to a 
relevant code conduct. I have defined relevant as being relevant to lobbying. 
However, what the industry has said to me is that it cannot be a relevant code of 
conduct if it only applies to a single organisation because if there is not any kind 
of compliance and enforcement process associated with the code, then it cannot 
be a relevant code. For example, if you sign up to the Association of Professional 
Political Consultants as a member then you have to subscribe to their code of 
conduct. If you breach that code and then they can expel you from membership 
and so their view is that if that cannot happen, you cannot declare a code of 
conduct to be relevant because it is not. 
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S – It is only relevant if you can expel someone? 
W – Yes, that is their view. I am currently conducting consultations on that. One 
of the things that I have included in the consultation was if there was to be a 
voluntary code associated with the register, who should define that voluntary code 
and who should enforce it because I do not have any statutory powers to do that. 
I do not know what the response of the respondents would be to that. It will be 
interesting to see what they have to say. I will publish the outcome of that in due 
course.  
S – If you had powers to set up a code of conduct and enforce it, what 
difficulties do you think you can envisage with that — ie, more 
funding, more resources?  
W – It is a bit like the APPC. They have a code of conduct. If someone 
complained to the APPC that a member had breached their voluntary code, then 
they have to have an enforcement process. There would have to be an 
investigation and, presumably, a hearing. I am not entirely sure what their code 
says, but somebody would need to adjudicate on whether or not there was a 
breach of their code or not. If there was a breach of that code, what would the 
penalty be? Resources would need to be put in place for those. 
S – How do you think raising the funds to cover broader statute might 
work?  
W – I think that has to be a political decision. The Scottish Government is doing 
it at the taxpayers’ expense, and the UK Government has decided that industry 
would cover the cost. For the UK, the cost is set by secondary legislation. 
Ministers decide on the legislation, they decide on the legislative framework, and 
it is the legislative framework that decides how many registrants there are. My 
responsibility is to interpret, implement and enforce the legislation and to collect 
the fees that the ministers decide should be paid. The income will be what it is. It 
is a function of (A) the legislation and (B) the cost of joining the register. 
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S – Do you think that if there was a charge on in-house lobbyists, that 
would cover the costs of a broadened register? 
W – It depends what your objective is. If your objective is to increase the number 
of registrants, then you have to change the legislation. Basically, the number of 
registrants is a function of what the legislation says. So yes, if you wanted more 
people on the register then you could include in-house lobbyists, or you could 
include special advisors, or you could include MPs, there is all sorts of things you 
could do, but that's a political decision. 
S – If the legislation were broadened to cover in-house lobbyists, then 
practically, is it possible to broaden or change the system of 
charging? 
W – Yes but you cannot disaggregate if the legislation were changed, all the other 
things. There would have to be new guidance, a new technical system and so on, 
all the things we have been talking about.  
S – What are the difficulties in taking payments? 
W – Well, in this day and age, people expect to be able to pay a Bacs transfer, by 
cheque, or by credit card depending on what methodology is most suitable for 
them, which means we have to provide all those facilities to enable them, and that 
means that we end up on the receiving end of having to deal with putting practical 
systems in place and making sure they work. You would have thought that 24/7 
payment providers would work 24/7, 365 days a year. Regrettably, one of them 
went on holiday between Christmas and New Year last year, and until they came 
back, the problem that had been caused by somebody leaving an apostrophe out 
or something, one of the algorithms, could not be resolved until they came back 
to work after the Christmas break.  
S – There are different systems that you have to use for different 
payment methods? 
W – Yes. It is in order to be able to get the money into the Cabinet Office’s bank 
account basically. What happens, is that my officials have to become experts in 
dealing with some of the practicalities of handling money because that is what we 
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are required to do. We have to collect cash, that is our responsibility, so we have 
to we have to find methodologies to enable us to collect cash. 
S – Can it not just be one centralised system to deal with all types of 
payments? 
W – Across all Government departments? Wouldn’t that be nice? Couldn't there 
just be one recruitment system? Couldn’t there just be one any system?  
S – You mentioned before that you met with other regulators; do you 
think lessons can be learnt from them for regulating lobbying? 
W – The lady who was appointed by the Irish Government to regulate lobbying 
in Ireland, came from Canada. Her name is Sherry Perreault. The Irish system is 
actually quite a complex system; she was a central player in the Canadian lobbying 
system, and they went to Canada to get somebody to implement their lobbying 
system.  
S – Is there anything you learnt from her that could make what you 
do more efficient, or does it not apply because it is different statute 
involved?  
W – It is less of an issue for Ireland because it is a different country than it is for 
Scotland (in that it is part of the UK). The predominant issue is, particularly, if 
the Welsh and Northern Ireland governments go for their own legislation, you 
potentially could have four different regimes where the same organisations have 
to collect four different sets of information and that, to me, I think it is incumbent 
on the regulators to try to work together as best they can to alleviate the 
compliance burden on registrants because I can see that being in due course a 
very difficult situation for organisations. However, there is not anything in the 
legislation that requires any of us to do that.  
S – That is the main issue then with regard to dealing with other 
regulators? Rather than learning broad lessons from other 
regulators? 
W – Well it is because it is all new. It has not yet happened. What is happening is 
that each of the governments are potentially drawing up their own requirements 
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in isolation of what has happened elsewhere and there was a discussion about 
this. I attended a conference in November of last year which involved Scottish 
policymakers, MPs, academics and regulators. There was a discussion around the 
table about these issues. It was run by the University of Stirling. 
S – APPGs are increasingly in the spotlight with regard to lobbying, 
I heard that you have been conducting some work in regard to them. 
W – I am doing an investigation of those organisations that provide support 
services for APPGs. There are a lot of APPGs, and they keep changing and 
creating new ones. There are about six hundred and fifty. I went through the 
whole list and looked to see who was providing their support services and then 
looked to see whether they were registered. I came up with a combination of 
providers of services on my register and declaring clients; on my register and not 
declaring clients; and not on my register. I have been working my way through all 
of them to establish what the nature of the services are that they are providing 
and whether or not they need to be registered, and if they do need to be registered, 
how they need to be registered. That is not finished yet. I am still working through 
that. 
S – How do you find out? Do you have to contact them directly and 
ask ‘what is it that you’re doing?’ 
W – Yes. For the ones on the register, it is quite easy because we have all their 
details. For the ones that are not on my register, you have to communicate with 
them through publicly available channels. In some cases, some of them do not 
have websites. To find their contact details, I use publicly available sources of 
information, internet searches, Companies House, etc. 
S – How many have not complied who are on the register? 
W – Part of the issue is that I have not issued guidance for providers of services 
to APPGs. This has been much more of an investigative, educational type of 
project as far as existing registrants is concerned. The more interesting area of 
study for me, is those organisations that are not on my register. Whether or not 
some of the activities that they are pursuing, might involve direct communications 
with ministers which would bring them into the need to be registered, I have not 
arrived at a conclusion on that yet, but it is an interesting area of study. 
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S – Are they being helpful?  
W – Yes, nobody is being obstructive. Some of them need to be shown why it is 
important to be cooperative; sometimes I have to be firm. Sometimes they think 
that perhaps I will just go away, but I do not because that is my statutory 
obligation.  
Interview Concluded. 
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